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2ABSTRACT
New Kids on the European Block:
Finnish and Swedish Adaptation to the European Union?
Jennifer Leigh Novack 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
University of London
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD in International Relations
This thesis examines Finnish and Swedish membership in the European Union 
since the two Nordic countries joined (along with Austria) in January 1995 to 
become “new kids on the European block.” The author compares the strategies 
that national decision-makers have pursued in EU policy-making to assess the 
nature and extent of their adaptation to the European Union. This analysis relies 
on case studies of three policy areas: 1) Economic and Monetary Union (with a 
focus on the decision on whether or not to adopt the Euro in the first wave); 2) 
relations with non-EU neighbours in Northern Europe (with particular attention 
given to EU enlargement and the Northern Dimension Initiative); and 3) public 
access to documents. Although the thesis concentrates primarily on empirical 
analysis, it also provides a theoretical critique. The author argues that differences 
in the historical backgrounds, institutions, cultures, and identities of Finland and 
Sweden have led to differences in their approaches to the EU. The thesis presents 
a challenge to existing theoretical frameworks that leave little or no room for the 
four factors that are emphasised here, with particular attention given to the 
approaches of Andrew Moravcsik (1998) and Christine Ingebritsen (1998).
3TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract 2
Table of Contents 3
Acknowledgements 5
Abbreviations 8
Section I: The Backdrop
Chapter One: Introduction 12
Constructing a Thesis 14
The Continuing Relevance of the State? 15
Theory and Research Design 18
A Niche of Its Own? 29
Chapter Two: A Theoretical Critique 31
A Critique of Existing Approaches 31
Towards the Construction of a New Framework 63
Chapter Three: Meet Two New Kids on the European Block 70
Two Similar “Kids” 71
Two Different “Kids” 92
Consequences for this Study 139
Section II: The Empirical Evidence
Chapter Four: Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 143
Two Similar Approaches 143
Two Different Approaches 152
Analysis and Conclusion 168
4Chapter Five: Relations with Non-EU Neighbours in Northern Europe 173 
Two Similar Approaches 173
Two Different Approaches 186
Analysis and Conclusion 196
Chapter Six: Public Access to Documents 200
Two Similar Approaches 200
Two Different Approaches 211
Analysis and Conclusion 222
Section III: What It All Means
Chapter Seven: Conclusion: Finnish and Swedish Adaptation to the European 
Union? 227
Two Similar Countries 228
Two Different Countries 230
Empirical Conclusions about Finnish and Swedish Adaptation 233
Methodological and Theoretical Findings 236
In Conclusion 240
Bibliography 242
Appendix 272
Table of Finnish Prime Ministers 1917-2000 272
Table of Finnish Presidents 1919-2000 273
Table of Swedish Prime Ministers 1905-2000 274
Map of Sweden about 1658 275
Map of Modem Finland 276
Map of Modem Sweden 277
5Acknowledgements
There are many individuals and groups without whose guidance and support this 
PhD thesis would never have been a reality. My co-supervisors John Madeley and 
Paul Taylor provided constructive criticism and support throughout the process. I 
am particularly appreciative of their continued faith in my abilities and their 
patience as my thesis topic evolved. My thanks also go to Erik Ringmar, who 
stood in for John Madeley for a year while he was on leave. I would also like to 
thank the participants (both the faculty members and the research students) in the 
doctoral workshops in which I participated in the European Institute, the 
Government Department, and the International Relations Department at the 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). They not only gave 
their comments on draft chapters of my thesis but also provided stimulating 
academic discussions that often provided inspiration for writing and research as 
well as a sense of community. As the list of individuals at LSE whose support I 
wish to acknowledge would be too long to list here, I hope that all of those to 
whom I am indebted will feel themselves included in this statement.
I was fortunate during my time as a PhD student that I had a second academic 
“home” in the Political Science Department at Stockholm University, which 
welcomed me into their fold during the academic year 1997-1998 and the summer 
of 1999. Again, there were so many individuals in the department who shared 
their ideas and suggestions that it would not be possible to list them. Both the 
faculty and the students succeeded in making me feel welcome in their 
department, and the courses and workshops in which I had the opportunity to 
participate made a definite contribution to my thesis. I was also able to meet 
academics in Finland and to participate in doctoral workshops organised by Lauri 
Karvonen and Jan Sundberg in Helsinki and in Turku, where I was able to present 
my own research. To all of those in the academic community in Finland who 
shared their insights I am also grateful.
I was also fortunate in that I was able to meet a variety of Swedish researchers, 
including those based outside Stockholm University. A particularly vital aspect of
6my time in Sweden was my participation in the Swedish Network for European 
Research in Political Science, which included me in their meetings even when I 
was once again based in the UK. Through the network I was able to meet 
researchers (located throughout the country) who shared their own research with 
me and gave their comments on mine. At meetings in Gothenburg, Stockholm, 
Umea, and Uppsala, I presented drafts of my research on which I received 
particularly useful comments, as the participants gave thorough attention to my 
writing and to providing me with constructive criticism.
I would also like to thank the participants at other conferences and meetings, who 
provided useful insights. These include those whom I met at the European 
Community Studies Association Biennial International Conference in Pittsburgh, 
PA, USA; the Finnish Institute for International Affairs Research Seminar on the 
Northern Dimension in Helsinki, Finland; the Nordic Political Science 
Association Conference in Uppsala, Sweden; the Political Studies Association 
Conference in London, UK; the Young Academics Seminars at the Finnish 
Institute in London, UK; and several meetings organised by the University 
Association of Contemporary European Studies. On a related note, there are 
several groups that I would like to thank for making my attendance at conferences 
and meetings possible through their financial support. These include the Finnish 
Institute for International Affairs, the LSE International Relations Department, the 
LSE Postgraduate Travel Fund, the Swedish Network for European Research in 
Political Science, and the University Association for Contemporary European 
Studies.
I would also like to extend my sincere appreciation to the many policy-makers in 
Finland, Sweden, and the UK who offered their time to discuss their experiences, 
expertise, and views with me. These ranged from brief chats following speeches to 
interviews lasting in excess of two hours; to all I am extremely grateful. 
Furthermore, I would like to thank the staff of the many libraries I used for their 
assistance, particularly those at the Leybum Library at Washington and Lee 
University in Lexington, VA, USA who went beyond their normal obligations to 
ensure that the months that I spent in Virginia were successful.
7On a personal level, there are also many individuals whom I would like to thank 
for helping to make this thesis possible. In addition to friends who provided both 
support for my research and (at times) distractions, my extended family deserves 
thanks for their support. I am particularly indebted to my parents without whose 
support my thesis would never have become a reality. Throughout the process 
they continued to believe in my competence and were steadfast in their support. 
Others in the family, including my grandparents, also took an interest in my 
studies and provided support. I would also like to thank my family-through- 
marriage. They have contributed much more than simply providing me with 
places to stay in Finland (and Stockport) and the opportunity to use and improve 
my Finnish and Swedish language skills. They have welcomed me into the Alanko 
clan (despite my continued use of the Novack name) and given me a second 
family.
Above all, however, I would like to acknowledge the constant support and 
encouragement provided by my husband Mika. Not only did he spend many days 
following me around Helsinki and Stockholm waiting in libraries or on park 
benches while I conducted interviews in ministries or met with academics. He also 
read many drafts of my thesis and stayed up with me to discuss my research on 
nights when I thought so much about my PhD that I could not fall asleep. He gave 
me the opportunity to use Finnish and Swedish on a daily basis and prepared 
gourmet dinners for me at the times that I most needed them. His love and 
encouragement provided the inspiration necessary to complete the thesis.
Despite the considerable support that I received from countless individuals, the 
final responsibility for this thesis rests with me, the author.
Jennifer Leigh Novack
8Abbreviations
AC Arctic Council
AVF (Swedish) Conservative Party (AUmanna Valmansfdrfundet)
BEAC Barents Euro-Arctic Council
BEAR Barents Euro-Arctic Region
BF (Swedish) Farmers’ Federation (Bondefdrbundet)
C (Swedish) Centre Party (Centerpartiet)
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CBSS Council of the Baltic Sea States
CEECs Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
COARM (Council of Ministers’) Working Group on Conventional Arms
Export
COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives
CP Comparative Politics
CPP Comparative Public Policy
DG Directorate-General
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC European Community
ECB European Central Bank
ECJ European Court of Justice
ECOFIN Council of Financial and Economic Ministers
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EEA European Economic Area
EEC European Economic Community
EFTA European Free Trade Area
EMI European Monetary Institute
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EP European Parliament
ERM Exchange Rate Mechanism
EU European Union
9FCMA Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (Sopimus
ystavyydesta, yhteistoiminnasta ja  keskinaisesta avunannosta 
Suomen tasavallan ja  Sosialistisen Neuvostotasavaltain Liiton 
valilld)
FF (Swedish) Independent Liberal Party (.Frisinnade Folkpartiet)
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNP Gross National Product
HI Historical Institutionalism
HICI History, Institutions, Culture, and Identity
IFI International Financial Institution
IGC Intergovernmental Conference
IKL (Finnish) Patriotic People’s Party (Isanmaallinen Kansanliike)
INTERREG Inter Regional 
IPE International Political Economy
IR International Relations
ISPA Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession
KD (Swedish) Christian Democratic Party (Kristdemokraterna)
KE (Finnish) National Progressive Party {Kansallinen Edistyspuolue)
KESK The Centre Party of Finland (Suomen Keskusta, or Keskustapuolue
1962-1987)
KOK (Finnish) National Coalition Party (Conservative Party)
{Kansallinen Kokoomus)
LRF Federation of Swedish Farmers {Lantbrukarnas Riksforbund)
LKP (Finnish) Liberal People’s Party (Liberaalinen Kansanpuolue)
LO (Swedish) Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisationen)
LSP (Swedish) Liberal Party {Liberala Samlingspartiei)
M The (Swedish) Moderate Party (Conservative Party) {Moderata
Samlingspartiei)
MEP Member of the European Parliament
MFA Ministry for Foreign Affairs
ML (Finnish) Agrarian Party (Maalaisliitto)
MTK The (Finnish) Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest
Owners {Maa- ja  Metsataloustuottajain Keskusliitto)
10
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NC Nordic Council
NCM Nordic Council of Ministers
ND Northern Dimension
NDI Northern Dimension Initiative
NEFCO Nordic Environment Finance Cooperation
NEI (United States’) Northern European Initiative
NIB Nordic Investment Bank
NOPF Nordic Project Fund
NUORS Young Finns Party (Nuorsuomalaiset)
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PHARE Poland, Hungary: Assistance for Economic Restructuring
(Pologne, Hongrie: Assistance a la Reconstruction Economique) 
PR Permanent Representation
PS (Finnish) Ordinary Finns (Party) (Perussuomalaiset)
SACO The Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (Sveriges
Akademikers Centralorganisation)
SAF Swedish Employer’s Association (Svenska Arbetsgivarefdrening)
SAK Finnish Federation of Trade Unions (Suomen Ammattiliittojen
Keskusjarjesto)
SAP (Swedish) Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokratiska
Arbetarepartiet)
SAPARD Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural
Development
SD or SDP Finnish Social Democratic Party {Suomen Sosiaalidemokraattinen
Puolue)
SFP (Finnish) Swedish People’s Party (Svenska Folkpartiet)
SKDL Finnish People’s Democratic League {Suomen Kansan
Demokraattinen Liitto)
SKL Finnish Christian League {Suomen Kristillinen Liitto)
SKP Finnish Communist Party {Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue) or
Swedish Communist Party {Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti)
SKYP Finnish People’s Unity Party {Suomen Kansan Yhtenaisyyspuolue)
11
SMP Finnish Rural Party («Suomen Maaseudun Puolue)
SUOMAL Finnish Party (Suomalainen Puolue)
TACIS Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
TCO The Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees
(Tjanstemannens Centralorganisation)
TEU Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty)
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
US or USA United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V (Swedish) Left Party (Vansterpartiet)
VAS (Finnish) Left Wing Alliance ( Vasemmistoliitto)
VIHR (Finnish) Green League ( Vihrealiitto)
WEU Western European Union
WTO World Trade Organization
12
SECTION I: THE BACKDROP 
Chapter One: Introduction
On the first day of January 1995 something happened that had never taken place 
before. On that day (or actually on the following day since the first was a holiday) 
Finns and Swedes (as well as Austrians) began to assume their positions in the 
institutions of the European Union (EU) as full members.2 There were, for 
instance, Finns and Swedes who, for the first time, had the opportunity to have a 
voice in the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament (EP), and the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). Finns and Swedes filled the bureaucracy of the 
European Commission, and Erkki Liikanen and Anita Gradin assumed their 
positions as the first Commissioners from Finland and Sweden respectively. In 
addition, Finnish and Swedish leaders had the opportunity to represent their 
countries at upcoming European Council summits.
Finland and Sweden were, as the title of this thesis indicates, “new kids on the 
European block.” This meant not only that Finns and Swedes needed to learn how 
to navigate their way through the physical mazes of the buildings of the EU 
institutions. They also needed, at least to some extent, to adapt to the EU’s 
decision-making processes by making changes to their pre-existing methods. The 
negotiators in the Permanent Representations (PRs), the national ministers who 
then joined the Council of Ministers, and other national representatives working in 
“Brussels” (as the EU collectively is often termed) required instructions from their 
national capitals about how to behave.
1 The author has presented or published pieces that rely in part on previous drafts of this PhD 
thesis. These include Novack (1998, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2000a, 2000b, 2001), which are 
included in the bibliography. Furthermore, although the author’s 1996 long essay for the MSc in 
European Studies provided background information on public access to documents in Sweden and 
the EU upon which this thesis could build, that essay does not constitute a part of this thesis. 
Rather, this thesis relies on original research.
2 Although the concern here is with the EU, mention is made at times of its predecessors, the the 
European Community (EC) and the European Economic Community (EEC). For further 
information on the EU’s development, see, for instance, Holland (1994), Stirk (1996), and Taylor 
(1996).
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In Helsinki and Stockholm, policy-makers had to plan their strategies and 
formulate their national EU policies. All government ministries were affected, and 
significant national adaptations were required in order to ensure that Finns and 
Swedes were able to deal with their new responsibilities as EU members. There 
was EU legislation that Finland and Sweden had to transcribe and implement, at 
the same time that they obtained the opportunity to influence the development of 
new legislation. Although membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) 
had already required considerable national adaptation, full EU membership 
provided new responsibilities as well as, for the first time, a full voice in the EU’s 
institutions.
During the time period on which this research focuses (from 1 January 1995 to 31 
December 2000), Finland and Sweden were members (along with Austria) of the 
most recent cohort to join the European Union. This was a step that required not 
only the physical movement of many Finns and Swedes to Brussels but also 
adaptation in the Finnish and Swedish national institutions. In a sense, the two 
Nordic neighbours, with a history of neutrality, were not only new kids on the 
European block but also new kids on the European bloc, giving the title of this 
thesis a double meaning. Although formal security guarantees were not given to 
the new members (or, indeed, to any EU members) and the EU “bloc” was 
different in its nature from the blocs of the Cold War era, there were strong 
political bonds formed between the new members and their EU colleagues. In fact, 
the EU between 1995 and 2000 was increasing cooperation among its members in 
ways that suggested that it was becoming a bloc of increasingly allied countries, 
perhaps even in the sense of being a security club, providing at least “Soft” non- 
military if not “Hard” military-based security. Although the EU was not a 
military grouping in the same way as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) or even the Western European Union (WEU), actions such as the 
establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) suggested that it 
had at least taken a step along that path.
3 For more on “Hard” and “Soft” security, see Archer (2001). He also discusses the terms “hard” 
and “soft” security, which relate to the ease of achievement, and, indeed, the type of security 
provided by the EU might be termed “soft” as well as “Soft.”
14
Constructing a Thesis
This PhD thesis centres on an analysis of Finnish and Swedish adaptation to the 
EU through a detailed analysis of the national formulation of EU policies in three 
different policy areas. Although the focus is on empirical case studies regarding 
policy formulation, the thesis also provides a theoretical critique of existing 
approaches to the study of national EU policy formulation.
The thesis is organised into three sections. The first section, entitled “The 
Backdrop,” of which this chapter forms a part, consists of three chapters and sets 
the stage for the later two sections. This first chapter introduces the topic. After 
this discussion of the contents and structure of the thesis, it continues with a 
discussion of the use of the state as the primary unit of analysis, the selection of 
the particular countries and policy areas, and other methodological issues. The 
second chapter consists of a theoretical critique of existing theoretical literature as 
well as the presentation of a new approach to explaining the formulation of 
national EU policies. The third and final chapter of Section I provides an 
introduction to the two countries that are the focus of this study: Finland and 
Sweden.
With the backdrop having been provided in the first section, the second (given the 
name “The Empirical Evidence”) consists of the empirical case studies that lie at 
the heart of the thesis. These studies focus on three very different policy areas, 
with one chapter devoted to each policy area. The areas are, in the order of 
presentation: Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), relations with non-EU 
Northern European neighbours, and public access to documents. Chapters four, 
five, and six consist of an analysis of Finnish and Swedish policy formulation in 
the three policy areas. These examinations are intended to provide the evidence 
necessary for conclusions to be made about the extent and nature of Finnish and 
Swedish adaptation to the EU from a comparative perspective. As is discussed 
later in the current chapter, each policy area has been selected to provide a 
different perspective on Finnish and Swedish adaptation to the European Union.
15
Together they give a good overview of how Finnish and Swedish EU policies 
developed between 1995 and 2000.
The final section, given the name “What It All Means,” consists of one concluding 
chapter. Here, the empirical data presented in the three preceding chapters is 
reconsidered as a coherent whole, along with the theoretical material from the 
second chapter and the background information about Finland and Sweden 
presented in the third chapter. The empirical and theoretical consequences are 
elaborated, and an evaluation is made of the nature and extent of Finnish and 
Swedish adaptation to the EU.
The Continuing Relevance of the State?
In fact, this focus throughout the thesis on two states as the primary actors may be 
one of the most striking aspects of the approach used here. The decision to 
concentrate on states as actors may appear strange at a time when, as Alan S. 
Milward (2000: 1) points out, “[i]t is now commonly argued” that the nation-state 
“has had its day,” especially in Western Europe. Even Milward (2000: 1) (himself 
an advocate of the continuing importance of the nation-state) asserts, discussion 
about European unification “has been accompanied by real changes in political 
structures, whose proclaimed purpose has been to bring that unity nearer.” Indeed, 
he explains, “Changes have occurred since 1945 which give citizens of European 
countries real cause to ask whether national government, which has so long 
shaped the basic organizational framework within which they live, will continue 
to do so” (Milward 2000: 1).
In the final years of the twentieth century, competence was continuing to be 
transferred from the governments and parliaments of the member states to the EU, 
and even interest groups were increasingly working at the EU level and 
transnationally. In the final years of the twentieth century, power was increasingly 
moving from the national capitals to Brussels at the same time that subnational 
and transnational regions were assuming an increasing role in the European and 
international arenas. Even in the EU itself, there was an acknowledgement of the
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role of regions through the structural funds, which were based on regions, as well 
as, of course, the Committee of the Regions. Scholars such as Liesbet Hooghe and 
Gary Marks (1997: 38) were arguing for a “multilevel governance” model rather 
than a “state-centric” one for studying the European Union. In fact, theories, such 
as those from Comparative Politics (CP) and Comparative Public Policy (CPP), 
that were once applied to states were, in the latter part of the twentieth century, 
being applied to the EU, which was viewed as increasingly state-like (Hix 1998: 
70).
One may rightly argue that the EU was becoming increasingly state-like between 
1995 and 2000, the time period on which this study concentrates, and that 
subnational and transnational actors were becoming increasingly important. There 
were, however, still a vital position and role for the individual EU member states. 
In fact, Milward (2000: 3) argues that “without the process of integration the west 
European nation-state might well not have retained the allegiance and support of 
its citizens in the way that it has.” Indeed, the fifteen member states of the EU 
were all members in their own right. For instance, tiny Luxembourg was a full 
member with its own Commissioner, whereas Catalonia and Scotland, both 
considerably larger in both land area and population, were only members through 
Spain and the United Kingdom (UK) and did not have their own Commissioners. 
Although voting in the Council of Ministers was weighted based on population, 
the ministers were representatives from the national level and voted on behalf of 
their states as a whole. The Presidency of the Council was held by each member 
state in turn for six months. Here again, Luxembourg received privileges and 
responsibilities not afforded to Catalonia and Scotland. Furthermore, the European 
Council was comprised of representatives of the member states at the national 
level.
There was an acknowledgement by many scholars, including those studying the 
EU, of the continued importance of the state as an actor. Swedish researcher 
Bengt Jacobsson (1999: 120-123) argues that internationalisation and
Europeanisation have paradoxically strengthened national actors. He asserts that 
this process takes place through exchanges with other actors in the European and 
international arenas; individual states attempt to create a unified position that they
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can present to the outside world, including the European Union. Swedes Magnus 
Ekengren and Bengt Sundelius (1998: 142) also note this effect of EU 
membership on its member states. They argue, for instance, that since Sweden 
became an EU member “Swedish officials in CFSP have had to make their 
positions more concrete” and “have had to formulate positions in international 
controversies, where Sweden traditionally did not articulate an official view” 
(Ekengren and Sundelius 1998: 142). Finnish political scientists Tapio Raunio and 
Matti Wiberg (2001: 73) assert, “The central role of civil servants at all stages of 
EU decision-making creates pressures for policy coordination, at least on key 
national questions.” In a publication from the Finnish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, Niilo Jaaskinen (1997: 50) explains, “[F]or the protection of national 
interests of the member state, it is vital that its conduct in the EU decision-making 
process is both co-ordinated and efficient. On all levels and all stages of decision­
making it must have a consistent and uniform negotiating position. It is very 
damaging to the influence of a member state not to have a clear position at the 
time when the substantive content of the act is decided, a time which for several 
issues may be quite early in the preparatory process. Similarly damaging is to 
have its different representatives present different positions on the same matter.”
Along a similar line, Swedish political scientist Karl Magnus Johansson (1999b: 
15) argues that EU membership has made it more difficult to identify individual 
actors within the member states. In other words, attributing a policy decision to a 
particular individual or group has been more difficult, and it may not be practical 
to focus on a level lower than the state. Writing about states in general, Alexander 
Wendt (1999: 221) points out that, although “concrete individuals play an 
essential role in state action, instantiating and carrying it forward,” “state action is 
no more reducible to those individuals than their action is reducible to the neurons 
in the brain.” According to EU-researcher Andrew Moravcsik (1998: 22), “[T]he 
primary political instrument by which individuals and groups in civil society seek 
to influence international negotiations is the nation-state, which acts externally as 
a unitary and rational actor on behalf of its constituents.” There is thus a 
considerable group of scholars who recognise the continuing relevance of the 
state, including in (and in some cases especially in) the context of the European 
Union during the 1990s.
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The focus on the state as the main unit of analysis does not, however, ignore the 
existence of actors on other levels. For instance, Moravcsik (1998: 22) (who uses 
the state as his main unit of analysis) points out that he does “not assume states are 
unitary in their internal politics.” Certain individuals, such as Prime Ministers or 
cabinet members, or groups, such as political parties or trade unions, may have a 
role in shaping national positions. Their influence, however, may not always be 
possible to identify and may vary between policy areas. In no policy area is the 
national position of an EU member state solely the decision of any one individual 
or even any one political party. Furthermore, even when states seem to lose their 
influence or even their sovereignty by transferring competence from the national 
to the EU level, the issue is not always straightforward. For instance, Moravcsik 
(1998), like Milward (2000), sees states as willing participants in the integration 
process, sacrificing their national sovereignty when it is regarded as in their 
interest to do so. Choosing to pool sovereignty can thus be seen as increasing it, 
rather than as a zero-sum game.4
Theory and Research Design
The concern here is with the extent and nature of Finnish and Swedish adaptation 
to the European Union. Although the term “adaptation” is discussed and defined 
in more detail in the next chapter, it is worth making a brief comment on it here. 
While the existing body of literature on adaptation theory is addressed, the term’s 
definition for the purpose of this thesis is more basic than that used by scholars 
such as James Rosenau (1981) and Nikolaj Petersen (1998), whose work is 
considered in the following chapter. Adaptation is taken here to mean a change 
made by national policy-makers as a result of their membership in the European 
Union, often moving national policies and policy-making closer to that found in 
the EU itself and/or in the majority of the other EU member states. As is discussed 
in chapter two, however, adaptation is not a one-sided process; rather, the EU 
adapts to new member states at the same time that new member states adapt to the
4 It should, however, be noted that the definition of the term “sovereignty” is itself controversial, 
particularly in relation to EU member states.
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EU, and the two processes are mutually reinforcing. Despite this 
acknowledgement, the focus here is on the adaptation of the new member states 
rather than of the EU itself. There is, nevertheless, mention of the EU’s responses 
and adaptation at times, such as the inclusion of a publicity principle guaranteeing 
access to information in the Treaty of Amsterdam.
Furthermore, this study is about more than simply adaptation. Rather, there is also 
an attempt to understand why similar states adapt to similar situations in different 
ways at the same time. Thus, in addition to examining adaptation theory, the 
following chapter also includes an analysis of existing studies that concentrate on 
the role of history, institutions, culture, and identity (HICI), which are considered 
to be central explanatory factors here. Competing theoretical approaches are 
critiqued, and a particular challenge is mounted against Moravcsik’s (1998: 6) 
argument for the “primacy of economic interests” as explanatory factors as well as 
Christine Ingebritsen’s (1998) argument for a sectoral approach. Instead, a strong 
argument is presented for the need to consider factors, particularly HICI, which 
are frequently relegated to the background or ignored.
For this study, an important element is the comparative approach. Rather than 
examining one country or one policy area, two countries and three policy areas are 
analysed. The research design that has been employed for this study is a most 
similar systems approach, also known as a study of concomitant variation; in line 
with this research design, two countries with much in common have been selected 
for comparison. As Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune (1970: 33) explain, with a 
most similar systems approach, “[cjommon systemic characteristics are conceived 
of as ‘controlled for,’ whereas intersystemic differences are viewed as explanatory 
variables. The number of common characteristics sought is maximal and the 
number of not shared characteristics sought, minimal.” With this research design, 
“[i]t is anticipated that if some important differences are found among these 
otherwise similar countries, then the number of factors attributable to these 
differences will be sufficiently small to warrant explanation in terms of those 
differences alone” (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 32). They actually suggest 
Finland and Sweden as examples of countries that might be suitable for a most 
similar systems study: “A difference in the intensity of political partisanship
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between Sweden and Finland can be attributed to a smaller number of intersystem 
differences than between Sweden and Japan” (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 32).
Several existing studies of Nordic politics have relied on such a research design. A 
most similar systems approach was behind Ingebritsen’s (1998) study of the 
Nordic countries and European integration. She explains, “I was guided in 
collecting data by the ‘most similar’ case design: here was a group of small, 
export-dependent states, all confronting changes in international politics. Because 
of the compatibility of Danish, Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian, and Swedish 
political systems, the Nordic subregion provides an ideal context for testing 
alternative hypotheses” (Ingebritsen 1998: x). David Arter (1999: 5) also writes of 
the suitability of the Nordic countries for comparison: “Small states, linked by 
geography, a shared history and common linguistic bonds, the Nordic states 
readily lend themselves to comparative analysis.” Ingemar Dorfer (1997) also 
focuses on the Nordic region. He concentrates on a comparison of Finland and 
Sweden, a decision he justifies by noting that both countries are “newcomers to 
European security policy” and “have changed the most since the end of the cold 
war” (Dorfer 1997:14).
Indeed, of all the Nordic countries, Finland and Sweden are particularly suited for 
such a comparison. While Ingebritsen (1998) argues that all five Nordic countries 
are sufficiently similar for such an approach, Finland and Sweden form an even 
more homogeneous combination. In fact, throughout her analysis, Ingebritsen 
(1998) groups Finland and Sweden together and sees no significant differences 
between them. They alone of the Nordic countries joined the European Union on 1 
January 1995. (Denmark was already a member, whereas Iceland and Norway 
remained outside the EU). Finland and Sweden were also the only Nordic 
countries that were not NATO members between 1995 and 2000. Their economic 
structures were also similar, with the forestry and telecommunications industries 
particularly important in both Finland and Sweden. There were also significant 
historical similarities, as both were part of the same country for many centuries. 
As a result of their common history, their institutions had much in common, both 
in terms of physical institutions and institutionalised practices. Their cultures, 
including their political cultures, and even their identities had similar features,
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including a common Nordic culture and identity. These similarities are discussed 
in far more detail in chapter three, where the suitability of these countries for a 
most similar systems research design is substantiated.
The differences between the two countries are also examined in the third chapter, 
since, according to a most similar systems approach, it is these differences that are 
potential explanatory factors for differences in their adaptation (or lack thereof) to 
the EU. The focus is on distinguishing features of their histories, institutions, 
cultures, and identities, which are regarded as the most significant independent 
variables that may explain the different manifestations of the dependent variable 
(the nature and extent of adaptation in the national formulation of their EU 
policies) in Finland and Sweden.
A most similar systems approach stands in contrast to a most different systems 
approach, which is actually the research design preferred by Przeworski and 
Teune (1970). A most different systems approach analyses the same issues in 
different systems. For instance, “[i]f rates of suicide are the same among the Zuni, 
the Swedes, and the Russians, those factors that distinguish these three societies 
are irrelevant for the explanation of suicide. If education is positively related to 
attitudes of internationalism in India, Ireland, and Italy, the differences among 
these countries are unimportant in explaining internationalist attitudes. Whereas 
studies of concomitant variation require positive identification of relevant 
systemic factors, the ‘most different systems’ design centers on eliminating 
irrelevant systemic factors” (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 35).
Because all EU member states share many common features, however, a most 
different systems research design would not be as appropriate for a study of 
national adaptation to the EU. A study concentrating on new member states using 
a most different systems method would be particularly difficult to justify because 
(at least during the twentieth century) member states tended to join the EU as part 
of a cohort of similar states. For example, Finland and Sweden joined the EU at 
the same time as Austria, which, despite having less in common with its Nordic 
colleagues than they shared with each other, was nonetheless similar to Finland 
and Sweden in many ways. For instance, all three were relatively wealthy
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industrialised countries and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members 
that had strong traditions of neutrality during the Cold War. Fellow applicant 
Norway (which also negotiated to join the EU in 1995 along with the other three 
but declined to do so because of the result of a public referendum) also had much 
in common with Finland and Sweden as well as Austria (despite the obvious 
difference that Norway, unlike the other three, was a NATO member).
Although the approaches that are employed for most similar systems and most 
different systems research designs clearly differ, there are nevertheless similarities 
between the two techniques. According to Przeworski and Teune (1970: 39), 
“Both of these strategies are based on some expectations about social reality. The 
most similar systems design is based on a belief that a number of theoretically 
significant differences can be used in explanation. The alternative design, which 
seeks maximal heterogeneity in the sample of systems, is based on a belief that in 
spite of intersystemic differentiation, the populations will differ with regard to 
only a limited number of variables or relationships.” Following this logic, “On the 
one hand, if it turns out that Swedes, Finns, Norwegians, and Danes are alike in all 
of the examined aspects of their social behaviour, then the study of these countries 
will not permit the identification of the systemic factors relevant for a particular 
kind of behaviour. If, on the other hand, Americans, Indians, Chileans, and 
Japanese show no common patterns of behaviour, a study of these countries will 
end up with four separate sets of statements contributing equally little to general 
theory” (Przeworski and Teune 1970: 39). As has already been suggested, Finland 
and Sweden, despite their differences, clearly fall into the category of similar 
states.
Because of the use of a most similar systems research design, the task of this 
thesis is in a sense threefold. First, the similarities between the two countries must 
be demonstrated in order to justify a most similar systems design. Then, the 
differences between the two countries must be determined. Finally, the 
significance of these differences needs to be evaluated for each policy area and 
their implications for adaptation assessed. Chapters three through six are 
structured around this tripartite method of analysis, although the main interest is
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clearly in the significance of the differences; however, an understanding of both 
the similarities and the differences is necessary for this analysis to be possible.
In line with a most similar systems research design, the case studies all relate to 
areas where there has been great similarity between the Finnish and Swedish 
approaches and situations prior to 1995. For instance, in terms of EMU, the two 
countries had similar economic structures and were both presented with the 
possibility of adopting the Euro at the same time. With relations with non-EU 
Northern European neighbours, both countries had a strong interest in and 
experience with cooperation in the Northern European area as well as the desire to 
assist the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) with obtaining EU 
membership. With access to documents, both countries had a long history of 
providing for such access and were eager to continue their national traditions and 
increase openness at the EU level.
Other possible policy areas were excluded because of the lack of similarity in the 
Finnish and Swedish situations when the period of this study commenced in 
January 1995. For instance, an issue such as agriculture would have been less 
conducive to a most similar systems approach because Sweden reformed its 
agricultural policy just before it joined the EU, whereas Finland had not recently 
taken such actions. Thus, when the two countries became EU members, Swedish 
farmers supported a return to the policies of the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP, which resembled the policy that Sweden had recently decided to 
abolish), whereas Finnish farmers preferred the existing Finnish policies to the 
CAP.
The policy areas were also selected because they were all areas in which 
significant concrete action was taken at the EU level between 1995 and 2000. For 
instance, in the area of EMU the decisions were made about which countries 
would participate in the first wave of EMU’s third stage and adopt the European 
single currency, the Euro. This third stage of EMU then commenced on 1 January 
1999. In the area of relations with non-EU neighbours, the Northern Dimension 
Initiative (NDI) was officially presented in September 1997, with an Action Plan 
following in June 2000. There was also the publication of the Commission’s
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Agenda 2000 document regarding EU enlargement, and concrete decisions were 
made regarding accession negotiations at the Luxembourg European Council in 
December 1997 and the Helsinki European Council in December 1999. In the 
final policy area, public access to documents, there were decisions made regarding 
openness at the 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) and incorporated 
into the Treaty of Amsterdam. There were also relevant court cases at the EU- 
level, notably the cases brought by the Swedish journalists’ paper Journalisten 
and by Finnish MEP Heidi Hautala.
In addition, the three policy areas represent a broad range of types of issues on 
which national governments must formulate EU policies. For instance, they 
involve policy types that would traditionally (prior to EU membership) have been 
formulated in three different ministries: the finance, foreign, and justice 
ministries, and to a large extent they were still formulated in those ministries. 
They also vary between areas of traditional high (EMU and relations with non-EU 
neighbours) and low (access to documents) politics. In addition, they include 
issues that are specifically connected to the Nordic countries (access to documents 
and relations with non-EU Northern European neighbours) as well as one that is 
equally important for all EU member states (EMU). An additional difference is 
the degree of divergence in support from the political parties in the three policy 
areas. Whereas EMU was a highly political issue, with divisions within as well as 
between parties, the other two policy areas enjoyed broad support from all parties 
in both countries. Access to documents was a particularly non-political issue.
A further way in which the policy areas diverge is that they demonstrate differing 
levels of similarities between the two countries, at least at first glance. The 
decisions that Finland and Sweden took on EMU were obviously in stark contrast 
to each other (with Finland deciding to adopt the single European currency in the 
first wave and Sweden choosing not to do so). In contrast, the two countries 
shared a common desire to increase openness and transparency inside the EU, 
particularly through increased public access to documents. Relations with non-EU 
Northern European neighbours would seem to lie somewhere in the middle, with 
Finland clearly championing the NDI, which was initially developed by Finland.
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Both countries were, however, eager supporters of regional cooperation and EU 
enlargement.
Clearly, there was a wide range of policy areas regarding which Finland and 
Sweden were required to formulate national EU policies between 1995 and 2000. 
As discussed above, the three that are analysed here have been selected to be 
representative of the various types of issues on which they formulated policies. 
The rationale for selecting three as the number of policy areas is that it allows for 
a comparison between three different types of policy areas, whereas a focus on 
only one or two areas would not have permitted such a comprehensive study. The 
importance of examining several observations is noted by many researchers, 
including Moravcsik (1998: 79), who argues that an important “methodological 
principle is to multiply the number of observations in order to generate variation 
on critical variables within and across cases.” According to Moravcsik (1998: 79), 
“Numerous observations across a substantial range of theoretically relevant causes 
and outcomes are a central requirement of social-scientific testing. The absence of 
such variation, sometimes termed the ‘n = 1 ’ problem, has traditionally burdened 
studies of European integration, which deals with the historical evaluation of a 
single exceptional institution.” Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba 
(1994: 209) also discuss the “n = 1” problem, which they term “[t]he most 
difficult problem in any research.”
There is an attempt made in this study to avoid the “n = 1 ” problem. The selection 
of two countries and three policy areas helps to minimise this potential difficulty. 
Even within the policy areas, there are multiple observations. For instance, the 
chapter on access to documents (chapter six) includes the declarations that Finland 
and Sweden attached to their Accession Treaty, their proposals for the 1996-1997 
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), the “Solana Decision,” and their 
involvement in court cases at the EU level. Particularly because each case study 
consists of not one but multiple observations, analysing four or more policy areas 
would have broadened the topic so far that such detailed analysis would not have 
been possible.
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Another methodological issue is the selection of the time period. The formulation 
of EU policies is, as noted previously, examined here during the period from 1 
January 1995 to 31 December 2000, although some attention is given to the time 
prior to this period (as it sets the stage for these decisions). The choice of the 
starting date is straightforward because it is the day on which the countries under 
consideration became full EU members. The selection of the closing date is less 
clear, but is one that allows for an examination of the degree and manner in which 
new members adapt to the EU. There is no set definition of what a new member is 
and no obvious day when a member state ceases to be a new member. Despite the 
vagueness of the concept of a “new member,” it is not feasible to argue that 
France or Germany or even the UK or Greece was truly a newcomer between 
1995 and 2000. An argument could be made that member states cease to be “new” 
members when other member states join the EU at a later date. In other words, the 
next enlargement would signal that those states, which had joined the EU in the 
previous enlargement, would no longer be considered new members. This is 
similar to Lee Miles’ (2000a: 235) assertion that “[i]n a technical sense, Sweden 
will cease to be a ‘new’ member state when the EU enlarges once again (as others 
will be the ‘new’ ones).” Because no other member states had joined the EU since 
Finland and Sweden (as well as Austria) did so in 1995, Finland and Sweden can 
be considered “new kids on the European block” at least for the duration of the 
period in focus in this study. Rutger Lindahl (2000: 123) argues that “five years of 
EU membership is not a long time” and that “Sweden can, quite obviously, still be 
regarded as a new member of the European Union.”
Furthermore, six years is a sufficiently long time for concrete actions and even 
adaptation to occur, but not so long as to risk that “new” member states have been 
members long enough to have adapted fully and ceased being new members. 
There were important developments within the EU during the six years between 
1995 and 2000 to which Finland and Sweden were able to make contributions and 
for which they were able to plan strategies. An earlier date would have limited the 
amount of information that could have been presented as evidence and would 
therefore have weakened the conclusions. The concluding date of 31 December 
2000 also allows for the inclusion of the preparations for the first Swedish EU 
Presidency, including the Presidency’s programme, which was presented in
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December 2000. Although one might argue for extending the time period of this 
study until the end of June 2001 to include the Swedish Presidency, the 2000 cut­
off provides for the inclusion of the formulation of Swedish policies relating to 
their Presidency. Indeed, the Presidency’s website (http://www.eu2001 .set was 
already on-line. As the focus here is on formulation rather than implementation, 
the exclusion of the time period of the Presidency itself (during the first half of 
2001) does not present a major difficulty. Furthermore, the use of 31 December 
2000 ensures that Finland and Sweden were still “new kids on the European 
block.”
One could, however, argue that the time period should have been extended until 
the accession of the next new member states or even longer. In fact, Miles (2000a: 
235) argues that “as British and, to a lesser extent, Danish experiences of full EU 
Membership indicate, 26 years, let alone the few years of Swedish membership 
covered by this book, may still not be enough to allow member states to ‘adjust 
fully’ to EU membership.” Yet, Miles (2000a) himself selects 1999 as the cut-off 
date for his study of Swedish adjustment to membership in the European Union. 
Furthermore, a longer time period would have meant broadening the project 
considerably; in such a situation, the detailed analysis of three policy areas on 
which this study is based would not have been feasible.
There has thus been thoughtful consideration given to the methodology of this 
study, relying on a variety of different sources. One scholar whose methodological 
approach provides particular inspiration for this study is Moravcsik (1998). The 
reliance on his methodology, not only through the avoidance of the “n = 1” 
problem that he suggests correcting by “multiply[ing] the number of observations” 
(Moravcsik 1998: 11), but also by following his suggestions on the selection of 
source material, is especially appropriate because this project is also designed in 
part to challenge his theoretical approach (as is elaborated upon later).
Moravcsik (1998) argues for the use of “hard” rather than “soft” primary sources. 
For him, “hard” primary sources “include internal government reports, 
contemporary records of confidential deliberations among key policy-makers, 
verbatim diary entries, corroborated memoirs by participants who appear to lack
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an ulterior motive for misrepresentation, and lengthy interviews with numerous 
policy-makers in which the interviewer sought to corroborate the ex post claims of 
policy-makers” (Moravcsik 1998: 82). On the other hand, according to Moravcsik 
(1998: 81), “A soft primary source is one in which there is a relatively strong 
incentive (or a low cost) to distortion or speculation. Soft primary sources include 
most contemporary newspaper and magazine reports (e.g., unattributable 
editorials or articles in the Economist or Financial Times), public statements by 
government spokesmen and national leaders justifying their actions, and ex post 
justifications in memoirs or interviews by participants who were either not in a 
position to know the truth or had an incentive to inflate (or deny) their own 
influence.”
Yet, as Moravcsik (1998) himself admits, “hard” primary sources, or, indeed, 
primary sources of any type, may not be as accessible for studies of recent events. 
For instance, for his study of the Maastricht process, Moravcsik (1998: 83) “was 
often forced to rely more heavily on secondary sources or the objective pattern of 
decision-making.” Furthermore, the “scope” of his project imposed 
methodological constraints that meant that he “employed as hard sources those 
sections of secondary sources that themselves report facts based on direct citation 
of a hard primary source” (Moravcsik 1998: 83).
Similarly, there have been constraints on the methodology of this thesis. “Soft” 
primary sources and secondary sources are relied on, particularly for this thesis’ 
third chapter, since the aim of that chapter is to provide background material for 
the rest of the study rather than itself consisting of the empirical subject matter of 
the thesis. Furthermore, the scope of this project does not allow for a full analysis 
of “hard” primary sources for this background information, which is primarily of a 
historical nature and is very broad, covering Finnish and Swedish history, 
institutions, culture, and identity from medieval times to 2000. Indeed, the scope 
of the third chapter also means that it is by far the longest one in the thesis. 
Despite the breadth of the chapter, there has been some use of “hard” primary 
sources as well as an attempt to use “soft” primary sources and secondary sources 
that rely on “hard” primary sources, although this has not always been feasible. 
Furthermore, an effort has been made to select either a variety of sources that
29
present differing interpretations of controversial subjects or to select sources that 
are based on an examination of a variety of approaches and provide an informed 
analysis. The empirical chapters, however, rely much more heavily on “hard” 
primary sources, despite the fact that the newness of the subject matter has at 
times meant that such sources were difficult or impossible to obtain.
By following much of Moravcsik’s (1998) own suggestions regarding 
methodology, this thesis is able to mount a significant challenge to his work as 
well as that of others, notably Ingebritsen (1998), which disregard or downplay 
the importance of HICI. The empirical cases provide concrete tests of the 
significance of HICI in explaining differences between the EU policies of two 
new members. The careful and methodological selection of the two countries and 
the three policy areas strengthens the results of the study. The use of the most 
similar systems research design, the same design used by Ingebritsen (1998), 
further strengthens the validity of this study to challenge her work.
A Niche of Its Own?
Furthermore, there is a definite place for the results of a study such as this one. On 
an empirical as well as a theoretical level, this study makes a contribution to the 
study of International Relations (IR), CP, and European Union Studies. Despite 
the increasing body of scholarship on post-Cold War Europe, there has been 
relatively little research done on Finnish and Swedish behaviour as EU members. 
Rather, the focus has often been on the Finnish and Swedish decisions to become 
EU members.
The academic work on these countries’ post-1995 participation in European 
integration in general and the European Union, in particular, has tended to be in 
the form of shorter book chapters or journal articles rather than longer research 
projects such as this one. Ivar Neumann (2001) agrees on the lack of monographs 
concentrating on this topic. Commenting on Ingebritsen’s (1998) The Nordic 
States and European Unity, he argues that “there are no other books with which 
Ingebritsen’s may compete, even half a decade after the Swedish and Finnish
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accessions to the European Union made the topic a central concern not only 
regionally, but to other Europeans as well” (Neumann 2001: 94). Although 
Ingebritsen’s (1998) work itself goes some way to filling this void in the academic 
literature, it does not do so entirely. In particular, she fails to pay attention to 
differences between Finland and Sweden, and, as is discussed in more detail in 
chapter two, her theoretical approach is particularly inappropriate for a 
comparison of Finland and Sweden. The study of Finnish and Swedish EU 
membership is, however, an area that is likely to expand, and this project is meant 
to contribute to this exciting new research area. Furthermore, the study also makes 
a contribution to the study of national adaptation to the EU, a research area in 
which Raunio and Wiberg (2001) identify the need for further study. The 
following two chapters provide the remaining backdrop necessary for the 
empirical evidence that is intended to shed light on adaptation to the European 
Union in terms of the formulation of EU policies at the national level.
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Chapter Two: A Theoretical Critique
A Critique of Existing Approaches
There is a multitude of theoretical approaches that could in some way be applied 
to this study. These include, for instance, those that concentrate on “adaptation,” 
those that examine European integration, and those that analyse foreign policy. As 
a comprehensive study of all potentially relevant approaches would require a book 
or more of its own, the focus here is on those that are most useful for an analysis 
of national adaptation to the European Union (EU) and those to which this project 
presents a particular challenge. An interdisciplinary approach is adopted here. 
Inspiration is drawn primarily from the fields of International Relations (IR), 
Comparative Politics (CP), and European Union Studies, although the boundaries 
between the disciplines are not always clear, nor should they be, as many different 
fields are relevant for a study of national adaptation to the EU. The chapter begins 
with an analysis of different types of theoretical approaches; these include 
political adaptation, international regime theory, new institutionalism, 
constructivism, liberal intergovemmentalism, and sectoral approaches. Attention 
is also given to the concepts of history, institutions, culture, and identity (HICI) 
and the roles assigned to them by various theoretical frameworks. Concrete 
definitions of these concepts, which feature in this thesis, are saved until the 
concluding paragraphs of this chapter, once other relevant methods of defining 
and employing them have been addressed.
As was explained in the preceding chapter, the focus of this thesis is on the 
differences between the extent and nature of Finnish and Swedish adaptation to 
membership in the European Union between 1995 and 2000. The particular 
concern here is the formulation of national EU policies. Although scholars 
studying the EU and its predecessors initially concentrated on integration and 
drew on IR theories such as neorealism and neofunctionalism, there has been an
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increasing body of literature that examines the impact of the EU on national 
structures, often in terms of “adaptation.”5
According to Hans Mouritzen (1988: 16), one of the most well known 
contributors to the study of “adaptation,” “[t]he adaptive politics field developed 
through the 1970s as a foreign body within the ‘Comparative Foreign Policy’ 
movement in American political science,” with James Rosenau being one of the 
pioneers. Biology and cybernetics served as inspiration for adaptation theory, with 
adaptation regarded as analogous to an organism’s survival (Mouritzen 1988: 17). 
Rosenau (1981: 1-2) introduces the concept of political adaptation in the 
following manner: “[T]he political organism is always experiencing both 
continuities and changes, and thus it is always in motion, slipping behind, moving 
ahead, holding fast, or otherwise adjusting and changing in response to internal 
developments and external circumstances. To analyze how the adjustments are 
made, the changes sustained, and the continuities preserved is to engage in the 
study of political adaptation. It is to focus on a compelling set of phenomena: 
those that propel the political organism through time in such a way as to maintain 
some of its elements while altering others.”
Adaptation has different meanings for different scholars. According to Rosenau 
(1981: 29), “In its ordinary usage, the concept [of adaptation] refers to the process 
whereby actors maintain a balance between internal needs and external demands. 
Conceived in process terms, any behavior pattern can be viewed as adaptive as 
long as the environed unit continues to persist.” However, he admits, “Obviously, 
such a conception is too all-encompassing” (Rosenau 1981: 29). Mouritzen (1988: 
24) argues that the word has been used to characterise behaviours, belief systems, 
and outcomes.
In answer to the question of who the adaptor is, Mouritzen (1988: 28-29) points 
out that different adaptation theorists concentrate on different adaptors, such as
5 Neorealism and neofunctionalism, theoretical approaches from IR that were important in the 
development of EU Studies, are not discussed in detail here, as they are regarded as less relevant 
than other approaches that are examined in this chapter. For a more thorough consideration of 
these and other IR concepts, see, for instance, Brown (1997).
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“the state,” “the regime,” or “society at large.” Rosenau (1981: 3) argues that his 
“conception of political adaptation applies to any type of political organism.” 
Seeing the interdisciplinary nature of the concept of adaptation, Rosenau (1981: 
29) suggests, “Since any living organism confronts the problem of adapting to its 
environment, surely clarifying formulations of the concept are to be found in other 
disciplines like biochemistry, ecology, and social psychology that evolved 
precisely because of concern with the links between organisms and their 
environments.” Examples of possible adaptors include, according to Rosenau 
(1981: 3), “an individual, a cabinet, a legislature, a political party, a regime, a 
nation-state, an international organization, or a revolutionary movement.”
“Regimes” are particularly popular subjects for adaptation theorists. For instance, 
for Mouritzen (1988: 30), “the unit of adaptation” is the “regime,” which he 
defines as follows: “A regime is constituted by its public commitment to a set of 
values ~  its regime identity (often ideological values), its general autonomy, and 
its control over territory and resources.” In a later phrasing, the same author 
defines a regime as “an actor that is publicly committed to safeguarding each of 
the following values: its autonomy, its identity, and its control over a certain 
territory. Empirically, however, most regimes tend to commit themselves to two 
further values: offensive power (influence) on the world around and welfare of 
‘its’ people” (Mouritzen 1996: 10).
Although Mouritzen’s (1988) regime is similar to a state, it is not the same. “The 
problem generally with the state level,” he argues, “is not only that of avoiding 
reification, but also that it can hardly cope with the rather fluid and ephemeral 
values that are frequently the subject of adaptive regulation. During adaptive 
acquiescence [one of the modes of adaptation identified by Mouritzen (1988)], for 
example, the values typically conceded are such ‘luxury’ values as total freedom 
of the press, political pluralism, a diffuse solidarity with other peoples under 
strain, and so on. The more typical ‘values of state’ such as basic autonomy or 
territorial integrity are seldom traded away, except in exceptional cases” 
(Mouritzen 1988: 38).
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Discussing what is involved in the actual process of adaptation, Rosenau (1981: 3) 
argues that an adaptor “has essential structures which sustain and differentiate it, 
which fluctuate as internal and external circumstances change, and which have to 
be kept within acceptable limits if the organism is to persist.” Rosenau’s (1981: 3) 
“essential structures” are “those patterns that endure.” Although “[a]ny political 
entity is comprised of many interaction patterns,” Rosenau (1981: 3) argues, “only 
relatively few of these are ‘essential’ in the sense that without them the entity 
would no longer be recognizable.” Yet, adaptation is not, according to Rosenau 
(1981: 6), only about survival, but also about “day-to-day events.”
For Rosenau (1981: 5), perfect adaptation, also termed “tranquility,” is on one end 
of a continuum, the other end of which is maladaptation, or extinction. Yet, he 
acknowledges that “[f]ew organisms ever approach either extreme, as most 
simultaneously engage in a multiplicity of both adaptive and maladaptive action 
that, in effect, cancel each other out and keep the fluctuations balanced well 
within the two extremes” (Rosenau 1981: 5). Rosenau (1981: 38) defines 
maladaptive as follows: “A behavior is regarded as maladaptive when it copes 
with or stimulates changes in the external environment that contribute to changes 
in the essential structures that are outside acceptable limits. By essential structures 
we mean those interrelated patterns that constitute the basic political, economic, 
and social life of a national society. By acceptable limits we mean those variations 
in the essential structures that do not prevent the society from maintaining its 
basic forms of life or from altering these forms through its own choices and 
procedures” (emphasis in original). Furthermore, Rosenau (1981: 39) argues that 
“the sum of all of a society’s adaptive or maladaptive acts at any moment in time 
constitutes its adaptation for that moment.” Adaptation is thus a dynamic process 
rather than a static condition.
Adaptation theory is used or referred to by many scholars when analysing national 
participation in European integration. These include, for instance, Nikolaj 
Petersen (1997, 1998) and Tapio Raunio and Matti Wiberg (2001). In particular, 
Danish scholars have used adaptation theory to explain Denmark’s approach to 
European integration. Peter Hansen (1974: 155) develops a framework to explain 
Denmark, but he argues that “with only slight alteration it might be applied to
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Norway and Sweden” and even (with a little more alteration) to the United 
Kingdom (UK). Discussing the Danish situation at the time of his writing, Hansen 
(1974: 172) writes, “The central issue in Danish European policy over the past 15 
years has been the problem of how to cope effectively with change in the external 
environment, and its effects upon internal economic and societal structures.” His 
interest lies in what he refers to as the “process of adaptation to changes in the 
environment,” with both internal and external factors being regarded as important 
and “inseparably intertwined” (Hansen 1974: 172).
As the interest in external as well as internal factors might suggest, adaptation 
theory has been used to explain foreign policy. In fact, adaptation theory is 
particularly applicable to a comparative analysis involving the foreign policies of 
small states. According to Hansen (1974: 150), “The adaptation framework seems 
eminently suited to bring small states theorizing into the proper, broadly 
comparative foreign policy perspective.” Relating adaptation to foreign policy, 
Rosenau (1981: 38) writes, “Any foreign policy behavior undertaken by the 
government of any national society is conceived to be adaptive when it copes with 
or stimulates changes in the external environment of the society that contribute to 
keeping the essential structures of the society within acceptable limits.” 
Adaptation theory allows for the recognition of the interdependence between the 
national and international spheres, as suggested by the discussion of Hansen 
(1974) above. According to Rosenau (1981: 58), “Conceiving of national societies 
as adapting entities that must keep their essential structures within acceptable 
limits provides a useful basis for probing the interdependence of their domestic 
and foreign affairs.” Clarifying this dynamic process of adaptation, Rosenau 
(1981: 58) explains that “the fluctuations in the essential structures of a society 
stem from a composite of three sources: from international developments and the 
society’s success in coping with and benefiting from them; from trends at home 
and the society’s success in absorbing them into its essential structures; and from 
the internal behavior whereby the society adjusts its institutions and values to 
meet the requirements of its external behavior and the demands from its external 
environment.”
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Adaptation theorists do, however, narrow their focus to that which they consider 
most relevant, as doing otherwise would leave their topics too broad. Rosenau 
(1981: 41) points out the importance of concentrating on the “salient 
environment” rather than “the entire international system.” He explains, “Societies 
need to adapt only to those changes in the international system that are salient 
with respect to their essential structures. Due to the nature of change and the 
temporal and spatial limitations of geography, not all the changes that are 
transpiring abroad will be relevant to the life of a society” (Rosenau 1981: 41).
As suggested by the previous use of the word “dynamic” to describe adaptation, 
change is vital for the concept of adaptation. As Rosenau (1981: 42) argues, 
“However the essential structures of societies may be defined, change is a central 
dimension of adaptation. When there is no change, there is nothing to which a 
society must adapt.” The EU policies of new member states would thus seem to fit 
well with adaptation since they almost by definition must adapt to a new 
environment and new situations. However, Rosenau (1981: 52) suggests, 
“Notwithstanding the centrality of change in the adaptive framework, the question 
arises as to whether the framework makes allowance for truly profound change — 
for change which is so thoroughgoing as to amount to transformation.” Yet, he 
eventually asserts that “an adaptive framework allows for far-reaching change. 
Governments can fall, ruling elites can be replaced, policies can be reversed, and 
economies can founder without the basic patterns o f interaction that comprise a 
national society and distinguish it from its environment becoming unrecognizable. 
Indeed, governments often fall in order to facilitate the adjustment of these 
patterns to trends in their environments” (Rosenau 1981: 52-53, emphasis in 
original). Furthermore, Rosenau (1981: 53) argues that “the adaptive framework 
also allows for change through the employment by a society of its own procedures 
to transform its essential structures. As long as the society is still recognizable 
once it has transformed these structures, then, no matter how profound, the 
transformation is conceived to be part of the process of adaptation.”
Another term that may be associated with adaptation theory is that of 
“conformity.” According to Rosenau (1981: 54), “While it is the main purpose of 
the adaptive framework to develop a body of theory to which all societies may be
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expected to conform, . . . such theory allows for choice on the part of actors” 
(emphasis added). Thus, it appears that actors may, at least to some extent, choose 
the extent to which they will conform to their environment.
Adaptation theorists often establish typologies of modes of adaptation. There have 
been a variety of typologies of different types, modes, or orientations of 
adaptation. Rosenau (1981: 58-59) identifies four “basic orientations”: 1) “the 
politics of acquiescent adaptation”; 2) “the politics of intransigent adaptation”; 3) 
“the politics of promotive adaptation”; and 4) “the politics of preservative 
adaptation.” Mouritzen (1988: 10) lists six types of “basic regime orientation”: 
domination, quiescence, balance, adaptive acquiescence, imposed domination, and 
no regime or regime orientation. Of these, only the first four are considered to be 
“modes of adaptation” (Mouritzen 1988: 10). Petersen (1979: 241) identifies “four 
patterns of overall foreign policy behavior: the patterns of dominance, balance, 
acquiescence, and quiescence” (emphasis in original). Despite criticising 
Mouritzen’s (1993) focus on acquiescent actors, Petersen (1998: 43-45) discusses 
the same four types of adaptation: dominance, balance, quiescence, and 
acquiescence. However, Petersen (1998: 45) asserts that “[a] balanced policy 
mode is the archetypical integration mode” and “the only posture which is 
theoretically compatible with full participation in international integration.”
Yet, even adaptation theorists acknowledge that the distinction between different 
types of adaptation may be blurred and that the categories may overlap. Petersen 
(1998) himself asserts that states often pursue a mixture of his four types of 
adaptation. For instance, “balancing policies will often be strongly coloured by 
characteristics and strategies belonging to the dominant, acquiescent or quiescent 
policy modes” (Petersen 1998: 41). He argues that his “four modes of behaviour 
are, of course, classical ideal-types, i.e. they cannot be expected to be found in 
pure form, but only in approximations. A number of intermediate positions can be 
imagined, depending on the degree of influence capability and stress sensitivity of 
the nation in question, and modified by the relevant perceptions of decision­
makers” (Petersen 1998: 43). However, for Rosenau (1981: 59), the “four types of 
adaptation are conceived to be mutually exclusive in the sense that during any 
period only one self-environment orientation predominates in a society.” Yet, he
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does admit that “[e]mpirical investigation may later dictate the need to relax this 
assumption of mutual exclusiveness and to posit societies as pursuing different 
types of adaptation in different issue-areas” (Rosenau 1981: 59).
Of all the various modes of adaptation, one that often recurs in the literature is 
acquiescent adaptation, which makes its appearance in many typologies. For 
instance, the term “acquiescent” or “acquiescence” appears in the typologies of 
Rosenau (1981) and Petersen (1979, 1998) and has been the particular focus for 
Mouritzen (1988). It is especially relevant here because it is often termed 
“Finlandization,” although not necessarily with a direct connection to the country 
of Finland itself. The presence of a larger neighbour (as in the case of Russia/the 
Soviet Union for Finland) is frequently associated with the categorisation of a 
regime or state as acquiescent. According to Rosenau (1981: 80-81), “A 
geographical variable from the systematic cluster — the proximity of a much larger 
society intent upon imposing its will on its neighbors -- is one of the two 
conditions necessary for the emergence and persistence of acquiescent adaptation. 
The other is the absence in the adapting society of any highly potent societal, 
individual, or governmental variables.”
Acquiescent adaptation has also been used, for instance, to characterise EU 
applicant countries, including Finland and Sweden at the time that they were 
aspiring to join the Union. According to Mouritzen (1993: 391), Finland and 
Sweden (which at the time of his writing were applicant countries rather than EU 
members) are both examples of acquiescent adaptation and “are willing to live 
with considerable autonomy and other infringements in order to, primarily, 
safeguard their welfare.” Mouritzen (1993: 398) argues, “The Swedes and the 
Finns feel that they must get inside, before they risk becoming ‘naughty boys.’” 
Yet, the characterisation of Finland and Sweden as acquiescent adapters seems to 
have been temporary. For instance, writing several years later, when Finland was 
already an EU member, Raunio and Wiberg (2001: 63) draw on Petersen’s (1998) 
modes of adaptation to argue that Finland follows the balanced mode of 
adaptation. Based on their analysis, one would assume that Sweden would also be 
regarded as displaying balanced rather than acquiescent adaptation.
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According to Mouritzen (1993), EU applicant countries tend to share several 
characteristics that lead them to adopt positions of acquiescent adaptation. 
Mouritzen (1993: 396) argues that EU members differ from those waiting to join 
because “they are not exposed to any time of pole dependency, simply because 
they are part of the pole.” Mouritzen (1993: 395) argues that “the would-be 
insiders wish to appear as natural future insiders, in any case as ‘good 
Europeans.’”
Adaptation is also generally regarded as being a two-way process. “The study of 
political adaptation” is, at least in the eyes of Rosenau (1981: 8), “first and 
foremost the study of feedback loops. It focuses attention on relational 
phenomena, on the interaction between action and its consequences for those who 
initiate it. This is what distinguishes an adaptive perspective from a policy- 
oriented approach to the study of politics. The policy approach is primarily 
concerned with the impact of action on those who are its targets, whereas the 
adaptation perspective looks beyond the targets to the feedback for the initiators.” 
Another way of phrasing this might be to argue that the adaptor receives feedback 
on its previous actions (e.g. a response from the EU to a Swedish declaration on 
access to documents, as is discussed in chapter six) that may impact on future 
policy formulation.
Adaptation theory also offers suggestions of why different actors pursue different 
modes of adaptation. For Hansen (1974: 150), influence capability and stress 
sensitivity are the two main factors that can predict the actor type. Petersen (1979: 
237) relies on Hansen’s (1974) definitions of influence capability and stress 
sensitivity. Discussing the difference between the two concepts, Petersen (1979: 
249) writes, “Stress sensitivity as a concept is more difficult to pin down than the 
concept of influence capability.” However, there are similarities in that both are “a 
very complex cluster of variables pertaining to the nation as well as to its 
environment” (Petersen 1979: 249).
Other factors that may affect adaptation include ideology and historical 
experience, both of which are mentioned by Mouritzen (1993: 396). An emphasis 
on structural constraints, including such factors as HICI may, indeed, affect
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adaptation, although these are not always emphasised by traditional adaptation 
theorists. G. John Ikenberry (1986: 166) acknowledges the importance of structure 
in constraining the choices available to states, so that, for instance, “a small state 
with few resources will find structures at the international level more inflexible 
than a larger state with resources capable of changing international regimes and 
arrangements.” Differences in domestic structures such as institutions and groups 
are also seen as constraining or not constraining the opportunities for adjustment 
offered to states (Ikenberry 1986: 166). He argues that a “state’s interests . . . 
emerge through the interplay of a state elite that is adapting and strategizing in the 
context o f . . .  structures” (Ikenberry 1986: 167).
“Adaptation,” however, is often used without complete definition or direct 
reference to the theoretical approaches put forth by Mouritzen, Petersen, Rosenau, 
and others. For instance, Ann-Cathrine Jungar (2000: 261) writes about Finland’s 
“deliberate and fast adaptation” to the European Union without discussing 
adaptation theory or defining the word “adaptation.” Rather, here, as elsewhere 
where the term is used without definition, it seems to imply changes made in order 
to adjust to new situations. Similarly, David Kirby (1995: 13) uses the words 
“adapting” and “adapt” to describe Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in the 
nineteenth century without any specific definition of the concepts, although he 
seems to imply that “adaptation” involves adjustments made by the state to ensure 
survival in the changing international environment. Kirby (1995:13) even uses the 
term “regimes” to describe the Nordic adaptors, but here again this is without any 
specific definition or relation to the literature on adaptation theory. This is perhaps 
to be expected as he is a historian rather than a political scientist, but it 
demonstrates, nevertheless, the broad usage of the terminology associated with 
adaptation theory.
Furthermore, authors may refer to processes that are similar or equivalent to 
adaptation without the use of any form of the word “adaptation” itself. A concept 
that seems closely related to “adaptation” is that of “adjustment,” which is used, 
for instance, by Lee Miles (2000b). It is also used at times in conjunction with 
“adaptation.” For example, Ikenberry (1986) writes of “adjustment” and 
“adaptation.” Using the term “adaptation,” he argues that “states are organizations
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that, given the alternatives, would like to survive. Consequently, they must change 
and adapt” (Ikenberry 1986: 158). A main concern for Ikenberry (1986: 159) is 
“the interconnections between domestic and international political economy,” and 
“adjustment” seems to be used in a way that is synonymous with “adaptation” to 
describe the dynamic elements of these interconnections. Using the term 
“adjustment,” Ikenberry (1986: 159) states, “Adjustment strategy may be directed 
outward at international regimes, or inward at transforming domestic structures, or 
somewhere in between in order to maintain existing relationships.”
Yet, confusingly, the term “regime” has been used by adaptation theorists in a 
different way from that used in the international regimes literature, which has also 
been used to analyse European integration. Mouritzen (1996: 10) himself notes 
that his definition of regime “has nothing to do, of course, with the notion of 
‘international regimes’ in various issue areas, so popular in much IR research.” 
According to B. Guy Peters (1999: 129), “Regime theory has its roots in 
American international relations scholarship in the early 1980s. The underlying 
motivation was to develop a concept that would capture the patterned interactions 
that were increasingly observable in international politics.” One of the most 
widely known definitions of a regime (based on international regime theory) 
comes from the heyday of international regime theory in the 1980s and is 
provided by Stephen Krasner (1983c), a definition regarded by Peters (1999: 130) 
as “[pjrobably the prevailing definition of an international regime.” According to 
Krasner (1983c: 2), “Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ 
expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” The definitions 
of those terms contained within Krasner’s definition are as follows: “Principles 
are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior 
defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for 
making and implementing collective choice” (Krasner 1983c: 2). Indeed, the 1983 
volume edited by Krasner, in which he presents his seminal definition of a regime 
(as cited above), includes a variety of different approaches to the study of 
international regimes and is seen as one of the most important works regarding 
international regime theory.
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In order to be influential in such a regime, an actor must, at least to some extent, 
adapt to its principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. According 
to Peters (1999: 135), “The assumption behind regime theories is that the 
‘expectations’ of the actors involved will converge through their actions over 
time, so that there will be substantially less variance in values and behavior when 
there is an operative regime than when there is not.” According to Moravcsik 
(1993: 481), “Regime theory is employed as a starting point for an analysis of 
conditions under which governments will delegate powers to international 
institutions.” Discussing the tendency for regime members to follow the regime’s 
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, Robert O. Keohane 
(1983: 158) writes about a “norm of generalized commitment.” This commitment 
“rests on the premise that a veil of ignorance stands between us and the future, but 
that we should nevertheless assume that regime-supporting behavior will be 
beneficial to us even though we have no convincing evidence to that effect” 
(Keohane 1983: 158).
There are, indeed, many ways in which the term “regime” may be defined, even 
within the context of the international regimes literature. For instance, Oran R. 
Young (1983: 95, note 6) argues that his definition of a regime differs from other 
definitions in the same volume (edited by Krasner) in that he does “not regard 
norms as defining characteristics of international regimes. Rather, I take the 
position that social conventions typically acquire an aura of legitimacy or 
propriety, which is normative in character.” Furthermore, as Krasner (1983a) 
points out, an international regimes framework can complement a variety of 
different types of theoretical approaches, although in different approaches regimes 
are viewed in different ways. According to Krasner (1983a: viii), “For 
liberals/Grotians, regimes remain the normal state of affairs in the international 
system. For realists they are difficult to create, but . . .  [in most cases] once 
created, they may assume a life of their own.”
A regime, like adaptation, is not a one-way flow. Rather, Krasner (1983b: 361) 
argues, “Once principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures are 
entrenched they may alter the egoistic interests and power configurations that led
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to their creation in the first place.” There are potential parallels here with 
principal-agent theory, with the regime being the agent and its creators/members 
the principles; in the case of the EU, the principals are the member states and the 
EU is the agent.6 There are also parallels with Rosenau’s (1981) feedback loops, 
which he uses to explain adaptation. Krasner (1983b: 361) identities four 
“feedback mechanisms”: 1) “regimes may alter actors’ calculations of how to 
maximize their interests”; 2) “regimes may alter interests themselves”; 3) 
“regimes may become a source of power to which actors can appeal”; and 4) 
“regimes may alter the power capabilities of different actors, including states.”
The definition of a regime is at times indistinguishable from that of an institution. 
For Young (1983: 94), international regimes are social institutions, and he argues, 
“The distinguishing feature of all social institutions, including international 
regimes, is the conjunction of convergent expectations and patterns of behavior or 
practice.” For Keohane (1983: 146), regimes are “like contracts, when these 
involve actors with long-term objectives who seek to structure their relationships 
in stable and mutually beneficial ways.”
Furthermore, regimes are not always regarded as fixed and objective. Rather, 
according to Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins (1983: 62), “[A] regime 
is an attitudinal phenomenon.” By this, they mean that “[bjehavior follows from 
adherence to principles, norms, and rules, which legal codes sometimes reflect” 
(Puchala and Hopkins 1983: 62). They further argue that “regimes themselves are 
subjective: they exist primarily as participants’ understandings, expectation or 
convictions about legitimate, appropriate or moral behavior” (Puchala and 
Hopkins 1983: 62, emphasis in original). Following logically from this, a 
“regime” could be perceived as such by one actor but not by another, even though 
both could be members of the same “regime.”
Regime theory has been applied to the European Union and its predecessors from 
an early stage, being used by Stanley Hoffman (1982) to analyse the EU’s 
predecessor, the EEC. Although the EU is generally not considered to be a regime
6 For an example of principal-agent theory applied to the European Union (or actually its 
predecessor, the European Community, or EC), see Garrett and Weingast (1993).
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per se, regime theory may be useful in understanding European integration. 
According to Robert E. Breckinridge (1997: 186), “[International regime analysis 
is appropriate for studying the European Union, especially its influence on states 
and in comparative terms.” This is despite the fact that the EU is not “just a 
regime, bu t . . . has both organizational and regime aspects” (Breckinridge 1997: 
174). Breckinridge (1997: 174) asserts that “regardless of what type of 
organization the EU is, there is a regime associated with it. Furthermore, as the 
EU has developed and will develop from one type of organization to another, 
those regime aspects will remain present.” Another scholar who has argued for the 
relevance of regime theory in the study of the European Union is Paul Taylor 
(1996). He writes about “the emergence of an increasing range of common 
principles, norms, and rules in the economic and social arrangements of the 
member states, that is, a Community regime has emerged” (Taylor 1996: 74). 
According to Taylor (1996: 74), the emergence of such a regime is one of the 
“factors working in favour of [European] integration.”
Although adaptation and regime theories continued to be relevant and cited in the 
1990s, these were not the dominant theoretical approaches. Instead, one of the 
most popular approaches to the study of European integration in the 1990s was 
that of liberal intergovemmentalism, put forth notably by Moravcsik (1993,1998). 
According to Moravcsik (1998: 497), “The central claim of Liberal international 
relations theory is that the pattern of underlying national preferences, not the 
distribution of power resources or institutionalized information, is the most 
fundamental determinant state behaviour in world politics.” Moravcsik (1998: 4) 
argues that “a tripartite explanation of integration -- economic interest, relative 
power, credible commitments -- accounts for the form, substance, and timing of 
major steps of European integration.” The “central argument” of Moravcsik’s 
(1998) book is “that European integration can best be explained as a series of 
rational choices made by national leaders” (Moravcsik 1998: 18). It should be 
noted that Moravcsik’s (1998) focus is, as noted above, on “major steps of 
European integration” rather than on individual national decisions on integration, 
although he does concentrate in his analysis on British, French, and German 
positions.
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Moravcsik’s approach meshes well with Robert D. Putnam’s (1988) two-level 
game theory, which stresses the importance of both the domestic and the 
international nature of policy formulation. According to Moravcsik (1993: 481), 
“An understanding of domestic politics is a precondition for, not a supplement to, 
the analysis of strategic interactions among states.” Discussing the merits of 
Putnam’s (1988) approach, Lee Ann Patterson (1997: 142) writes, “The 
characteristic of Putnam’s framework that renders it both fascinating and 
conceptually complex is the idea that negotiations do not proceed in a linear 
fashion from one level to the next but instead occur simultaneously at all . . . 
levels.” Patterson (1997) herself expands Putnam’s (1988) two levels to include a 
third EU (or EC) level. She argues that “in the case of the EC, there is an attempt 
to achieve domestic goals while simultaneously pursuing cooperative integration. 
Thus the unique structure of the EC requires that Putnam’s two-level game be 
expanded to a three-level interactive game in which negotiations at the domestic, 
Community, and international levels affect policy options at each of the other 
levels” (Patterson 1997: 141).
Miles (2000b) also integrates Putnam’s (1988) two level approach into his own 
framework of the “Membership Diamond,” which he uses to explain Swedish 
participation in European integration, both before and after joining the Union. 
Since 1997, when Miles introduced his “Membership Diamond,” he “clarified” 
the “interaction between international and domestic influences in Swedish foreign 
policy-making . . .  through the analytical linkage of the ‘Diamond’ with Putnam’s 
concepts o f ‘two-level games’ and ‘double-edged diplomacy’” (Miles 2000b: 12). 
Observing the usefulness of such an approach, Miles (2000b: 12) writes, “Putnam 
and others have argued that ‘double-edged diplomacy’ requires national political 
leaders to conduct foreign policy by simultaneously managing contending 
political pressures and constraints in the international (Level I) and national 
(Level II) environments.” Miles (2000b) divides his four “points” into two groups 
of two. “New challenges of economic independence” and “Security policy with a 
European identity” are regarded as Level I, or “‘International’ considerations,” 
whereas “Declining corporatism” and “Fragmenting ‘Europeanized’ democracy” 
comprise Level II, or “‘National’ considerations” (Miles 2000b: 5). Miles’ 
(2000b) framework differs, however, substantially from those of Patterson (1997),
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Putnam (1988), and Moravcsik (1998) in that his “Diamond” is specifically 
designed to explain Swedish policy rather than being a more generalist approach.
Ingebritsen (1998) concentrates on the Nordic area but develops a more general 
framework as well, in which she critiques the work of Moravcsik (1993). 
Ingebritsen (1998: 41) “modifies the intergovernmental approach and concurs 
with theorists who view preferences as endogenous” rather than exogenous, as in 
the intergovernmental model. Like Moravcsik (1998), however, Ingebritsen 
(1998) views economic interests as essential for understanding policy-making. 
She argues that “in order to understand Nordic state preferences in European 
politics, we need to know more about which economic interests are expected to 
win and which economic groups are expected to lose in the EC. Interests were 
contested by societal groups with different stakes in the process” (Ingebritsen 
1998: 41).
Although scholars such as Ingebritsen (1998) focus on societal groups and 
economic interests rather than policy-makers, there are others who concentrate on 
political decision-makers. In fact, policy-makers are often at the heart of foreign 
policy analysis, an approach that was initially the source of much of the earliest 
literature on European integration and may still be of some assistance. Potentially 
relevant here is the bureaucratic politics model, which stresses the bargaining 
nature of governmental policy. This model was developed and promoted, in 
particular, by Graham Allison (1971). According to Allison’s (1971: 361) 
bureaucratic politics model, government behaviour is seen as the result of 
bargaining and there is “no unitary actor but rather many actors as players, who 
focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems 
as well, in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to 
various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals, making 
government decisions not by rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is 
politics.”
Later scholars also considered the bureaucratic politics approach when 
formulating their own theoretical frameworks. Rosenau (1981: 17) responds to the 
importance of bureaucratic politics as follows: “My response is to acknowledge
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that bureaucratic politics may be at work in the policymaking process of any state, 
particularly those that are economically developed, and that therefore different 
groups in and out of government may differentially assess where the state as self 
should fit in relation to its environment.” Yet, Rosenau (1981: 17) argues, “To 
acknowledge that a particular adaptive mode is not totally shared by all the 
members and groups of a nation-state, however, is not to negate the premise that 
adaptation results from the predominance of one of the four self-environment 
orientations” that he proposes. Rosenau (1981) further asserts that one mode of 
adaptation predominates, due in part to the hierarchical nature of states. There are, 
in fact, many ways of studying foreign policy, and the appropriateness of various 
theoretical approaches for understanding foreign policy are referred to at times 
throughout this chapter, although the primary interest here is the formulation of 
EU policies rather than traditional foreign policy.
Institutions are regarded by many theorists as capable of explaining or at least 
helping to explain the formulation of foreign and/or EU policies. In particular, 
new institutionalist approaches, which came to prominence in the 1980s and 
1990s, emphasise the importance of institutions. Although there are many variants 
of new institutionalism, even within political science (and far more when all social 
science disciplines are considered), there are certain unifying features. According 
to James G. March and Johan P. Olsen (1996: 30), “The core notion (from an 
institutional perspective) is that life is organised by sets of shared meanings and 
practices that come to be taken as given. Political actors act and organize 
themselves in accordance with rules and practices that are socially constructed, 
publicly known, anticipated, and accepted. Actions of individuals and 
collectivities occur within these shared meanings and practices, which can be 
called identities and institutions.” These identities and institutions in turn 
“constitute and legitimate political actors and provide them with consistent 
behavioural rules, conceptions of reality, standards of assessment, affective ties, 
and endowments, and thereby with a capacity for purposeful action” (March and 
Olsen 1996: 30).
There are also many similarities between new institutionalism and international 
regime theory. Peters (1999: 130) argues that similarities between regime and new
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institutional theories are so substantial that regime theory can perhaps be 
considered an international version of new institutionalism. Furthermore, regimes 
are similar to institutions, as viewed from a normative approach, in that “the 
institution [like the regime] influences the values of the components and then the 
values influence behavior” (Peters 1999: 135). As noted earlier, some theorists 
(e.g. Young 1983) consider regimes to be institutions (in Young’s case, social 
institutions). Another common bond is that both approaches relate to concepts that 
may be defined in many ways. This fact is also noted by Peters (1999), who 
discusses the broad range of both new institutional and regime approaches.
The variety within international regime theory has already been considered. As for 
new institutionalism, March and Olsen (1996: 27) point out that the word 
“‘institutional’ seems more notable for its capacity to engender variations and 
typologies of meanings than for its precision.” They themselves use a broad 
definition of an institution, so that the concept refers “not only to legislatures, 
executives, and judiciaries but also to systems of law, social organization (such as 
the media, markets, or the family), and identities or roles (such as ‘citizen,’ 
‘official,’ or ‘individual’)” (March and Olsen 1996: 27). Institutional theory has 
been applied in a variety of arenas and forms, not all of which necessarily identify 
themselves as new institutional theories. For instance, Peters (1999) argues that 
international regime theory can be viewed as a type of international 
institutionalism. Indeed, the boundary line between institutions and regimes is 
often either blurred or non-existent. According to Arthur A. Stein (1983: 133), 
who himself draws a distinction between institutions and regimes, many 
international regime theorists “equate [institutions] with regimes. Even those who 
recognize that regimes need not be institutionalized still suggest that 
institutionalization is one of their major dimensions.”
A particularly relevant variant of new institutionalism is historical institutionalism 
(HI), one of whose most prominent defenders is Paul Pierson (1996). According to 
Pierson (1996: 126), HI is historical “because it recognizes that political 
development must be understood as a process that unfolds over time” and 
institutionalist “because it stresses that many of the contemporary implications of 
these temporal processes are embedded in institutions -- whether they be formal
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rules, policy structures, or norms.” For historical institutionalists, there are sunk 
costs that add constraints to later policy options. In this way, there are particular 
parallels with international regime theory. For instance, according to Krasner 
(1983b: 361), “Once a regime is established there are sunk costs.”
Moravcsik (1998: 489), who finds both benefits and flaws in a historical 
institutionalist approach, sees HI as a “reviv[al]” of “the neofunctionalist search 
for a theory of integration as a self-reinforcing process of spillover.” There is, 
according to Moravcsik (1998: 490), some agreement between him and historical 
institutionalists, such as the “lock[ing] in” of integration by “structural adjustment 
and other economic feedback” and even “ideological” feedback at times. 
However, in contrast to historical institutionalism (as viewed by Moravcsik), 
Moravcsik (1998: 491) “suggest[s] that these consequences were neither 
unforeseen nor unintended, as HI theory claims. To the contrary, it was the 
deliberate triumphs of European integration, not its unintended side-ejfects, that 
appear to have increased support for further integration. This is the key point of 
divergence between HI theory and the tripartite ‘liberal intergovemmentalist’ 
interpretation advanced” in Moravcsik’s work (emphasis in original). 
Interestingly, Moravcsik (1998) attributes the weakness of the HI approach in part 
to the methodology employed by such scholars; he argues, “HI theorists overlook 
the foresight of governments because their analyses are rarely based on a detailed, 
primary-source analysis of national preference formation. Instead, they make do 
with public justifications by governments or with secondary sources” (Moravcsik 
1998: 491).
History can have a role in many types of theoretical approaches, including 
traditional adaptation theory. Arguing in support of the importance of history, 
adaptation theorist Mouritzen (1993: 396) writes, “When accounting for 
integration attitude, it is obvious that historical experience will play a decisive 
role.” Despite acknowledging the importance of history, many theorists, however, 
have failed to specify how and why it influences policy formulation. Rosenau 
(1981: 10) finds a role for history (as well as culture), arguing, “Irrespective of 
their size and scope, all political organisms are conceived to proceed on the basis 
of how they orient themselves to their surroundings. These orientations derive
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from the history, culture, and capabilities of each organism and, as such, they are 
regarded as so fundamental as to be simple, mutually exclusive, and all- 
encompassing.”
A major theoretical and methodological dispute concerns the attention that should 
be given to the role of “ideas,” which at times are defined as including culture and 
identity. Here again, definitions are problematic. As Mark Laffey and Jutta 
Weldes (1997: 193) point out, a major difficulty with the “ideas” literature in 
general is that the definition of what ideas are is often “not clear.” Judith 
Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (1993: 3) define ideas as “beliefs held by 
individuals.” In describing the role that they see for ideas, Goldstein and Keohane 
(1993: 12) argue, “Ideas help to order the world. By ordering the world, ideas may 
shape agendas, which can profoundly shape outcomes. Insofar as ideas put 
blinders on people, reducing the number of conceivable alternatives, they serve as 
invisible switchmen, not only by turning action onto certain tracks rather than 
others, as in Weber’s metaphor, but also by obscuring the other tracks from the 
agent’s view.” Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 7-8) classify ideas as “world 
views,” “principled beliefs,” and “causal beliefs,” the first of which is particularly 
relevant here and includes culture and identity.
According to Alexander Wendt (1999: 92), himself one of the leading scholars 
arguing for the importance of ideas, the “focus” on ideas “goes back at least to 
Snyder, Brack, and Sapin who [in 1954] pioneered a tradition of cognitive 
research on the role of belief systems and perceptions in foreign policy decision­
making.” Michael J. Gorges (2001: 141) traces the attention given to the role of 
ideas back even further, pointing out, for instance, that as early as 1949 Philip 
Selnick was writing about “morally sustaining ideas” in his study of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority. Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 4) argue that most scholars rely 
on rationalist approaches and “have relegated ideas to a minor role.” According to 
Goldstein and Keohane (1993: 4-5, note 4), “Ideas . . . have traditionally been 
granted the status of ‘unexplained variance.’” Despite this traditional view, ideas 
regained salience in IR in the 1990s, with a multitude of literature arguing in some 
sense for the re-incorporation of ideas into the research agenda. Wendt (1999: 92) 
argues that the study of ideas “has really taken off in the last decade with multiple
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lines of theorizing, both mainstream and critical, about identity, ideology, 
discourse, culture, and, simply, ideas.”
Despite the increasing attention given to “ideas” at the turn of the millennium, 
Andreas Bieler (2001: 93) argues, “There is a tendency in international 
relations/international political economy (IR/IPE) to neglect ideas, in particular in 
relation to how actors define their interests.” Wendt (1999: 370-371) himself 
acknowledges, “The dominant ontology today in mainstream theories of 
international politics is materialist. IR social scientists usually turn first to material 
forces, defined as power and interest, and bring in ideas only to mop up residual 
unexplained variance. This approach is clearest in Neorealism, but Neoliberalism 
seems to be based on it as well.”
In fact, a criticism that has been levelled against new institutionalism is its failure 
to account for how ideas matter. Gorges (2001: 142) is particularly dissatisfied 
with the ability of institutional theories to “account for the sources of ideas, or the 
conditions under which particular norms and rules are diffused and adopted. 
Studies of intra-organisational learning or a focus on cognitive/psychological 
approaches might be helpful in explaining these processes of diffusion or 
adoption. This would, however, take us a long way away from an analysis of 
institutions themselves.” Although Gorges’ (2001) criticism that the ways in 
which ideas are developed, spread, and incorporated into institutions are often not 
clarified by institutional theorists is valid, the solution to this difficulty would not 
necessarily seem to be to alter the approach completely to the neglect of 
institutions themselves. Rather, a thorough empirical study that examines 
institutions and policy-making to determine what ideas were involved and how 
they influenced decisions might be more appropriate.
Furthermore, Gorges (2001: 141) argues that “ideas arise out of social, economic 
and historical factors that may themselves be important explanatory factors.” 
Gorges’ (2001) point is valid that ideas are themselves shaped by other factors. 
Yet, one could argue that social and economic factors are themselves shaped by 
historical experiences and that it is thus history that is most important. Certainly,
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however, it would seem that there are a variety of factors that shape ideas, and 
institutions, whether they are formalised or not, are among them.
Many of those scholars arguing for the importance of ideas are constructivists, 
termed “reflectivists” by Goldstein and Keohane (1993), a school of thought in IR 
that, according to Wendt (1999:1), can be dated to 1989 and the work of Nicholas 
Oluf. The disciplines that influenced the development of constructivism include 
“critical theory, postmodernism, feminist theory, historical institutionalism, 
sociological institutionalism, symbolic interactionism, structuration theory, and 
the like” (Wendt 1999: 1). According to Wendt (1999: 1), “[S]tudents of 
international politics have increasingly accepted two basic tenets of 
‘constructivism’: 1) that the structures of human association are determined 
primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and 2) that the identities and 
interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than 
given by nature.”
A constructivist approach works well with a study of identity. According to 
Ingebritsen (1998: 42), “The strength of the constructivist framework lies in rich, 
detailed accounts of identity formation and change.” “Identity” itself is, however, 
much like “institutions” and other concepts considered in this chapter, a term that 
may be defined in many different ways and has many different forms. The various 
types include national identity, cultural identity, European identity, etc. The form 
of identity that is most relevant for this study is national identity, although this is 
often so closely tied to other types of identity (such as cultural identity) that 
complete differentiation is impossible.
Constructivists such as Wendt (1999) often stress the importance of identity. 
According to Wendt (1999: 170), “To have an identity is simply to have certain 
ideas about who one is in a given situation, and as such the concept of identity fits 
squarely into the belief side of the desire plus belief equation. These beliefs in turn 
help constitute interests.” He argues, “Two kinds of ideas can enter into identity, 
in other words, those held by the Self and those held by the Other. Identities are 
constituted by both internal and external structures” (Wendt 1999: 224). Although 
Wendt’s structural approach regards change as difficult, he argues that “identities
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are always in process, always contested, always an accomplishment of practice” 
(Wendt 1999: 340).
Identity has been seen as important in the formulation of foreign policy. Indeed, 
national identity is often regarded as crucial for understanding foreign policy. 
According to William Wallace (1991: 66), “Nationhood and national identity 
represent necessary myths which underpin foreign policy.” He argues that “[t]hey 
constitute the distinction between the ‘national community’ which the government 
represents abroad and the foreigners with whom it deals; more than that, they 
legitimize the actions of governments in defence of the ‘national’ interest” 
(Wallace 1991: 66). Indeed, Wallace (1991: 78) regards identity as so essential 
that “[s]tates cannot survive without a sense of identity, an image of what special 
contribution they have to make to civilization and international order. Foreign 
policy is partly a reflection of that search for identity.” Similarly, Christopher Hill 
and William Wallace (1996: 8) argue, “Effective foreign policy rests upon a 
shared sense of national identity, of a nation-state’s ‘place in the world’, its 
friends and enemies, its interests and aspirations. These underlying assumptions 
are embedded in national history and myth, changing slowly over time as political 
leaders reinterpret them and external and internal developments reshape them.”
Jurgen Habermas (1996: 286) also regards history as crucial in the formation of 
national identity and argues that “the awareness of a national identity” 
“crystallizes around common history” (as well as culture and language). Indeed, 
he argues that “only” this “awareness[J . . .  the consciousness of belonging to the 
same nation, makes distant people spread over large territories feel politically 
responsible for each other” (Habermas 1996: 286). For Habermas (1996: 286), 
therefore, history and culture shape identity, and it is, indeed, of “cultural identity” 
that he speaks. Discussing the importance of such an identity, Habermas (1996: 
286) writes, “This cultural identity provides the socially integrating substrate for 
the political identity of the republic.”
Pursuing a similar line of argument, Eric J. Hobsbawm (1996) prioritises national 
identity and the importance of history. According to Hobsbawm (1996: 255), 
“Nations without a past are a contradiction in terms. What makes a nation is the
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past.” Similarly, for Anthony D. Smith (1997: 36), “In order to create a 
convincing representation of the ‘nation’, a worthy and distinctive past must be 
recreated and appropriated. Only then can the nation aspire to a glorious destiny 
for which citizens may be expected to make some sacrifices.”
As has been hinted at earlier, an additional “idea” that is important in shaping 
policy is culture. Like identity, culture is an “elusive” concept, which is 
sometimes regarded as an idea itself, at other times as being comprised of ideas 
(Hudson 1997: 2). Valerie M. Hudson (1997: 2) argues, “The elusiveness of 
culture becomes apparent when one attempts to define it in a theoretical sense. 
The difficulty is not so much centered on what to include in such a definition, but 
rather what to exclude” (emphasis in original). As Philippe Keraudren (1996: 72) 
points out, “[I]t is difficult to find more than a handful of authors who use the 
same definition, or rather the same words, to define culture.” Keraudren (1996: 
73) argues that, according to “a traditional scientific view of culture,” “culture is a 
mental product, usually defined as shared values, shared beliefs, norms or ideas.” 
For Wendt (1999: 188), “Cultures consist of many different norms, rules, and 
institutions, and the practices they induce will often be contradictory.” The blurred 
boundaries between culture and the concepts of “institutions” and “regimes” are 
suggested by the above quotations.
Some scholars differentiate various types of culture, often choosing to concentrate 
on political culture rather than culture in general. Gabriel A. Almond (1989: 1) 
argues, “Something like a notion of political culture has been around as long as 
men have spoken and written about politics.” Wolfram F. Hanrieder (1971: 115) 
defines political culture as “the relevant values, cognitions, and expressive 
symbols” on which the “image of the Good Society rests.” Jan-Erik Lane and 
Svante O. Ersson (1996: 175) write, “The concept of political culture refers to 
attitudes that individuals hold in relation to politics broadly conceived.” 
According to Hudson (1997: 16), however, the “distinctions” between different 
types of culture are, with the exception of elite culture, “not very meaningful, or 
even helpful, to the researcher.”
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One of the earliest modem scholarly pieces to address “culture” is Gabriel A. 
Almond and Sidney Verba’s (1963) The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and 
Democracy in Five Nations. For them, as their title suggests, the main interest is 
what they term “civic culture” (Almond and Verba 1963). Jerzy J. Wiatr (1989: 
119) argues, “In general, The Civic Culture can be considered one of the 
milestones in the recent history of comparative social science.” For Almond and 
Verba (1963: 5), “[T]he working principles of the democratic polity and its civic 
culture -- the ways in which political elites make decisions, their norms and 
attitudes, as well as the norms and attitudes of the ordinary citizen, his relation to 
government and to his fellow citizens -- are subtler cultural components. They 
have the more diffuse properties of belief systems or of codes of personal 
relations, which the anthropologists tell us spread only with great difficulty, 
undergoing substantial change in the process.”
Almond and Verba (1963: 8) regard “national histories” and “social structures” as 
factors that can explain differences in civic cultures. Describing the differences 
between the civic cultures of the UK and the United States, they write, “Though 
their basic patterns are similar, the civic cultures of Britain and the United States 
have somewhat different contents, reflecting these differences in national histories 
and social structures” (Almond and Verba 1963: 8). There are, in fact, similarities 
between their approach and that of new institutionalism, as social structures can 
be regarded as institutions, and history is given an important role in new 
institutionalism, particularly in historical institutionalism.
Although their focus is on civic culture, Almond and Verba (1963: 5) also speak 
of political culture, arguing, “A democratic form of participatory political system 
requires as well a political culture consistent with it.” For them, “the term political 
culture . . . refers to the specifically political orientations -- attitudes toward the 
political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in 
the system. We speak of a political culture just as we can speak of an economic 
culture or a religious culture. It is a set of orientations toward a special set of 
social objects and processes” (Almond and Verba 1963: 13). They further specify 
their use of the term culture by explaining that they “employ the concept of 
culture in only one of its many meanings: that of psychological orientation toward
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social objects. When we speak of the political culture of a society, we refer to the 
political system as internalized in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its 
population” (Almond and Verba 1963: 14, emphasis in original).
Almond and Verba (1963: 13) argue that they use “the term political culture for 
two reasons. First, if we are to ascertain the relations between political and 
nonpolitical attitudes and development patterns, we have to separate the former 
from the latter even though the boundary between them is not as sharp as our 
terminology would suggest.” The second reason is that the term political culture 
“enables us to utilise the conceptual frameworks and approaches of anthropology, 
sociology, and psychology” (Almond and Verba 1963: 13). Furthermore, they 
assert that “the concept of political culture . . .  enables us to formulate hypotheses 
about relationships among the different components of culture and to test these 
hypotheses empirically” (Almond and Verba 1963: 14).
Commenting on his earlier work with Verba, Almond (1989: 29) writes, “The 
position taken in The Civic Culture that beliefs, feelings, and values significantly 
influence political behavior, and these beliefs, feelings, and values are the product 
of socialization experiences is one that is sustained by much evidence.” David P. 
Conradt (1989: 225), however, criticises Almond and Verba (1963) for their 
failure to consider history and to explain change sufficiently: “In neglecting to 
examine directly or systematically the effects of history upon political culture, the 
authors were unable to deal satisfactorily with the problem of change.” Identifying 
a specific example of a flaw in their work, Conradt (1989: 227) argues, “The Civic 
Culture's treatment of national identity and pride was also deficient in the German 
case.”
However, the methodology employed by Almond and Verba (1963), as well as by 
Almond (1989) in his later work reflecting on their earlier project, would not be 
appropriate here because their work focuses on citizens rather than policy-makers. 
Their concern is with what is in the minds of citizens, whereas the concern here is 
the way in which policies are formulated by national decision-makers at the elite 
level.
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A more relevant approach to and definition of political culture (for the purposes of 
this study) is that developed by Teija Tiilikainen (1998a). For Tiilikainen (1998a: 
17), political culture “refers . . .  to the whole system of political traditions that is 
characteristic of a particular political unity at a particular time. Political traditions 
can be seen as political doctrines, or political systems of meaning, which are 
characterised by a clear historical continuity. Political culture refers to the 
substance of the main political traditions as well as to their structure and the 
relations between them.” Furthermore, for Tiilikainen (1998a: 17-18), “[PJolitical 
culture is more or less based upon the political concepts of those in power.”
Tiilikainen’s (1998a) definition is particularly appropriate here, not only because 
her study concerns Finland and European integration, but also because it 
concentrates on the “political concepts of those in power”, i.e. the policy-makers, 
as well as because it acknowledges the importance of history in constructing 
political culture. Focusing on the role of political culture in explaining 
participation in European integration, Tiilikainen (1998a) identifies history as an 
important factor that can explain the variations in political cultures in different 
parts of Europe. She argues, “The division of European political culture brought 
about by the Reformation has conditioned the project of European unification by 
imposing cultural and political limits upon it” (Tiilikainen 1998a: 55). She thus 
concentrates on the significance of a specific historical episode, the Reformation, 
in shaping national political cultures and, in turn, attitudes towards European 
integration.
Furthermore, Tiilikainen (1998a: 18) elucidates the way in which political culture 
impacts upon policy formulation as follows: “Political culture constitutes the basis 
for political values and identities and, consequently, for the formulation of 
political goals.” Thus, for her, identity is constituted by political culture, rather 
than existing alongside it. Tiilikainen (1998a) also, as noted above, views the 
political culture of policy-makers as most important. She furthermore sees an 
interconnection between political culture and history and institutions: “The terms 
of political culture receive expression through the conceptions of political elites 
and decision-makers even if they also have to achieve a broader legitimacy among 
the citizens. The terms of political culture live in, and are transmitted by, people’s
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political conceptions as well as institutionalised political structures such as 
different types of laws and norms and organisations of governance. Elements of 
political culture live in history, which means that political conceptions and 
understandings are all the time being reproduced and adapted to new historical 
conditions” (Tiilikainen 1998a: 18). For Tiilikainen (1998a: 170), cultures are 
“historically constructed.” Based on her work, the causal arrows would seem to be 
as follows: history -> political culture -> formulation of political goals.
An emphasis on culture and identity is frequently combined with a focus on 
structure. For instance, Wendt (1999: 138) argues that “in addition to idealism, a 
key feature of constructivism is holism or structuralism, the view that social 
structures have effects that cannot be reduced to agents and their interactions. 
Among these effects is the shaping of identities and interests, which are 
conditioned by discursive formations -- by the distribution of ideas in the system - 
- as well as by material forces, and as such are not formed in a vacuum” (emphasis 
in original). In terms of the importance of structure, constructivism bears some 
similarities to historical institutionalism, which was, indeed, one of the approaches 
that contributed to the development of constructivism.
Historical institutionalism and constructivism, particularly the version put forth by 
Wendt (1999), also share an emphasis on history and a similar view of change. 
Both place importance on path dependency, such as that promoted Pierson (1996), 
whose work is discussed above. For instance, Wendt (1999: 339) writes, 
“Structural change is . . . path dependent.” Wendt’s (1999) discussion of the 
difficulty of structural change resembles the HI concept of sunk costs that is 
mentioned above. According to Wendt (1999: 339), “Structural change is difficult. 
The term ‘structure’ itself makes it clear why this must be so, since it calls 
attention to patterns or relationships that are relatively stable through time. If 
things were constantly changing then we could not speak of their being structured 
at all.” However, despite the lack of attention given by structuralists such as 
Wendt (1999) to individual actors, a structural approach does not preclude a role 
for individuals, nor does it preclude change.
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Related to the role of individuals and the actor/structure debate itself is the issue 
of the extent to which actors are treated as “rational.” The rational choice 
literature (which is inspired by economics), prevalent in both CP and IR, assumes 
that actors make rational decisions. In short, as Moravcsik (1993: 481) explains, 
“State action at any particular moment is assumed to be minimally rational, in that 
it is purposively directed toward the achievement of a set of consistently ordered 
goals or objectives. Governments evaluate alternative courses of action on the 
basis of a utility function.” According to Wendt (1999: 169), “Rationalists tend 
not to be very interested in explaining interests, preferring to see how far they can 
get by focusing on behavior while holding interests constant. Still less are they 
interested in issues of identity.” Preference formation (where the role of ideas is 
crucial in shaping interests), in particular, is often neglected, although “rationalists 
are increasingly taking an interest in both preference and identity formation” 
(Wendt 1999: 170).
Although rationality is sometimes considered to be capable of coexisting with an 
approach that prioritises “ideas,” it is at times regarded as being in opposition to 
such an approach. For instance, Rosenau (1981: 14) argues that his adaptation 
theory is not one of rational choice: “Preferences for one or another self­
environment orientation do not result from rational calculation and careful 
deliberation. Rather they originate in the cultural impulses, historical precedents, 
and structural circumstances that differentiate the entity and give it meaning. The 
members and leaders of an entity acquire their cultural, historical, and structural 
understandings from its prior generations and treat them as givens, as values they 
have to articulate and protect rather than as alternatives they have to select or as 
issues they have to ponder and resolve.” Yet, even Rosenau (1981: 15) admits that 
“many of the mechanisms through which adaptation occurs involve the 
accumulation of information, the framing of alternatives, the assessment of costs 
and benefits, and the other steps whereby actors seek to maximize rational choice. 
To focus on such activities, however, is to study the dynamics of adaptive 
behaviour and not its wellsprings.” The degree to which rational choice is 
involved therefore depends largely on the point in the process of policy 
formulation that is being analysed and what the analyst is attempting to explain.
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Rational choice can also be combined with an international regime approach. For 
instance, Keohane (1983: 141) presents “an interpretation of international regime- 
formation that relies heavily on rational-choice analysis in the utilitarian social 
contract tradition.” Yet, he admits that rational choice is not “the only valid way to 
understand international regimes, or even . . . preferable to others” (Keohane 
1983: 143). Rather, Keohane (1983: 143) “view[s] rational-choice analysis as one 
way to generate an insightful interpretation of international regimes that 
complements interpretations derived from analyses of conventions and of 
learning.” In addition, Stein’s (1983: 132) “conceptualization of regimes is 
interest-based. It suggests that the same forces of autonomously calculated self- 
interest that lie at the root of the anarchic international system also lay the 
foundation for international regimes as a form of international order.” He argues 
that “[t]he same forces that lead individuals to bind themselves together to escape 
the state of nature also lead states to coordinate their actions, even to collaborate 
with one another. Quite simply, there are times when rational self-interested 
calculation leads actors to abandon independent decision making in favor of joint 
decision making” (Stein 1983: 132).
As is suggested by Stein’s (1983) argument above, the discussion on the degree to 
which actors can be considered to be “rational” is related to the debate on the 
relationship between interests and ideas. Laffey and Weldes (1997: 200) argue 
that “the conceptual distinction between interests and ‘ideas’ . . .  is central to 
rationalism.” Indeed, as pointed out above, Stein’s (1983) rational choice 
approach to regime theory is “interest-based.” Not only regime theorists, however, 
may (in some cases) see interests as separate entities.
Even constructivists may see a distinction between interests and ideas. 
Concentrating on the difference between identities and interests, Wendt (1999:
231) writes, “Identities refer to who or what actors are. They designate social 
kinds or states of being. Interests refer to what actors want. They designate 
motivations that help explain behavior.. . .  Interests presuppose identities because 
an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities 
have varying degrees of cultural context so will interests. Identities may
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themselves be chosen in light of interests, as some rationalists argue, but those 
interests themselves presuppose still deeper identities.”
Even interests may be subdivided into different categories and defined in different 
ways. According to Wendt (1999: 231), “The social theory literature distinguishes 
two kinds of interests, objective and subjective.” He argues that “[t]he concept of 
subjective interests refers to those beliefs that actors actually have about how to 
meet their identity needs, and it is these which are the proximate motivation for 
behavior. This is equivalent to what rationalists mean by ‘preferences’ or ‘tastes,’ 
and philosophers by ‘desire,’ and to avoid confusion we might want to use one of 
those terms instead and reserve ‘interest’ for ‘objective’ interests” (Wendt 1999:
232). Objective interests are defined as “needs or functional imperatives which 
must be fulfilled if an identity is to be reproduced” (Wendt 1999: 231-232).
The type of objective interest that would seem most relevant here is national 
interest. Wendt (1999: 198) defines national interest “as the objective interests of 
state-society complexes, consisting of four needs: physical survival, autonomy, 
economic well-being, and collective self-esteem.” Collective self-esteem is the 
only one of the four that does not necessarily appear straightforward. For Wendt 
(1999: 236), the need for collective self-esteem is “a group’s need to feel good 
about itself for respect or status.”
Constructivists such as Wendt (1999) regard structural forces as constructing, or 
shaping, “ideas.” There are, however, other ways of examining the role of ideas 
than the approaches that they put forth. For instance, Bieler (2001) combines an 
economic-focused approach with one that focuses on ideas. Bieler’s (2001: 99) 
neo-Gramscian approach “conceptualise[s] the material basis of ideas, combining 
a ‘constructivist’ understanding of the role of ideas with a clear acknowledgement 
of the importance of their material structure.” He argues that such an approach 
avoids “two things”: 1) “falling into the trap of economic determinism, which 
regards ideas merely as a reflection of material structure” and 2) “adopting a 
position of empirical pluralism, which treats ideas as a factor completely 
independent from material reality” (Bieler 2001: 99). He asserts that “ideas 
represent an independent force, but only in so far as they are rooted in the
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economic sphere, going beyond it at the same time, i.e. that they are in a 
dialectical relationship with the material properties of the sphere of production” 
(Bieler 2001: 98). In constructing his argument, Bieler (2001: 93) draws on the 
1971 work of Antonio Gramsci to argue that “ideas must be disseminated through 
a material structure consisting of publishing houses, political newspapers, 
periodicals, etc. to become relevant.” In this sense, Bieler’s (2001) approach 
resembles Benedict Anderson’s (1991) conception of “imagined communities” in 
which individuals are connected by the print media to form communities despite 
the fact that they will never be able to meet each other personally, but must 
instead imagine each other’s existence.
An alternative approach, which, in contrast to that of Bieler (2001), downplays the 
role of “ideas,” yet does not concentrate entirely on economic factors either, is a 
sectoral approach, such as that proposed by Ingebritsen (1998). Discussing the 
flaws that she sees with both economic and constructivist approaches, Ingebritsen 
(1998: 44) argues, “Constructivists portray Nordic integration with the EC as an 
impressionistic, subjective process of changing identities. Economists focus on 
macroeconomic conditions as a predictor of accession and obscure the intense 
political struggles that raged within each state as some societal groups pushed for 
accession and others actively resisted. Neither the combined Nordic pursuit of 
political integration nor the divergent roles these governments will play in 
European politics can be captured by relying on these two alternative approaches.” 
According to Ingebritsen (1998: 45), her “analysis reveals how economic sectors 
in northern Europe become politically important in the integration process once 
international security threats are no longer the primary concern of states.”
Ingebritsen (1998: 44) does, however, see “qualifications” to her approach: “First, 
sectors do not always define the choices available to the state. When security 
imperatives prevail, states may resist integration with the European core, and no 
amount of sectoral pressure will convince state authorities to trade off autonomy 
for integration.” Although Ingebritsen (1998) does see security imperatives as 
being capable of prevailing over a sectoral explanation, she does not recognise the 
possibility that such imperatives may also lead states in the opposite direction, of 
pursuing more rather than less integration. The second “qualification” that she
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identifies is that “sectors are caught in a two-level game because by their very 
nature they bridge the international and domestic political spheres. In each state, 
economic sectors define their interests in relation to European policy regimes. The 
process is political and depends on who is expected to win or lose in the 
integration process, in contrast to an optimal economic choice made by a rational, 
unitary actor. While parsimony may be sacrificed in an effort to trace the 
interaction of sectors and the capacity of the state to act, it is possible to predict, 
based on a comparative analysis of differences in sectoral dependence, that some 
states will face greater social resistance to European integration than others” 
(Ingebritsen 1998: 44-45).
Although sectors may be important in determining whether or not a country 
decides to join the EU, a sectoral approach is weaker in explaining a state’s 
behaviour inside the EU. It is also not as useful when the focus is not merely one 
of the degree of integration but also the way in which the state behaves and 
pursues integration. In particular, Ingebritsen’s (1998) approach fails to explain 
the differences between Finnish and Swedish behaviour as EU members; on the 
contrary, her approach leads one to concentrate on the similarities between these 
two countries. Thus, her theoretical framework, like the others presented here, 
cannot alone explain the differences between Finnish and Swedish adaptation to 
theEU.
Towards the Construction of a New Framework
The analysis of the relevant theoretical literature has demonstrated a multitude of 
approaches that both compete with and complement each other, often without 
dialogue between them. For instance, although Peters (1999) points out the 
similarities between new institutionalist and international regime approaches, 
most of the scholars arguing in support of these approaches fail to see the 
similarities and do not engage in dialogue with each other. Moreover, within 
theoretical approaches, such as the two mentioned above, there is often 
tremendous diversity. Furthermore, terms such as “regime” may have completely 
different meanings depending on who uses them. None of the key concepts
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highlighted in this study (adaptation, regime, history, institution, culture, and 
identity) has a clear-cut definition.
The approaches outlined above have come from a variety of different 
perspectives, including both domestic and international politics approaches. As 
the EU is neither truly domestic nor fully international, one type of theory that is 
appropriate in that it draws on both domestic and international politics is foreign 
policy theory. Yet, because the EU is not truly “foreign,” the formulation of EU 
policies is certainly more than simply the formulation of foreign policy. The term 
“foreign policy” implies that one is dealing with the international system, which is 
generally characterised by weak institutions with little binding force from which 
exit is relatively easy. This is in contrast to the stronger institutions, both formal 
and informal, found in the EU that did constrain member states and from which 
exit was so costly that no member state had attempted it at the close of this study 
in 2000. At the same time, the EU between 1995 and 2000 was not entirely 
domestic; adapting to the EU involved working with other member states in a 
fashion that, at times, was highly intergovernmental.
Adaptation is seen here as a behavioural strategy. In particular, it is defined as the 
altering by a member state of its own strategy as a result of EU membership. For 
instance, when an EU member state officially states a position and then changes it 
to fit in with those of the EU as a whole, that is an example of adaptation. 
Although it is not a belief system, adaptation may be based on a belief system or 
systems. In particular, identity and culture (themselves far more than simply belief 
systems), shaped by historical experiences and institutions, are the determinants of 
the nature and degree of adaptation. Although the modes of adaptation identified 
by traditional adaptation theory are referred to at times, the goal here is not to 
categorise Finland and Sweden as to which of the models they best fit. 
Furthermore, the analysis is not based on a continuum from maladaptation to 
adaptation, but, rather, adaptation is considered to be a change (or changes) that 
the adaptor makes as a result of its relationship with the “regime” (in this case, the 
EU) to which it adapts. These changes, or adaptations (or, indeed, adjustments), 
may vary in their nature and extent. Indeed, the goal here is to characterise the 
nature and extent of the differences between Finnish and Swedish adaptation to
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the EU between 1995 and 2000. In other words, how and why did Finnish and 
Swedish policy-makers alter their positions and policies on EU-related matters 
during this time period and to what extent?
The adaptation theory put forth by scholars such as Mouritzen (1988, 1993) and 
Petersen (1998) provides a useful starting point for this study. Yet, interestingly 
and perhaps ironically, one of the most useful versions of adaptation theory is one 
of the earliest: Rosenau’s (1981) theory of political adaptation. However, the 
various typologies of modes of adaptation are not capable of accounting for the 
differences between Finnish and Swedish adaptation to the EU, as both countries 
seem to have pursued a balanced approach, as later chapters demonstrate. 
Furthermore, whereas adaptation theorists give importance to external as well as 
internal factors, the focus here is on internal ones. In fact, although external and 
internal factors are intimately connected, the external ones are held primarily 
constant here since Finland and Sweden joined the EU at the same time and faced 
nearly identical external opportunities and constraints. Focusing on their 
adaptation to EU membership rather than the entire international system is in 
keeping with Rosenau’s (1981: 41) suggestion of focusing on the “salient 
environment.”
International regime theory also provides insights that can be employed in this 
study. However, the existing literature alone is not capable of explaining the 
differences between Finnish and Swedish adaptation to the EU and requires 
clarification. The definition of a regime is often too broad to be useful, and 
although regime theory has been applied to the EU, it is frequently used to analyse 
very different types of “regimes.” For instance, international regimes may be 
groupings such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, replaced 
by the World Trade Organization, WTO) that do not have the same control over 
their members that the EU has. Furthermore, most regimes have the possibility of 
exit, whereas it is not certain that the option of exit from the EU was a feasible 
one.
In addition, whereas much of the literature on regimes concentrates on the 
formation of regimes, the focus here is on what happens when new members join
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an existing regime from the perspective of the new members. Finland and Sweden 
entered an already formed Union whose acquis communitaire they were forced to 
accept in full and to whose principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures they would need, at least to some extent, to adapt as a condition of 
their membership.
A “regime” is used here to refer to the European Union, but with the 
understanding that the EU is not truly a regime in the full sense of word as used 
by international regime theorists such as Krasner (1983c). Although the EU is not 
taken to be a regime per se, it is regarded as having regime-like characteristics 
and, significantly, may be viewed by member states as a regime to which they 
must adapt in order to maximise their influence. Despite potential confusion with 
the use of the word “regime” by adaptation theorists such as Mouritzen, the 
decision has been made to use “regime” to mean the target of adaptation rather 
than the adaptor. Rather than viewing Finland and Sweden as regimes (as, for 
instance, Mouritzen does), they are treated as unified actors formulating national 
EU policy (with the understanding that they are actually comprised of individuals 
and groups that together shape common national positions).
Constructivism provides considerable inspiration for the theoretical approach 
employed here, including both the importance of “ideas” (in this case primarily 
culture and identity) and the importance of structure (primarily historical 
experiences and institutions) in shaping these ideas. In this study, the primary 
form of culture that is of interest is political culture, particularly as far as it refers 
to the decision-making style of elites. Although political culture is related to 
popular, or mass, culture, it is not entirely the same. Identity is seen as co-existing 
with political culture, with the two concepts influencing each other and both being 
shaped by historical experiences and institutions. For the purposes of this project, 
identity may be roughly defined as the sense of being that a state has as a 
collective entity, the sense of who or what that state is. It should also be noted 
that, although culture and identity are described as “ideas,” they are also much 
more than simply “ideas” in the sense of the thoughts inside the minds of the 
decision-makers. They are, however, certainly a part of their thought processes 
(whether consciously or not) and, in turn, influence the formulation of policies.
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Rationality is not totally disregarded, but, at the same time, policy-makers’ 
decisions are seen as a combination of “rational” choices and the influence of 
structure and ideas that “colour” their decisions (at times without their knowledge) 
or constrain them due to past choices or experiences. In fact, it is not always 
possible to know the extent to which a particular decision is rational, nor is it 
necessary. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that policy-makers may consciously 
take decisions that will constrain the choices of future decision-makers, 
particularly by establishing sunk costs. In keeping with this view, Moravcsik’s 
(1998) critique of historical institutionalism for concentrating on the unintended 
and unforeseen nature of structural consequences is considered to be valid because 
many decisions are, as Moravcsik (1998) observes, deliberate and intended.
Historical experiences, whether deliberately constructed by policy-makers or not, 
are viewed as vital in defining the structure within which future decisions can be 
taken by shaping institutions, culture, and identity.7 The concept of path 
dependency, used by scholars such as Pierson (1996), is thus relevant, although 
the possibility for change is accepted. Policy-makers are not fully bound by past 
decisions and events, even though they are influenced and constrained by them. 
There is a variety of historical experiences, which are defined in the following 
chapter, that impact on policy-making. This is in contrast to the approach of 
scholars such as Tiilikainen (1998a), who concentrate on a specific historical 
episode (in Tiilikainen’s case, the Reformation).
Interests are regarded as integrally related to identities and are thus not a focus of 
analysis in their own right in this thesis. Despite this, Wendt’s (1999: 198) 
definition of the national interest is useful, particularly his fourth “need,” 
“collective self-esteem,” which is an important determinant of national EU 
policies. Yet, collective self-esteem (or self-confidence) is considered here to be 
part of national identity and is shaped by historical experiences and institutions. 
Clearly, Wendt’s other three needs (physical survival, autonomy, and economic
7 Institutions here include both formal ones (such as the office of the President in Finland) and 
informal ones, which may overlap at times with political culture (e.g. decision-making style, 
considered here to be a part of political culture, might also be considered an institution).
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well-being) are also influential in determining a country’s EU policies (although 
the EU and its member states are not the focus of Wendt’s work), but they are less 
useful in explaining differences between the Finnish and Swedish approaches. 
Indeed, this is probably true for explaining differences between most member 
states, as participation in the EU imposes more or less the same constraints on all 
members in these respects.
While most of the theoretical approaches reviewed in this chapter have something 
to contribute, one that particularly contradicts the arguments presented here is that 
of Moravcsik’s (1993,1998) liberal intergovemmentalism and especially his focus 
on the primacy of economic interests in explaining national EU policy-formation. 
Rather than prioritising economic interests as the primary explanatory factors, in 
the current model they are incorporated into a theoretical framework that 
concentrates on the role of historical experiences, institutions, identity, and 
culture. Thus, economic historical experiences are considered to be part of 
historical experiences as a whole (and, indeed, Finland and Sweden’s economic 
histories are mentioned in chapter three along with other aspects of their 
histories). Similarly, economic institutions are part of each state’s institutional 
framework. Thus, economic historical experiences and institutions may, like other 
historical experiences and institutions, shape culture and identity and in turn affect 
policy formulation. They are therefore not exogenous to the model employed in 
this study. Although they are incorporated into the model, economic factors are 
not viewed as being decisive aspects of HICI for the purposes of this study. In 
fact, they tend to demonstrate more similarities than differences between Finland 
and Sweden. Furthermore, economic interests are particularly ineffective in 
explaining the differences in their adaptation to the EU in terms of their 
formulation of national EU policies, where (as is argued in the following chapters 
of this thesis) HICI factors have been the primary influences on policy 
formulation. On the other hand, economic factors alone are unable to explain these 
differences.
Another approach that differs considerably from that pursued here is that of 
Ingebritsen (1998), whose sectoral approach also fails to give much importance to 
HICI. Instead, her focus is on economic sectors and how they influence national
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participation in European integration. Although her focus is on the Nordic region 
(whereas Moravcsik’s (1993, 1998) is not), she groups Finland and Sweden 
together and observes no significant differences between them. Thus, although her 
approach may be capable of explaining why the behaviour of Finland and Sweden 
differs from that of their Nordic neighbours, it cannot explain why these two 
relatively similar countries diverged on some aspects of their EU policies between 
1995 and 2000. Economic sectors are not viewed as being exogenous to the 
present model; rather, they are considered to be a part of the institutional structure 
of Finland and Sweden. However, as there are such similarities between the two 
countries in this regard (as Ingebritsen herself argues), they are not particularly 
useful in explaining the differences between these states. An approach such as that 
of Ingebritsen (1998), which concentrates on the role of economic sectors, cannot 
clarify divergences between Finnish and Swedish adaptation to the EU.
Many of the concepts that are highlighted here are, as has already been noted, 
ones that are known for their elusiveness. Despite their many forms in the 
theoretical literature, they are too important to be ignored. An attempt is made in 
this thesis to give them form and assert which elements of these concepts are most 
important for explaining the differences between Finnish and Swedish adaptation 
to the EU. The next chapter (chapter three) elucidates which aspects are most 
relevant for the particular countries analysed here, and the case studies (chapters 
four, five, and six) demonstrate in what ways HICI matter.
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Chapter Three: Meet Two New Kids on the European 
Block
The two preceding chapters have introduced the topic of the study of the 
adaptation of new member states to the European Union (EU). Now it is time to 
“meet” the two “new kids on the European block” that are at the heart of this 
study through an analysis of their histories, institutions, cultures, and identities 
(HICI). This chapter first substantiates the appropriateness of the use of the most 
similar systems research design introduced in the preceding chapter. The 
similarities between Finland and Sweden are examined through an overview of 
their HICI. Because the main interest here is in the differences (as they are, based 
on a most similar systems research design, capable of explaining differences in 
their adaptation to the EU), the section focusing on differences is significantly 
longer than that examining similarities. Should the interest have been in the 
similarities between the two countries, it would have been possible to reverse the 
lengths of the two sections, and thus the difference in length should not be 
interpreted as meaning that the differences between Finland and Sweden are 
greater than the similarities.
It should be noted that this chapter is by no means meant to provide a thorough 
coverage of Finnish and Swedish history between the Middle Ages and the end of 
the twentieth century (although it does encompass this vast period), an ambitious 
task for a thesis of its own. As this is a political rather than a historical thesis, the 
history is provided in order to substantiate the theoretical arguments that have 
been suggested in the preceding chapter and will be developed in the forthcoming 
chapters. The focus in the first section is therefore on those aspects of their 
historical experiences as well as their institutions, cultures, and identities that 
substantiate the appropriateness of Finland and Sweden for a most similar systems 
research design. The following section of this chapter then highlights their 
differences, which may be able to explain why these two similar countries did not 
pursue identical strategies as EU members between 1995 and 2000. Indeed, there 
are many elements of these countries’ backgrounds that could have been included 
here. However, due to limitations in space and scope, a general overview
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approach has been employed in this chapter, leaving out many aspects of the two 
countries’ histories that would have been vital components of a more historical 
study. Furthermore, although certain events are highlighted at times, these must be 
seen in the context of historical processes and developments, which are discussed
o
in this chapter.
Two Similar “Kids”
Despite being newcomers to the EU, Finland and Sweden share a lengthy 
common history. A series of organised military incursions from Sweden 
eventually resulted in the integration of the area known today as “Finland” into 
the Swedish kingdom, which was considerably larger than modem Sweden and 
did not include parts of today’s southern Sweden that originally belonged to 
Denmark.9 There is evidence of settlement from Sweden in Finland by the 
eleventh century (Arter 1999: 13). Finland, although clearly a frontier-zone for the 
realm, was not regarded as a colony, but rather “soon acquired equal status with 
other parts of the Swedish kingdom” (Engman and Kirby 1989: xi). Similarly, 
David Kirby (1990: 153) argues that although Finland was “geographically 
isolated” from modem Sweden, it was “regarded as an integral part of the realm.” 
An example of Finland’s integration was the participation by Finnish 
representatives in the 1363 election of the Swedish king, although the integration 
was economic and social as well as political (Engman and Kirby 1989: xi).
Furthermore, Finland was itself “by no means a clearly defined or unified area,” 
and “the most integrated parts of the [Swedish] kingdom were those nearest the 
capital” (Engman and Kirby 1989: xi). This meant that some parts of “Finland,” a 
term which itself “applied to different areas at different periods,” were more 
integrated than were parts of modem day Sweden, whereas more distant areas of 
Finland were less integrated (Engman and Kirby 1989: xi). Similarly, Risto
8 This chapter concentrates on the historical experiences, institutions, cultures, and identities of 
what would become the modem Finnish and Swedish states, with the understanding that the 
Finnish and Swedish states as such, with their current borders, did not exist until the twentieth 
century.
9 Another effort to Christianise the Finns, although less well-organised and also less successful, 
was made from Novgorod to expand its influence into Karelia.
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Alapuro (1988: 19) writes, “The southwestern region of what later became the 
Finnish state belonged more or less to the core of the Swedish Kingdom, whereas 
the other regions remained at the periphery.” This was a distinction that would 
persist into the nineteenth century, when, according to Matti Klinge (1982: 12), 
there were “two Finlands” (kaksi Suomea), one tied to Stockholm and the other to 
St Petersburg.
A common bond throughout the Swedish realm was the Swedish language, which 
was found on the Finnish mainland as early as the eleventh century. Although the 
vernacular language in Finland was Finnish, Swedish became the language of the 
educated classes, and legally Swedish was the only official language of the realm. 
Although Finnish does not belong to the same language group as Swedish and the 
other Scandinavian languages, there are semantic similarities between Finnish and 
Swedish. For instance, as Erik Allardt (1989: 220) points out, “Each language has 
many loan words taken from the other.” The list of almost identical Finnish and 
Swedish words includes, for example, “poika” (Finnish) and “pojke” (Swedish), 
both meaning “boy.” Furthermore, as Allardt (1989: 220) astutely notes, “There is 
a strong purist tendency in Finland which produces attempts to find genuinely 
Finnish new words, and which has sometimes led observers to overlook the fact 
that many terms in Finnish are direct translations from Swedish. For instance, 
compound words are often produced by combining existing words in the same 
way as in Swedish.” The common history of the two countries, including the 
presence of both Swedish-speakers in Finland and Finnish-speakers in Sweden 
(including, for instance, those in the Tomio valley), led to these “semantic and 
conceptual similarities” between the Finnish and Swedish languages (Allardt 
1989: 220). Klinge (1983: 222-223) also discusses the close relationship between 
the two languages. These bonds certainly had their roots in the close contact 
between the two languages over many centuries.
In June 1397, Sweden (then including Finland) participated in the Kalmar Union 
with the rest of Scandinavia. Although the Union was, according to David Arter 
(1999: 14) “Danish dominated,” no one ruler even managed to assume full 
control. The Union came to an end during the early sixteenth century after the 
1520 Stockholm bloodbath and the election in 1520 and crowning in 1523 of
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Gustav Vasa as the King of Sweden. The legacy of the joining of Denmark and 
Sweden lived on, however, with the incorporation during the seventeenth century 
of parts of Denmark (e.g. Skane) into Sweden. These areas continue to have 
stronger ties to Denmark than elsewhere in Sweden and, in modem times, strong 
regional identities that have witnessed a resurgence following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the enlargement of the EU, and the opening of the 0resund bridge. 
The Kalmar Union, furthermore, had an impact on national and Nordic identity, 
particularly in Sweden.
Throughout the period of the Kalmar Union (as well as before and after), Finnish 
institutions were integrated into the Swedish ones, with Finns participating in 
elections and holding seats in the parliament. The first Riksdag, or parliament, met 
in 1435, although the name Riksdag was not applied to this body until 1561 
(Nordstrom 2000: 32). According to Kirby (1990: 42), “In the course of the long 
and exhausting struggles between king and regent [during the Kalmar Union], the 
practice of summoning representatives of other sections of society to discuss 
matters of national importance with the council developed; and out of these 
herredagar was to emerge the Swedish parliament (riksdag)” This time period 
was therefore one during which institutions that would continue to be important in 
both modem Finland and modem Sweden began to develop.
The years following the dissolution of the Kalmar Union were ones marked by 
important changes for the Swedish realm. Whereas “all of Scandinavia was 
Catholic” in 1500, “by 1600 all of Scandinavia was Lutheran in structure and 
practice” (Nordstrom 2000: 37). Finland and Sweden thus both underwent the 
transformation from Catholicism to Lutheranism in the sixteenth century, when 
translations of the Bible appeared in both Finnish and Swedish. Kirby (1990: 90), 
however, cautions that “[t]he literary work of the reformers did not transform the 
kingdom overnight into a bastion of orthodox Lutheranism.” Confirming the 
conversion of the realm to Lutheranism by the beginning of the seventeenth 
century, Kirby (1990: 91) writes, “The endorsement of the Augsburg Confession 
by the church assembly in 1593 finally gave official confirmation of Sweden’s 
status as a Lutheran land, and subsequent legislation during the reign of Karl IX 
enforced strict religious uniformity.” Despite this, he asserts that “[t]he
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implantation of the evangelical faith in northern Europe was a . . . slow process” 
(Kirby 1990: 97).
The Reformation strengthened the role of the state in Sweden-Finland, leaving a 
legacy of state-centrism that would continue well after the two countries ceased to 
be joined. Teija Tiilikainen (1998a: 172) argues, “The Lutheran Reformation 
planted in Finland a firm tradition of State-centrism which was finally sealed 
when Finland came under the impact of German nationalism in the eighteenth 
century.” As a result of its Lutheran heritage, according to Tiilikainen (1998a: 
173), “Finland entirely lacks a federal tradition”; the same could also be said of 
Sweden. Kirby (1990: 98) also notes the centralisation of the Swedish state during 
the 1500s. The state-centrism that resulted from the Reformation would continue 
to influence Finnish and Swedish institutions and political culture for centuries to 
come. Indeed, during the sixteenth century, the Swedish state and its institutions 
took form, setting patterns that would continue to be influential in both Sweden 
and Finland.
For Tiilikainen (1998a), the Reformation was the crucial element in the history of 
Finland and other Lutheran countries that can to this day explain their differing 
approaches to participation in European integration. She argues that the 
Reformation left a state-centrism and general structure and approach that differed 
from that found in Europe’s Catholic countries. She is certainly correct in arguing 
that the Reformation left a lasting legacy, not least in its impact on the Swedish 
state (and subsequently on the Finnish state as well). Her claims about the 
Reformation being the primary explanatory factor for national participation in 
European integration are, however, more difficult to accept.
It should also be remembered that, at the time of the Reformation, there was not 
yet a Finnish state, nor was there a Swedish state in the modem sense. There were, 
however, already political institutions, notably the Swedish parliament, whose 
roots (as mentioned previously) dated back to 1435, which developed into a more 
important body during the 1500s and would become even more important in later 
centuries. Kirby (1990: 105) argues that in Sweden (unlike in neighbouring 
Denmark) “the four estates of the clergy, nobility, burghers and peasants [which
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together comprised the parliament] were to become an integral feature of the 
polity during the seventeenth century.” Already in the early decades of the 
century, Swedish king Gustav Adolf made an effort to share his power and work 
together with the estates (Roberts 1968: 13, cf. citation of “Gustav Adolph’s 
farewell speech to the Estates” on 16 May 1630 in Roberts 1968: 13-16).
Although the Swedish parliament was reasonably developed by the end of the 
sixteenth century, Swedish institutions and even territorial borders continued to 
develop and change. The seventeenth century was a time of great power as well as 
warfare for the Swedish realm. The period of greatness started with the Thirty 
Years War (Trettioariga Kriget), which began in 1618 and ended with the Peace 
of Westphalia in 1648. Ten years after the conclusion of the Thirty Years War, in 
1658, the Swedish kingdom was at its maximum size (despite having lost New 
Sweden in 1655).10 Yet, despite being a great power, Sweden was lacking in 
resources such as copper as well as human resources, despite having a “major 
asset” in its mining industry (Kirby 1990: 242). The Swedish Age of Greatness 
(Stormaktstiden) ended with the Great Northern War (Stora Nordiska Kriget, 
1700-1721), when the leading role in Northern Europe moved from Sweden to 
Russia (Nordstrom 2000: 35). When the Great Northern War ended, “[a]ll that 
remained of Sweden’s Baltic empire was Sweden proper, Finland, and Swedish 
Pomerania” (Nordstrom 2000: 77). Sweden’s “age of greatness was over, and 
Sweden now joined Denmark as a minor player or pawn in Baltic and European 
affairs” (Nordstrom 2000: 77-78).
A particularly notable step in the development of institutions in the Swedish realm 
was the adoption of the constitution of 1720, although, as Kirby (1990: 346) 
points out, it received a “mixed” reception outside the kingdom. According to 
Kirby (1990: 346), the constitution “severed the link between council and the 
administrative machinery of the collegial system.” The changes of 1720 also had 
an impact on the Swedish parliament. Kirby (1990: 368) argues, “The effecting 
dismantling of royal power in 1720 gave the riksdag an important role in the 
affairs of Sweden, both as a forum for debate and as an initiator of legislation.”
10 See the Appendix for a map of the Swedish realm in 1658 (as well as maps of modem Finland 
and Sweden).
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The institutions of the Swedish kingdom had thus already begun to take form in 
ways that would distinguish both Finland and Sweden from other European 
countries. Notably, the Swedish kingdom had developed an efficient bureaucracy 
that was honest and loyal and a system of conformity, the construction of which 
was assisted by the homogeneous nature of the Swedish realm’s population that 
lacked the presence of heretical or dissident religious movements. This system 
would influence both the Swedish and Finnish states for centuries to come and set 
them apart from their fellow Europeans.
Many of the common institutions established in the Swedish kingdom while 
Finland was joined to it continued even after their legal separation from each 
other. In 1809, Finland became a Grand Duchy in the Russian empire. Finland 
was, however, not yet a true entity in its own right. As Osmo Jussila (1999: 12) 
points out, “Sweden did not cede the Finnish polity to Russia in its entirety, 
simply because it did not yet exist. . .  rather, it forfeited six provinces, the Aland 
islands and parts of Westrobothnia.” Kirby (1995: 5) refers to the area ceded to 
Russia in 1809 as “the eastern marchlands of the Swedish realm.”
Despite the obvious parting of the ways between the Swedish kingdom and the 
region that would grow to become the modem Finnish state, the changes within 
Finland were relatively small. Jussila (1999: 18-19) argues, “Paradoxically it was 
fortunate for the future development of the Finnish state that, unlike the Baltic 
lands, it did not have its own Estate-based, self-governing institutions but had 
been an integral part of the Swedish realm.” The Russians were thus not able to 
integrate Finland into their empire in the same way that they incorporated Estonia 
and Livonia. Accordingly, the Swedish institutions were kept in place, with the 
Russian tsar Alexander I being substituted for the Swedish king and Finland 
becoming a Grand Duchy of the Russian empire rather than a Grand Duchy of the 
Swedish kingdom. Initially, Finland continued to use Swedish currency, adopting 
Russian currency first in 1840 (Jussila 1999: 32). Alapuro (1988: 30) similarly 
asserts that “the separation of the Finnish counties from Sweden did not lead to a 
sudden change in commercial relations with the former mother country.” Rather, 
Finnish peasants continued to sell their produce for sale in Stockholm and until 
the 1860s Finland’s iron industry relied on ore from Sweden (Alapuro 1988: 30).
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The difference between Finland and its Baltic neighbours within the Russian 
empire, a distinction noted, for instance, by Kirby (1995: 5), was, indeed, striking. 
Whereas the Finns had inherited from their experience in the Swedish kingdom 
the institutions that would provide a foundation for the Finnish state, their 
neighbours had no such inheritance. Furthermore, the Estonians and Latvians had 
been dominated by the Baltic Germans in a way that the Finns had never been 
dominated by the Swedes and had also been more involved in wars and 
revolutions between 1905 and 1918 (Kirby 1995: 5). Whereas their Baltic 
neighbours had never been able to identify with the vision of the Baltic Germans, 
the Finns had been a part of the Swedish realm and were able to identify with, 
defend, and develop the institutions that they inherited from Swedish times.
It should also be noted that part of “Finland” (known as “Old Finland”) had 
previously been granted to Russia and that this “‘Russian Finland* had developed 
something of an identity of its own, separate and distinct from that of ‘Swedish 
Finland’” (Jussila 1999: 12). In 1811 the “two Finlands” were united as one Grand 
Duchy within the Russian empire. When “Old Finland” (the Eastern region, which 
had been a part of the Russian empire for longer) was merged with “New Finland” 
(the region that had been a part of the Swedish kingdom until 1809), as Jussila 
(1999: 21) notes, “the Russian administration was incorporated into the Swedish.” 
In fact, Jussila (1999: 21) argues that State Secretary M. M. Speransky “preferred 
the administration of Swedish Finland to that of Russian Finland and regarded it 
as a model for the future system of Russia.” Thus, the two systems were united 
under the Finnish Senate, which would grow to become a particularly central 
institution for the Finnish state, and were linked more closely to the world of their 
Scandinavian neighbours than to the Russian empire (cf. Kirby 1995: 135).
Therefore, although there were changes in Finland after its separation from 
Sweden in 1809, the consistency was more remarkable than the changes, 
considering the major transfer of allegiance (from Sweden to Russia). Rather than 
adopting Russian institutions, the Finns retained in nearly identical form the 
political structures that they had enjoyed when they were joined with Sweden. 
According to Nordstrom (2000: 176), the Finns now had their own “miniature
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Finnish version of the Swedish parliament,” which was convened in Porvoo 
(Borga in Swedish) in March 1809 “to ratify the new situation” (although it did 
not then meet again until 1863). The Finns also took actions themselves to ensure 
that they would not be fully absorbed into the Russian empire. Jussila (1999: 22) 
argues, “There was an improvement when the council of government was 
renamed as the Senate in 1816, a step designed to show that it was not subordinate 
to the ruling Russian Senate. Hence, the decrees of the Russian Senate had no 
force in Finland until the Finnish State Secretary referred them back to the Tsar in 
a form specifically adapted to Finnish circumstances.” Even after Finnish 
independence, which was declared on 6 December 1917, Finland’s institutional 
infrastructure remained similar to that found in Sweden. Furthermore, Finland was 
not the only country to experience territorial change, as Sweden’s borders altered 
with the separation of Norway and Sweden in 1905. There were also important 
institutional changes to both of their parliaments in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. The Swedish Riksdag was the first to abolish the four estates system in 
the 1860s, followed by the Finnish Eduskunta in the beginning of the twentieth 
century.
Despite continuities, both Finland and Sweden had to adapt to new situations. 
According to Kirby (1995: 13), both countries “proved quite adept at surviving 
and adapting” during the nineteenth century. He argues, “It was possible for 
systems of government to adapt because there was always present in the 
Scandinavian lands that element of social and political consensus which enabled 
reforms to be carried through in a manner which built upon the traditions and laws 
of the past, and which was strong enough to steer the state through sudden crisis” 
(Kirby 1995: 13-14). Finland and Sweden are compared by Kirby (1995: 14) with 
Poland-Lithuania, Prussia, and the Russian empire, all of which lacked the same 
“consensus” found in Finland and Sweden (as well as Denmark). There were thus 
already indications that Finland and Sweden were being “adaptive” long before 
EU membership became even a remote possibility.
This adaptability included not only political institutions and structures but also 
economic and industrial ones. These similarities included Finnish and Swedish 
methods of technology transfer during the nineteenth century. According to Timo
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Myllyntaus (1990: 127), the Finnish model of technology transfer resembled the 
Swedish one more than it did the Russian or eastern European models. The 
channels of technology transfer in nineteenth-century Finland and Sweden 
included immigration, the import of machinery, “national diffusion,” and 
“nationals’ study tours abroad” (Myllyntaus 1990: 128). Along with “some 
fortunate coincidences,” this Finnish technology transfer model led eventually to 
the development in Finland of “a welfare state of the Nordic type, which still 
relies on some of the nationalist principles of the late nineteenth century” 
(Myllyntaus 1990: 132).
Further similarities in Finnish and Swedish economic structures during the 
nineteenth century included their reliance on the same industries. By the second 
half of the nineteenth century, the timber industries that would prove vital in 
decades to come were already developing in both Finland and Sweden, 
particularly between 1850 and 1870, when the world demand for timber, also 
known as “green gold,” increased rapidly (Kirby 1995: 141). As Kirby (1995: 
142) writes, “The volume of wood pulp produced by both countries rose steeply 
from the 1890s, with the development of the sulphite cooking process and the 
seemingly insatiable world demand for newsprint and paper.” Kirby (1995: 295) 
also argues, “In Sweden and Finland the demand for timber by the wood- 
processing industries, now freed from legal restrictions and able to exploit to the 
full all available energy resources, had a major impact upon the countryside. 
Felling, carting and floating the timber created employment.” For the most 
isolated areas, “the timber industry helped break down the barriers of isolation and 
brought not only new goods and commodities, but also the cash economy” (Kirby 
1995: 296).
Their economic and infrastructural development during the nineteenth century 
was similar in many other ways as well. As Kirby (1995: 142) explains, “Industry 
in Sweden and Finland was primarily located in the countryside, by the main 
watercourses and in the mining areas. As elsewhere [in the Baltic region], 
communications were vastly improved by the advent of the railways, but in 
neither country was the network frilly completed before the end of the century, 
and many settlements remained miles away from the nearest railroad.” The similar
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industrial structure of the two countries was, in many respects, a natural outcome 
of the similarities in their geographies, as, for instance, both countries contained 
many lakes and forests. The “commercial exploitation of the vast forests of 
[Swedish] Norrland and of the Finnish hinterland from the 1870s onwards” led to 
changes in the lifestyles of the populations in the two countries as well as 
furthering the industrialisation process (Kirby 1995: 144). These changes included 
“home improvements” (Kirby 1995: 144). Status was increased for many Finnish 
and Swedish families and reflected in their homes: “Red or yellow-painted 
wooden houses were an indication of status and prosperity in Sweden and Finland, 
although the chimneyless hovel was still to be found in the remoter parishes even 
at the beginning of the twentieth century” (Kirby 1995: 145). There were thus 
similarities of various types, not only economic and industrial ones.
Despite the growth of the timber industries in both countries in the nineteenth 
century, both Finland and Sweden (as well as their Baltic neighbours) differed 
from many other European countries, such as the United Kingdom (UK), in that 
they did not industrialise as early or as rapidly as did, for instance, the UK. 
According to Kirby (1995: 301), “In contrast to the countries or regions which 
industrialised early, northern Europe never developed huge conurbations of cheap 
working-class housing interspersed with smoking mill chimneys, pot banks or 
angry blast foundries.” Both Finland and Sweden began to industrialise rapidly 
first in the twentieth century, particular after the Second World War. Kirby (1995: 
303) writes, “Whereas the pattern of industrial development along the southern 
shores of the Baltic can best be described as uneven, Sweden and Finland found 
themselves on a growth curve which was to take them to post-1945 affluence.”
In addition, their political parties and interest groups, although present to some 
extent, were not fully developed in the modem sense as the twentieth century 
dawned. In Sweden, in the beginning of the twentieth century, interest groups 
were, according to Hermansson (1993: 35), “fairly weak.”11 Nevertheless, groups 
such as the army held an important position in Sweden, and social democracy was 
beginning to develop into an important force in both countries in the early
11 Translation of: “tamligen svaga”
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twentieth century. The Swedish Social Democratic Workers’ Party 
(iSocialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet, SAP) was established in 1889 and the 
Finnish Social Democratic Party (Suomen Sosiaalidemokraattinen Puolue, SDP) 
came into existence ten years later in 1899 (Kirby 1995: 198). According to Kirby 
(1995: 199), “The Finnish labour movement, like its Swedish, Danish and German 
counterparts, grew out of an earlier tradition of liberal concern for the moral and 
educational improvement of the working classes; its members were also 
emphatically ‘of the people’ whose support the nationalists relied on.”
Thus, despite the fact that Finland was a part of the Russian empire, its social 
democracy developed along the same general lines as its Nordic counterparts, 
rather than along the lines of other parts of the Russian empire. Kirby (1995: 199) 
explains, “The kind of [social democratic] movement which came into being in 
Finland . . . simply did not and could not exist elsewhere in the empire.” Noting 
the similarity between Finland and its Nordic neighbours, Kirby (1995: 199) 
writes, “Discipline, respectability and a watchful preparedness were the key 
features of social democracy in Finland, and indeed in the other countries of 
northern Europe where mass, legally tolerated labour movements developed.” 
Membership in the Finnish SDP increased from approximately 16,500 in 1904 to 
45,298 in 1905 to almost 100,000 in 1906 (Kirby 1995: 230). Kirby (1995: 275) 
argues that “in essence, the Finnish party political system rested upon not 
dissimilar foundations” from the Swedish system.
Although the histories of Finland and Sweden diverged from each other between 
1905 and the Second World War (a period during which Norway was separated 
from Sweden and Finland gained its independence, as is discussed in the 
following section), common elements in their histories once again became 
particularly noteworthy during the middle of the twentieth century. Both Finland 
and Sweden felt the consequences of World War II and the bipolar world that 
emerged from it. In particular, the growth of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) into a world superpower and its annexation of the Baltic states 
(Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) created tensions in the Nordic region. These 
tensions were accentuated when Denmark, Iceland, and Norway signed the Treaty 
of Washington in April 1949 and became founding members of the North Atlantic
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Treaty Organization (NATO). The collapse of the Nazi regime in Germany also 
had consequences throughout the Nordic/Baltic region, where the Soviet Union 
then became the dominant power (Kirby 1995: 372-373). The USSR’s influence 
was felt in a variety of different ways. For Finland, the Soviet Union’s 
establishment of a military base at Porkkala (which it maintained until 1955) made 
Soviet influence in Finland particularly tangible. In addition, the Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (Sopimus ystavyydesta, 
yhteistoiminnasta ja  keskinaisesta avunannosta Suomen tasavallan ja  Sosialistisen 
Neuvostotasavaltain Liiton valilla, known as the YYA-Sopimus or FCMA Treaty) 
institutionalised the relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union and forced 
Finland to consult with the Soviets. Sweden felt the Soviets’ presence in other 
ways, such as in discussions over control of territorial waters (cf. Kirby 1995: 
373). An indication of the palpable effect of the USSR throughout the region, 
Kirby (1995: 373) argues, “The options open to the Nordic countries in the 
atmosphere and tension of the immediate postwar years were few.”
Both Finland and Sweden selected a path of neutrality, preferring to stay non- 
aligned in a region where the fault line between the two sides of the Cold War ran. 
Both countries thus tried to maintain their neutrality while located geographically 
as well as politically between East and West. Despite differences between Finnish 
and Swedish neutrality, for both countries participation in international 
organisations, especially the United Nations (UN), was an important part of their
19identity and strategy in the international arena during the Cold War.
As a consequence of the countries’ precarious positions and neutral status, 
intellectuals as well as policy-makers in both Finland and Sweden were 
constrained during the years of the Cold War. According to Swedish academic Jan 
Hallenberg (2000: 20), “During the Cold War, it was difficult even for Swedish 
academics to question publicly whether Sweden under any conceivable 
circumstance really ought to pursue what came to be known as the neutrality line. 
Such hypothetical discussions could, according to the policy-makers, risk the 
credibility of this vital political strategy. Any public hints of the possibility that
12 The obvious differences between Finnish and Swedish neutrality are addressed in the following 
section (“Two Different ‘Kids’”).
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Sweden might, under any circumstances, apply for NATO membership was the 
greatest sin of all in this context.” In Finland, the constraints were also visible, 
with policy-makers and even academics adhering to the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line 
(named after Finnish Cold War Presidents J. K. Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen).
In many ways, Finland and Sweden became increasingly similar in the years 
following the Second World War. According to Kirby (1995: 386-387), “Out of 
the wartime experience . . . grew a new style of industrial relations in Finland, 
more akin to the Scandinavian pattern of national collective bargaining.” He adds, 
“Over time, the annual round of negotiations has been greatly extended in all the 
Nordic countries, to cover such things as social and incomes policy, and has given 
rise to comment about the ‘corporatist’ nature of the system” (Kirby 1995: 387).
In addition to constructing corporatist systems, Finland and Sweden developed 
welfare states along the lines of the Swedish, or Scandinavian, model. Along with 
these developments came segregated labour markets, where women were 
concentrated in public sector employment and men in private sector jobs. Arthur 
Gould (2000: 207) notes that “Sweden is one of the most segregated labour 
markets among industrialised countries.” Finland, which developed along similar 
lines, also had a highly segregated labour market.
The latter years of the twentieth century brought economic challenges for both 
Finland and Sweden, particularly for their welfare states. These troubles were 
especially noticeable by the 1990s, although the difficulties were already 
becoming clear by the late 1980s. According to Henry Milner (1989: 2), “Years 
ago, the reader found a positive image of life in Scandinavia; it even became a 
kind of unconscious model.” However, by the time of Milner’s writing in 1989, 
that model had “faded,” primarily because “the very idea of a real alternative to 
the ‘system’” had been “tarnished” (Milner 1989: 2). The roots of the problems 
could be observed already in the 1970s when “the demand for change grew 
stronger and shriller” in Sweden (Milner 1989: 11). Between 1973 and 1976 the 
Riksdag was evenly split between members of the social democratic coalition and 
their opponents; in 1976 the Conservatives (Moderata Samlingspartiet, M) 
assumed control of the government at what Milner (1989: 12) terms “exactly the
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worst moment.” Sweden was facing recession and “the new government borrowed 
heavily on the international market, seriously weakening Sweden’s balance-of- 
payments position” (Milner 1989: 12). Milner (1989: 12) argues that in the late 
1970s “[t]he old consensus had tarnished” and “[s]ome for the first time began to 
question the long-term viability of their societal institutions.” Yet, by the 1980s 
Sweden’s situation had improved, and by 1989 Milner (1989: 15) was writing 
about the “resilience” of the Swedish welfare state. Finland, too, felt the impact of 
the oil crisis and recession and was forced to reconsider the extensiveness of its 
welfare state.
Both countries also underwent changes with the end of the Cold War order. The 
changing international structure in the post-Cold War world demanded adaptation 
from both Finland and Sweden. They both found themselves in a new world 
where their old approaches to foreign (as well as domestic) policy, which were 
marked by neutrality, were no longer applicable in the same form. Tiilikainen 
(1998a: 161) argues that “Finland first had difficulties in adapting itself and its 
policies to the changes taking place in Europe.” Even as late as 1999, Sweden was 
in a foreign policy “muddle . . . mainly because neither the government nor the 
Swedish people can decide what kind of EU member they want Sweden to be” 
(Smiley 1999b: 10).
For both Finland and Sweden, the first main step towards greater participation in 
the process of European integration was applying to join the European Economic 
Area (EEA), of which both countries became full members on 1 January 1994. 
Although they had already joined the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), EEA 
membership held far greater significance and required far more adaptation from 
its members. By joining the EEA, Finland and Sweden became part of the internal 
market comprised of EFTA and EU states, although certain elements, such as 
agriculture, did not apply. As Niilo Jaaskinen (1995: 9-10) points out, “The 
original EEA Agreement comprised some 110 EC [European Community] 
regulations, 1000 EC directives and 110 EC decisions. These totalled some 9000 
pages of the Official Journal of the EC. In addition, the Annexes and Protocols to 
the EEA Agreement listed some 300 legally non-binding EC acts (resolutions,
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recommendations, etc.), which the EFTA states undertook to take appropriately 
into account.”
Both Finland and Sweden needed to begin a process of change far in advance of 
their actual membership in the EEA. According to Jaaskinen (1995: 10), “Finland 
started a determined process of adaptation to the EEA Agreement in 1989, when 
the Ministry of Justice [Oikeusministerid] issued a circular to the other ministries 
with instructions that EC legislation was to be duly taken into account in law 
drafting, if there were no special reasons for the contrary.” The direct 
consequences of EEA membership for Finland included “96 government bills to 
Parliament, in addition to which some 90 bills were substantively linked to the 
implementation of the EEA Agreement” (Jaaskinen 1995: 10). Yet, despite the 
considerable efforts that Finns and Swedes put into adapting to membership in the 
EEA, they (along with their EFTA colleagues) did not have decision-making 
powers in this grouping and were largely deprived of any influence in determining 
the rules that would govern them as EEA members.
The lack of influence they were able to have in the EEA, despite being
constrained by considerable legislation from the grouping, was one of the factors
that motivated both Finland and Sweden (as well as Austria and Norway) to apply
for full membership in the European Union. During the membership negotiations,
the two countries often worked in concert. Finland’s chief negotiator Pertti
Salolainen, who also served as the country’s Foreign Trade Minister and Deputy
Prime Minister, has pointed out that he and Sweden’s primary negotiator, Ulf
Dinkelspiel, had frequent contact throughout the negotiation process and held
1 ^numerous meetings for unofficial negotiations.
In both Finland and Sweden, a crucial aspect of the domestic debates on EU 
membership concentrated on the impact of joining the EU on national policies of 
neutrality. Even in the EU, there were concerns about how the neutral countries 
would fit into a European Union that was in the process of developing a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Members of the domestic political elite in
13 Interview with Pertti Salolainen on 16 December 1998.
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both countries had to walk a fine line between satisfying the domestic (as well as 
Russian, particularly in the case of Finland) desires for their continued neutrality, 
and their own wishes to become EU members and to convince the EU of their 
suitability for membership.
Finland and Sweden (as well as Austria and Norway) held referenda on EU 
membership in the autumn of 1994. In the Finnish referendum, held on 16 
October 1994, the votes (excluding blank votes) were 56.9 percent in support of 
EU membership and 43.1 percent against in a turnout of 74 percent. The Finnish 
referendum was closely followed by the Swedish referendum on 13 November 
1994 when (again with blank votes excluded) 52.7 percent voted in favour of 
membership and 47.3 percent against in a turnout of 83.3 percent (Luif 1998: 
119). The Austrians also voted in favour of EU membership, whereas the 
Norwegian public rejected such a step for their country. On 1 January 1995 
Finland, Sweden, and Austria became full members of the European Union.
The relatively low levels of public support for EU membership in both Finland 
and Sweden did not improve much during the first six years of membership. Both 
countries witnessed a sharp divide between the political elite (who were more 
positive towards the EU) and the public (who were more sceptical). Writing about 
Sweden, Magnus Ekengren and Bengt Sundelius (1998: 146) assert, “In spite of 
the best efforts of the new generation of leaders to draw public attention back to 
this traditional focus of interest [the European Continent, from which Swedes had 
been encouraged to look away], most Swedes (across party lines, but more so the 
young and women than the middle-aged and men) tend to remain sceptical.”
The two countries shared more than simply the common bond of EU membership 
and the “security” that it provided (despite the lack of Hard security guarantees 
offered by the EU).14 EU membership also resulted in institutional changes in both 
Finland and Sweden, although much of this adaptation took place long before 
January 1995. Both countries had already implemented many of the necessary 
changes in connection with the EEA Agreement and thus did not require many
14 Clive Archer (2001) distinguishes between hard (difficult to achieve) and Hard (military) 
security.
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additional alterations in 1995 when formal membership in the EU commenced. 
Describing the Finnish case, Raunio and Wiberg (2001: 72) confirm that 
administrative changes “introduced by membership were already carried out in 
connection with the EEA.” Despite this, EU membership required that new 
member states adopt the full acquis communitaire, not all of which had been fully 
adopted by non-EU EEA states. As Jaaskinen (1995: 10-11) explains, 
“Membership in the EU brought some 40000 more pages of EC legislation into 
the Finnish legal system. With the main exception of indirect taxation, these 
contained norms relating to the EC common policies, i.e., the Common 
Agricultural Policy [CAP], the Common Fisheries Policy and the Customs Union, 
and took the form of directly applicable EC regulations. Even though national 
legislation was necessary also in these fields for purposes of administration of the 
EC systems, legally the membership in the EU meant primarily the change of 
certain administrative organs into parts of larger and centrally controlled European 
administrations, that is, into their national enforcement agencies.” When one 
combined the new legislation required for the EU and EEA Agreements, the 
amount was considerable. Sweden, too, was required to adopt this new legislation, 
first for the EEA and then for the EU.
Joining the EU also meant confronting a new administrative and political culture 
to which Finnish and Swedish policy-makers would need to adapt in order to 
ensure their influence within the Union. Both Finland and Sweden differed from 
the EU itself as well as from the other member states in many areas of policy­
making. The divergences included differences in their political cultures and 
informal institutions as well as in their formal political institutions.15 Discussing 
the Swedish situation, Ekengren and Sundelius (1998: 139) write about a “clash 
between the EU style and Swedish administrative culture. Proper performance in 
the Swedish civil service is based on an attitude of time-orientated fulfilments: the 
timetable for rule-making and implementation has to be followed. The means to 
achieve this in Swedish eyes, efficiency, was lost when a time schedule, including 
dates for implementation, could not be achieved.” For Finns, too, there were
15 A notable difference in this area concerns the issue of public access to information, which is 
discussed in the sixth chapter of this thesis.
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differences between their own administrative style and that which they 
encountered inside the EU.
A particular feature of Finnish and Swedish public administration was the 
existence of autonomous authorities known as virastot in Finnish and ambetsverk 
in Swedish. As Ekengren and Sundelius (1998: .139) write, in the Swedish 
“tradition, a clear delineation is made between relatively small ministries serving 
the cabinet members (<departement) and a large public administration composed of 
constitutionally autonomous authorities (ambetsverk)” The same was also true of 
Finland, in contrast to the situation in other Nordic and EU countries (cf. Allardt 
1989: 214 on the Nordic countries). Indeed, Hermansson (1993: 70) explains that 
this “unique” situation in Finland and Sweden meant that their ministries were 
relatively smaller than those of countries without such authorities.16
Related to this administrative structure is the remiss system, or the process of 
“offentliga utredmngar” (Hermansson 1993: 70). Hermansson explains this 
procedure as being one in which “the government appoints a committee with a 
fixed investigative directive. When the committee has finished its work it presents 
a reflection report (betankande). Thereafter a document is sent out for comment; 
in other words, authorities, the parties’ supporting organisations, other types of 
organisations and others who are interested are given the opportunity to comment 
on the investigation’s work. On the basis of these viewpoints, which have come 
forth from this, the government can form the suggestion that is presented to the 
parliament.”17 A similar system existed in Finland, although other Nordic 
countries did not have the same remiss system or autonomous authorities.
Although their institutional structures remained primarily the same, there were 
some institutional adaptations made by both countries as a result of their EU 
membership, not just when they joined in 1995 but also during their first few
16 Translation of: “unika.”
17 Translation of: “regeringen tillsatter en kommitte med ett bestamt utredningsdirektiv. Nar 
kommitten arbetat fardigt presenterar den ett betankande. Darefter foretas en remissbehandling 
dvs. myndigheter, partiernas sidoorganisationer, dvriga typer av organisationer och andra 
intresserade ges tillfalle att kommentera utredningens arbete. Pa grundval av alia de synpunkter 
som med detta framkommit kan sa regeringen utforma det for slag som foreldggs riksdagen”
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years as members. Both Finland and Sweden initially had portfolios in their 
governments for a Minister for European Affairs, but both abolished these 
positions in 1999. Instead, both countries in 1999 strengthened the role of the 
Prime Minister’s Office in coordinating EU policy-making (Raunio and Wiberg 
2001: 73 on Finland, Ruin 2000: 60 on Sweden).
Indeed, both Finland and Sweden were not ashamed to learn from their 
experiences and adapt their institutions for dealing with the European Union. For 
instance, in August 1995 the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
(Utrikesdepartementet, MFA) “up-grad[ed] . . .  the position of the small CFSP 
coordination uni t . . .  as a direct result of the experiences of the first half year of 
membership” (Ekengren and Sundelius 1998: 138). Discussing this change, 
Ekengren and Sundelius (1998: 138) explain, “The fact that almost every unit in 
the foreign ministry is affected by the CFSP was not realized until one worked 
inside this network. Initially, this small unit was part of the West European 
division, but it is now placed directly under the head of the political department, 
who participates in the political committee of the CFSP. This closeness would 
give it a better position to pursue the general CFSP responsibility across the 
jurisdiction of ministry units.”
Ekengren and Sundelius (1998: 138) see the changes in the MFA as part of a 
broader adaptation process, although the adaptation was centred in this ministry: 
“The institutional adjustment in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs reflects well the 
Swedish learning process of the first membership year. Earlier, the EU was seen 
as only an ‘extra’ question, which could be added to the organizational chart. EU 
coordination concerns quickly became an overarching priority for the ministry as 
a whole. Contrary to what could be expected, it was here and not in the domestic 
ministries that one found the greatest surprise over the scope and scale of the 
process changes required after the membership.” In Finland, too, there were 
changes within the MFA as a result of EU membership.
Both countries gave their foreign ministries coordinating roles in the EU policy­
making process. In Finland, the main forum for coordinating EU policies between 
the various government ministries was the seventeen-member Committee for EU
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Matters (EU-asioiden Komitea), located within the MFA (despite the relatively 
“minor” role of the Committee in overall policy-making) (Raunio and Wiberg 
2001: 73). Discussing the functioning of the Committee, Raunio and Wiberg 
(2001: 73) explain that it “has 38 sections (in early 2000) that operate under the 
appropriate ministries. The sections are consultative and their function is to 
coordinate European matters within the respective ministries. Sections include 
also representatives from relevant interest groups. Officials present matters to 
sections for discussion and inform them of issues under preparation. When 
agreement is reached, the section procedure provides a sufficient basis for 
determining Finland’s final position. Otherwise the matter is presented to the 
Committee for EU Matters and/or the Cabinet European Union Committee [EU- 
ministerivaliokunta].”
Sweden, too, gave its MFA a role in coordinating national EU policies. In 1994- 
1995 Sweden established a unit for European integration in the MFA (Hallenberg 
2000: 23). According to Ekengren and Sundelius (1998: 138), the Coordinating 
Group for EU Relations (EU-beredningen) was “[t]he main body for political- 
level coordination of EU relations and policy positions.” As Ekengren and 
Sundelius (1998: 138) explain, “This permanent committee is composed of the 
state secretaries of the cabinet office, the Ministry of Justice 
\Justitiedepartementet] and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The role of this 
senior-level coordinating group is to settle questions that have not been resolved 
by the civil servants.” Other ministries besides these two were involved in the 
committee as well; as Ekengren and Sundelius (1998: 138) point out, “The under­
secretaries of other ministries participate as needed, when the unresolved issue 
falls under their competence.” Despite the roles given to other ministries, 
particularly the Ministry for Justice, the Committee gave a major role to the MFA. 
Relying on interviews, Ekengren and Sundelius (1998: 138) assert, “These 
institutionalised arrangements and regularized procedures obviously give a very 
influential role to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, being the core of this 
government-wide web for national EU coordination.”
Furthermore, the Coordinating Group for EU Relations was supported by the EU 
Coordination Secretariat (EU-sekretariat) in the MFA, which was “the link
91
between the Swedish PR [Permanent Representation] in Brussels and the various 
ministries” (Ekengren and Sundelius 1998: 137). Explaining the unit’s role in 
more detail, Ekengren and Sundelius (1998: 137-138) write, “It has the 
responsibility for ensuring that Swedish standpoints are prepared for all items on 
the agendas prepared by the EU presidency, and for finalizing and transmitting 
official instructions to the representatives in COREPER [Committee of Permanent 
Representatives] and in Council meetings. The final collection of official 
instructions to Brussels is made at the weekly meeting of the committee of EU 
coordinators of each ministry, chaired by the head of the pivotal EU Secretariat.” 
The Secretariat also worked together with the Swedish parliament’s Advisory 
Committee on EU Affairs (EU-namnden) (Ekengren and Sundelius 1998: 138).
Within the EU, Finland and Sweden also cooperated on several policy areas, 
noticeably in the area of public access to information (as is discussed in chapter 
six). For instance, both Finland and Sweden presented suggestions for the 
inclusion of a publicity principle (guaranteeing public access to documents) in the 
Amsterdam Treaty (as is discussed in more detail in chapter six). They also 
cooperated in the area of crisis management. At the 1996-1997 Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC), they presented a joint initiative that proposed incorporating the
1 ft“Petersberg tasks” into the Treaty of Amsterdam. The foreign ministers at the 
time (Lena Hjelm-Wallen of Sweden and Taija Halonen of Finland) worked 
closely with each other and wrote a joint article about their cooperation that was 
published in the Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat and the Swedish 
newspaper Dagens Nyheter on 21 April 1996 (Hjelm-Wallen and Halonen 1996). 
According to Hallenberg (2000: 24), “The eventual result of the negotiations on 
the Amsterdam Treaty were in essence identical to the joint Swedish and Finnish 
position, in that the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’ were incorporated into the 
framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).” Yet another 
example of Finnish and Swedish cooperation was the EU’s Northern Dimension 
Initiative (NDI), discussed in chapter five, where both countries were involved in
18 The Petersberg tasks, so-called because of their establishment by the 1992 Petersberg 
Declaration, relate to humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and the use of combat forces in 
crisis management (which includes peacemaking).
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the initiative regarding regional cooperation in Northern Europe and included it in 
their Presidency programmes (Finland 1999, Sweden 2000).
On the whole therefore, there were significant similarities between Finnish and 
Swedish behaviour inside the EU during their first six years of membership. Both 
also adapted their institutions and decision-making styles, while maintaining, for 
the most part, the general structures that they had previously had. These 
similarities within the Union had their basis in a range of similarities dating from 
the time that the two countries were both part of the Swedish realm. Even after 
their separation, however, their institutional structures and even historical 
experiences continued to have much in common, including neutrality during the 
Cold War in the latter half of the twentieth century. Their political cultures, 
largely shaped by history and institutions, were also similar in many respects, 
including the importance of public access to documents. They even shared a 
Nordic identity, and they joined the European Union at the same time on 1 
January 1995.
Two Different “Kids”
Having observed the many similarities between Finnish and Swedish historical 
experiences and their institutions, cultures, and identities, it is time to begin 
another journey back in time to re-examine their histories, institutions, cultures, 
and identities. This time the focus is on the differences between Finland and 
Sweden. Already during the time when Finland was part of the Swedish kingdom, 
there were differences between Finland and the rest of the realm. Although 
Finland was an integral part of the kingdom, “[wjhether or not Finland occupied a 
special position in the Swedish kingdom has been one of the major bones of 
contention in Finnish historiography” (Engman and Kirby 1989: xiv). Max 
Engman and David Kirby (1989: xiv) explain that, despite the integration of 
Finland into the Swedish kingdom, “nationalist historians have sought to discover 
particular features, even a consciousness of a specifically Finnish identity, in their 
endeavours to show that Finland was a distinctive and separate part of the 
Swedish kingdom,” a natural task for nationalist historians and one undertaken on
93
a regional level as well, by authors including Heikki Ylikangas (1989), who writes 
about Ostrobothnia.
During the centuries in which it was a part of the Swedish kingdom, Finland often 
served as a frontier region, or a marchland, even as a battleground (cf. Kirby 
1990: 50-53). The borders of the Swedish realm changed several times, with 
Finland being especially affected by these territorial shifts. “By the terms of the 
treaty of Teusina [in 1595], Muscovy abandoned claims to Estonia and Narva, but 
Sweden was obliged to return Kexholm town and province and Ingria. For the first 
time, a frontier was drawn which marked the boundary between Finland and 
Karelia from the isthmus to the White Sea. Thus, although Swedish claims to the 
Kola peninsula had to be abandoned, much of Lapland was now acknowledged to 
be part of the Swedish realm” (Kirby 1990: 120). Although these changes affected 
the whole of the kingdom, the inhabitants of the Finnish portion of the realm were 
particularly affected.19
Furthermore, despite the existence of Finnish-speakers elsewhere in the realm, 
Finland was already a bilingual region, whereas the Swedish language dominated 
elsewhere, among the general public as well as the elites. In particular, according 
to Nordstrom (2000: 43), “More than elsewhere in Scandinavia, the Reformation 
played a role in the development of the vernacular language” in Finland. Although 
“a few religious texts were translated into Finnish before the Reformation, the 
religious revolution rapidly accelerated this trend and was vitally important to the 
development of Finnish as a written language. Mikael Agricola’s Finnish 
language primer from 1542 and his translation of the New Testament (published 
in 1548) are central in this context” (Nordstrom 2000: 43-44).
There have also been suggestions that the Finnish nobility developed its own 
identity during the Club War (Luokkasota) at the end of the sixteenth century. 
According to Kirby (1990: 152), “The ‘Club War’ has long been a contentious 
issue in Finnish historiography. The nationalist historians of the nineteenth 
century and their later disciples believed that, as a result of the acquisition of lands
19 Of course, the boundaries of “Finland,” as well as those of the Swedish realm itself, shifted 
frequently and were not clear-cut.
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and offices, and of the experience of long years of war on the eastern frontier, the 
nobility in Finland developed a sense of separate identity.” Although the actual 
development of such an identity is questionable, it did provide a basis on which 
later national historians could develop their claims for the existence of a separate 
Finnish identity. Finland also became a more defined entity within the Swedish 
realm in 1556, when “Finland was given the position of a duchy . . .  as a reflection 
of the increasing power of the king” (Tiilikainen 1998a: 117). The title of 
“Duchy” was one that Finland would carry throughout its time in the Swedish 
kingdom and even into the Russian empire.
Furthermore, the Swedes (during the time that Finland was a part of the Swedish 
kingdom) established a history and national identity that remained with them once 
Finland left the Swedish realm. The adoption of the Lutheran religion played a 
role in the development of a Swedish identity (although this could also be argued 
of Finland as well). According to Kirby (1990: 161), “The Lutheran faith was not 
the only means of establishing an identity for the Swedish people. Great attention 
was paid to the glorious past of the nation.” It was, in particular, this “glorious 
past” that would distinguish Sweden from Finland for centuries to come.
Especially important for the establishment of a Swedish identity was Sweden’s 
status as a great power during the seventeenth century. As discussed above, the 
Swedish Age of Greatness began with the Thirty Years War, in which Sweden 
became involved in 1630. Here the nation’s past came into play in building a 
national identity and encouraging Swedish soldiers to fight for their country. 
Although Kirby (1990: 163) admits that the king’s “hint at broad acres to be won 
was probably a more powerful inducement,” he argues that “[i]t was not in vain 
that Gustav Adolf bade [the estates] . . .  in his farewell speech . . .  on 19 May 
1630 to go to war to restore the ancient honour of their Gothic ancestors.” Yet, 
Nordstrom (2000: 69) sees other factors and argues, “Although religious and 
economic considerations as well as issues of Sweden’s credibility as a great power 
and the king’s legitimacy as ruler were important, it was upset in the Baltic 
balance of power that triggered Gustav II Adolfs entry into the war.” Thus, for 
Nordstrom (2000), this change in the balance of power in the Baltic region was 
the impetus for Swedish engagement in the Thirty Years’ War.
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Nordstrom’s (2000) interpretation contrasts with Erik Ringmar’s (1996) argument 
that recognition was the main motivation for Swedish involvement in the war. 
Ringmar (1996) also regards the consequences as important for Swedish identity 
and status. According to Ringmar (1996: 9), “For Sweden, first of all, the war 
meant that the country secured its sovereignty and an officially recognised place 
as a legitimate member of the community of European states. In fact, it achieved 
much more than this: when the peace treaty was finally signed in Westphalia in 
1648, Sweden was generally regarded as a major political power and one of the 
principal players in European politics.” The recognition that Sweden received as a 
result of its involvement in the Thirty Years’ War and the history of its great 
power status left a lasting legacy for the Swedish nation. In particular, Swedish 
participation in the war was important for the formation of Swedish identity, 
including, especially, Swedish collective self-esteem. Although there were 
implications for the Finns that participated, these were different and reflected the 
loyalty of the Finnish soldiers rather than the greatness of and international 
recognition for the Finnish nation, which, at the time, hardly existed (if, indeed, it 
existed at all in the seventeenth century).
The new status that Sweden achieved as a result of the Thirty Years War was, 
according to Ringmar (1996), in stark contrast to that found prior to the war. Prior 
to participating in the war, “geography itself seemed to condemn Sweden to a 
peripheral role on the world stage: the country was pent up in a remote comer of 
Europe; it had no stakes in European affairs; no glorious history to defend and no 
dynastic ties to any of the combatants on the continent. And perhaps most 
importantly of all: at the time of intervention the country had no allies and no 
financial support from any quarter” (Ringmar 1996: 10). One could argue that, in 
a sense, it was to this status that Finland returned upon its separation from Sweden 
in 1809 (despite the new opportunities afforded to Finland within the Russian 
empire).
During the seventeenth century, Sweden went through a period of artistic 
development, which also involved the construction of a national identity and of a 
past mythical golden age. In fact, in some ways the process that Sweden went
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through in the 1600s was similar to that which Finland would (as is discussed 
below) undergo two centuries later. According to Kirby (1990: 260), “In his 
monumental Atlantica (1679), the Swedish polymath Olof Rudbeck portrayed the 
ancestral homeland of the Swedes as a fertile and populous land from whence the 
ancient Goths had poured forth to conquer Europe.” The mythical rather than 
realistic nature of Rudbeck’s work is pointed out by Kirby (1990: 260), who 
argues, “This bold image was sharply at odds with the demographic situation of 
Rudbeck’s own time. Rudbeck’s vision of a land blessed by God and Nature, 
whose bounty had attracted the survivors of the Flood, was primarily intended to 
conjure up a glorious mythological past. Although later Swedish writers believed 
that the Creator had blessed their land with a healthy climate and a great variety of 
flora and fauna, foreign contemporaries found little evidence of this benevolence 
in seventeenth century Sweden.”
There were indications that while Sweden in the seventeenth century built an 
identity upon its status as a great power and its creation of a mythical golden age, 
Finland was not given the same status. This difference was, for instance, marked 
by the (arguable) decline in the status of the Finnish language. Kirby (1990: 283) 
writes, “National historians in Finland have long argued that the status of Finnish 
declined during the seventeenth century, though their arguments are predicated on 
the contentious assumption that Finland enjoyed a kind of special position within 
the realm before that time.”
It should perhaps be noted, however, that, according to Kirby (1990: 286-287), 
“The invention of a glorious Swedish past also spilled over into Finland. In his 
Scondia illustrata, the Swedish-born historian Johannes Messenius declared the 
Finns to be descendants of the Wends, and described an ancient Finnish kingdom 
which had stretched from the Tomio river to the borders of Saxony.” Kirby (1990: 
287) provides examples of other authors, including Michael Wexionius and 
Daniel Juslenius, but he also cautions, “The growing interest in antiquity and the 
origins of the inhabitants of the northern lands, and the process of self-definition 
set in motion by increased contacts with foreigners should not however lead us to 
make too sweeping conclusions about national awareness.” Kirby (1990: 287) 
further explains, “The degree to which the peasantry perceived of a fatherland
97
beyond the confines of the family or local community is difficult to ascertain, 
though it is perhaps interesting to note that the descendants of the Orthodox 
Karelians who fled to the hinterland of Russia in the seventeenth century have 
only the vaguest folk memories of their historical past, and little sense of national 
self-awareness.” Despite the impact that Sweden’s “glorious past” had on Finland, 
the Finns needed to adopt other means of building their national identity, with 
Finns unable to rely on Sweden’s past for the construction of a uniquely Finnish 
national identity.
Although Sweden’s status as a great power did not last forever, its legacy lived on 
and continued to affect Swedish identity, particularly in terms of its collective 
self-esteem. The legacy of the Swedish Age of Greatness could be said to live on 
in a somewhat similar way to that in which the legacy of the British empire 
continued long after it ceased to be an area on which the sun never set. In formal 
terms, Sweden’s period as a great power concluded (as mentioned earlier) with the 
Great Northern War (1700-1721). Although Russia assumed the position of great 
power in the region, Sweden had already gained international recognition and a 
heightened national self-confidence.
During the eighteenth century there were also indications that Finland and Sweden 
were drifting apart from one another. According to Kirby (1990: 328), “Anxiety 
and fear of the disastrous consequences of a war against Russia had been 
frequently voiced by the Finnish estates. In Sweden it was widely believed that, 
exposed once more to danger, the inhabitants of Finland would choose to seek 
their own salvation by submitting to Russian rule.” Kirby (1990: 328) further 
explains, “The flight of many officials and parish priests during the Russian 
occupation of the Finnish provinces in the Great Northern War had severely 
dented the image of a protective state authority. The commissions set up in the 
1720s to investigate the circumstance of the occupation and postwar conditions in 
Finland found that they had to proceed with some caution, especially in the 
eastern frontier areas, for fear of losing the loyalty of the peasantry towards the 
crown.”
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In fact, by the mid-eighteenth century, there were already indications that the 
Russians were extending a welcoming arm to the Finns in the hopes of luring 
them away from Sweden and into the Russian fold. According to Kirby (1990: 
328), “On 18 March 1742, Elizabeth had issued a manifesto, offering protection to 
the Finns and holding out the promise of support for an independent Finnish state, 
should the Finnish estates seek to break with Sweden.” However, a “Swedish 
counter-manifesto . . . warned the inhabitants of Finland of the old Russian trick 
of fomenting rebellion and promising self-government in frontier provinces” and 
then bringing them under Russian control (Kirby 1990: 329). According to Kirby 
(1995: 16), who describes the situation in Finland in the late eighteenth century, 
“Although the local authorities tried to play down the extent of this disaffection, it 
is clear that there was a small core of malcontents who were at least considering 
the alternative of seeking independent status for Finland in preference to Russian 
subjugation.” The Finnish desire for independence, however, seems to have been 
limited to “a small circle of officers” in the Finnish army (Kirby 1995: 20). 
Rather, Kirby (1995: 20-21) argues, “It was the policies of the king, not the 
separatist wishes of a few Finnish gentlemen, which had caused unrest and 
discontent.”
There were also suggestions of a Swedish willingness (particularly on the part of 
Swedish king Gustav III) to relinquish Finland in return for Norway, which Kirby 
(1995: 18) claims were “not entirely groundless.” Indeed, Kirby (1995: 18) argues 
that Gustav III “had long toyed with the idea of seizing Norway, and tried to take 
advantage of the Russian plans to annex the Crimea in 1783 to persuade Catherine 
II to back him.” Despite the arguments of potential Finnish dissatisfaction with the 
Swedish realm, their move from being a part of Sweden to being a Grand Duchy 
of the Russian empire was more because of “international relations” than because 
of “the volition of the Finnish. . .  people” (Kirby 1990: 403).
Whether the Finns wished it or not, “[t]he de facto separation of the Finnish 
provinces from Sweden which had occurred in 1808 was formally acknowledged 
in the peace of Fredrikshamn, concluded in September 1809” (Kirby 1995: 40). 
Although Finland retained the institutions from the Sweden it left in 1809, “[t]he 
developments in Sweden beginning with the coup of 1809 . . . were far more
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dramatic and extensive in their outcomes” than were those in Finland (Nordstrom 
2000: 177). According to Kirby (1995: 40), losing Finland “laid bare the 
deficiencies of the Swedish state” and left Sweden with “a desperate need for 
something which might salvage the pride of the nation.”
There were also institutional changes that pulled the two countries in different 
directions. In March 1809, the Swedish king, Gustav IV, whose mistakes Kirby 
(1995: 40) terms “blundering inadequacies,” was deposed, and Sweden received a 
new constitution, which was “approved by the four estates of the Riksdag on 6 
June” 1809 and “remained in force [with amendments] until 1974” (Nordstrom 
2000: 177). Whereas the Finnish parliament met once in 1809 and then did not 
meet again until 1863, the Swedish parliament “returned to a place of importance 
in the system it had not enjoyed since 1772” and “was to meet at least once every 
five years (later every three) or in special session” (Nordstrom 2000: 177). The 
size and shape of the Swedish realm also changed after 1809, not only with the 
loss of Finland, but also with the inclusion of Norway between 1814 and 1905.
Despite the Swedes’ active participation in battles during the preceding centuries, 
there was a transformation in Swedish foreign policy during the nineteenth 
century, noticeably the development of the Swedish neutrality doctrine. 
Hermansson (1993: 199) argues that “on a very general level the neutrality 
doctrine can be traced back to the 1830s, when Karl XTV Johan declared that 
Sweden planned to remain neutral in the conflict between Russia and England.” 
In contrast to Austria, for instance, Swedish neutrality was not secured in its 
constitution (Hermansson 1993: 199).21
However, despite the adoption of the new Swedish constitution in 1809, it did not 
provide the strengthened democracy that it seemed to promise. According to 
Kirby (1995: 82), “[WJithin three years, [Swedish king] Carl Johan was 
contemplating replacing it with a new form of government more suited to the
20 Translation of: “pa ett mycket allmdnt plan kan neutralitetsdoktrinen harledas tillbaka till 1830- 
talet, da Karl XIV Johan forklarade att Sverige hade for avsikt att forhalla sig neutral i konflikten 
mellan Ryssland och England”
21 Finnish neutrality, although not a part of the constitution, had some written basis in the FCMA 
Treaty, which Finland signed with the Soviet Union in 1948.
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interests of the ruler; the Regency Act of 1810 and the Act of Union with Norway 
were both passed by extraordinary sessions of the Riksdag, in breach of the 
constitutional stipulation that only ordinary sessions had such authority; and 
several of those responsible for producing the constitution cast around for reasons 
why it had failed to live up to expectations.” Furthermore, there was considerable 
anti-Russian sentiment in Sweden, which also had consequences for Finland. 
Kirby (1995: 98) asserts, “Aware of anti-Russian sentiment in Sweden, the 
authorities in Finland took all possible steps to isolate Finland from the outside 
world.”
Although Finland, as has been mentioned above, retained its pre-existing 
institutions, there were nevertheless institutional changes that took place in 
Finland. According to Alapuro (1988: 25), “In sum, . . . when Russia created the 
Finnish polity, the position of the domestic bureaucracy was greatly strengthened. 
A central administration was built up, but its role was not limited to administrative 
affairs. By suspending the Diet for nearly half a century, the Russians indirectly 
endowed the top of the administration with vital political functions. These 
arrangements were to change power and status relations among the dominant 
groups and to create new tensions.” Furthermore, there were physical changes in 
the location of Finnish institutions as the capital was moved from Turku (Abo in 
Swedish) to Helsinki (Helsingfors in Swedish) in 1819, in part as a way to 
“dissasociate Finland as much as possible from pro-Swedish Abo” (Thaden 1984: 
90). Having been largely destroyed by fire in 1808, Helsinki, which lay closer 
geographically to Russia and farther from Sweden than Turku, was available for 
rebuilding in a new style.
One way in which a Finnish identity was developed during the nineteenth century 
was through what is known as the “Finland concept.” Jussila (1999: 24) writes of 
this concept, which he defines as “the notion of a new political entity called 
Finland.” He argues that this concept “started to take shape and gain strength 
within the Committee for Finnish Affairs [Suomen Asiain Komitea]. The concept 
was clearly a part of the propaganda directed at the Finns from St. Petersburg with 
the purpose of strengthening the bond between the occupied territory and the
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mother-country. According to this propaganda, Finland was no longer part of 
Sweden, but neither had it been incorporated into Russia” (Jussila 1999: 24).
This concept is based on a creative reading of the events that took place when 
Tsar Alexander I convened a meeting of the Finnish estates in Porvoo on 29 
November 1809 and was, as suggested above, a reading of the events that was 
developed several decades later. Based on this interpretation, Finland was not seen 
as having been “annexed to Russia in the form of a province,” but rather as having 
“become a State by means of a contract made with Tsar Alexander I in Porvoo in 
1809. In the old Swedish constitution that could not be amended without the 
Finnish State organs, an uncontestable argument was found for Finnish 
Statehood” (Tiilikainen 1998a: 129). An article published in Helsingfors Dagblad 
in 1863 elucidated this argument: “Obliged by existing conditions the Finnish 
people decided to dissociate itself from its old provincial relationship to Sweden 
and to enter into a new connection with Russia to which the Emperor Alexander I 
had invited i t . . .  Instead of having earlier been a province, Finland now became a 
sovereign State with definite connections to the new State to which it was united. 
And this is the present position of Finland in the law of nations” (Cited in 
Tiilikainen 1998a: 129). This interpretation of the events in Porvoo was part of the 
process of the construction, during the nineteenth century, of a Finnish national 
identity, including a collective self-esteem.
There were prominent Finns who were involved in the creation and spread of the 
concept. According to Jussila (1999: 24), “The ‘Finland concept’ has been 
generally associated with A. I. Arwidsson and is expressed as follows: ‘We are no 
longer Swedes; we cannot become Russians; so we must be Finns.’ Yet this 
sentiment had already been clearly expressed by G. M. Armfelt [chairman of the 
Committee for Finnish Affairs] and his colleagues. The Tsar had created for the 
Finns a state of their own and it was their duty to give it substance, but it was 
important that this argument emphasised the need for strengthening the new union 
of states. In short, the positions of the Finns was better than before 1809; in the 
words of the Tsar’s Porvoo speech, they had been elevated to national status.” In 
addition, Jussila (1987: 69, 1999: 38) argues that Arwidsson’s friend in Turku, 
Swedish medicine professor Israel Hwasser, developed Arwidsson’s ideas further
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and was the primary creator of the Finland concept. In pamphlets written in the 
late 1830s and early 1840s, Hwasser argued that Finland became a state due to a 
contract with the tsar in 1809 (cf. Jussila 1987: 72-73, 1999: 38). However, 
according to Jussila (1987: 75), “Hwasser’s and Alexander I’s ‘Finnish states’
O'}were very different.” Thus, the adoption of this doctrine involved creatively 
rewriting Finnish history such as to construct the identity of a unique and special 
Finland that was not only a nation but also a state. Jussila (1999: 38-39) argues 
that, despite its popularity within elite circles earlier, the Finland concept “did not 
gain acceptance generally in Finnish public life in either the 1840s or the ’50s.”
During the eighteenth century, there had been, particularly among the Swedish­
speaking elite, frustration with the extent to which Finland was involved in 
repeated wars between Sweden and Russia. Already during this period (the 
eighteenth century, when Finland was still joined with the Swedish kingdom), 
Finns including Colonel G. M. Sprengporten and Professor Henrik Gabriel 
Porthan were involved in efforts to increase the use and knowledge of the Finnish 
language and culture that distinguished it from Sweden (cf. Thaden 1984: 83-84).
Once Finland became part of the Russian empire, Finns were able to replace their 
allegiance to the Swedish crown with loyalty to the Russian tsar. According to 
Kirby (1995: 86), “The Lutheran ruling elite in Finland, accustomed to service and 
obedience to higher authority, and with no deep or particularist sense of national 
tradition were soon won over by the generosity of the emperor.” In fact, the 
Russian tsar did initially treat Finland differently from its Baltic neighbours to the 
south, allowing the Finns to retain far more of their pre-existing institutions and 
traditions (cf. Thaden 1984, chapters 5 and 6, for more on the Russian empire’s 
treatment of Finland and the Baltic provinces). Indeed, many Finns may even have 
preferred their new situation to their position when they were joined with Sweden. 
Kirby (1995: 86) writes, “In the immediate aftermath of occupation and separation 
from Sweden, many [Finns] complained of the lack of public spirit and patriotic 
sentiment, but there was little enthusiasm for a return to a country which had so 
badly let them down.” In many cases, Finns saw advantages in their new situation,
22 Translation of: “Hwasserin ja  Alexanteri I:n »Suomen valtiot« olivat hyvin erilaiset”
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which seemed to offer them more liberty and independence than they had had 
under Swedish governance (cf. Kirby 1995: 86).
Max Jakobson (1987) argues that it was Finland’s becoming part of the Russian 
empire that led to the establishment of a national Finnish identity and that 
language played an important role in this (despite the fact that many of those 
championing the Finnish language were Swedish-speaking). The nineteenth 
century and particularly the early twentieth century in Finland were times when 
many Finns changed their names from Swedish to Finnish. Translating names was 
a part of the creation of a common Finnish identity, in which the Finnish language 
played a role in distinguishing Finland from its neighbours (particularly Sweden).
Nevertheless, Swedish-speakers continued to co-exist with Finnish-speakers, 
meaning that Finland, in contrast to Sweden, had a sizeable and identifiable 
linguistic minority, concentrated along its southern and western coasts. Kirby 
(1995: 52) acknowledges this difference between the two language groups in 
Finland, writing, “Beyond the business of buying tar barrels or timber, there were 
few contacts between this predominantly Swedish-speaking coastal area and the 
Finnish-speaking inhabitants of the densely forested hinterland.” Despite this 
division, “there was not the kind of racial gulf dividing those who spoke Swedish 
from those who spoke Finnish as there was between the German-speaking ruling 
class and the servile peasantry of the Baltic provinces” (Kirby 1995: 71). Thus, 
even though there were two distinct sub-groups in Finnish society, the country 
was nevertheless fairly united.
The region known as Karelia provided particular inspiration for much of the 
Finnish nationalism and the construction of a Finnish identity that developed in 
the nineteenth century. According to Hannes Sihvo (1989: 67), Karelia “played a 
central role” in “the building of a Finnish national identity in nineteenth century 
Finland.” Elias Lonnrot was particularly influential in using Karelia to construct 
such an identity through his Kalevala epic. Sihvo (1989: 67) writes, “The Finnish 
nation did not have its own history in the political sense, but with the publication 
of Elias Lonnrot’s Kalevala in 1835 it gained an imagined past.” In other words,
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Lonnrot’s epic provided Finns with a mythical past that they could use in the 
construction of a national identity.
Ironically, the part of Karelia on which he drew was Archangel Karelia, the 
Russian part of Karelia that had been separated from the rest of the region. Yet, 
this separation may have been the reason why it provided the inspiration that it 
did. Along this line, Sihvo (1989: 65) writes, “It might be asked whether the 
‘Karelian culture’ of the Archangel Karelians would have been present had they 
been subjected to the miseries, as well as the benefits, which affected the rest of 
Karelia. The Archangel Karelians were left in peace, isolated from civilisation and 
wars; they were left alone as if living on a reservation, waiting for the Finnish 
national romantic discoverers in the nineteenth century.” Regardless of the 
benefits of Archangel Karelia’s separation from the rest of Finland, it was able to 
provide Lonnrot with the inspiration and material necessary to write his epic.
“Educator-intellectuals,” including Lonnrot as well as J. L. Runeberg, and J. V. 
Snellman, who were, like most of the elite at the time, Swedish-speaking, were 
influential in shaping Finnish identity during the nineteenth century (Smith 1991: 
67). According to Anthony D. Smith (1991: 67), “Lonnrot, in particular, captured 
the imagination of the Finnish intelligentsia and later of the people, by bringing 
back from the province of Karelia the ballads and poems that he formed into the 
Kalevala in 1835.” Despite the fact that Lonnrot’s epic “bore only a partial 
resemblance to earlier ‘Finnish’ society of the first millennium AD (judging from 
material remains),” “it was enough to create for modem Finns a cult of the golden 
age of the heroes Vainambinen and Lemminkainen, which was to inspire popular 
art and the genius of [Jean] Sibelius and [Akseli] Gallen-Kallela” (Smith 1991: 
67). In addition to composer Sibelius and artist Gallen-Kallela, writers Juhani Aho 
and Eino Leino and artists Pekka Halonen, Eero Jamefelt, and Emil Wikstrom 
were also among those who drew inspiration from Russian Karelia and 
contributed to the construction of a Finnish national identity (Sihvo 1989: 68).
The intellectuals who played this role were generally conscious that they were 
“national awakeners” (Kirby 1995: 127). For instance, regarding Lonnrot, Kirby 
(1995: 127) writes, “Elias Lonnrot did not hesitate to claim . . . that posterity
105
would value the results of their labours as highly as the Gothic peoples cherished 
their Edda, or the Greeks and Romans their Homer and Hesiod.” Yet, Kirby 
(1995: 127) argues that the works of Lonnrot and his fellow “national awakeners” 
were directed more to “an educated public” than to the common people. The work 
of these “awakeners” may be seen as part of a process of increasing both the use 
and status of the Finnish language, making it a civilised language (sivistyskieli). 
Other elements of this awakening included increased use of the Finnish language, 
and many Swedish-speaking students spent their summer vacations with Finnish­
speaking families in order to learn the language (cf. Kirby 1995: 128). By using 
Finnish rather than Swedish, Finns were also distancing themselves further from 
Sweden and pleasing the Russians, for the use of the Finnish language was 
preferable to the use of Swedish from the Russian perspective.
The Finnish identity grew stronger through the difficult times of the late 
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. The pressures for 
Finnish independence grew in the late nineteenth century as the Russians’ attitude 
towards the Finns, which had become increasingly intolerant, became particularly 
so after the accession in 1881 of Alexander III, who did not accept the argument 
that Alexander I had granted the Finns a special status or even statehood 
(Nordstrom 2000: 200). Although the situation intensified when Alexander III 
came to power, Jussila (1999: 61) argues, “The progression towards conflict 
between the Finnish ‘government’ (the Senate and Diet) and the Russian 
government (the Tsar and his ministers), known as the ‘Years of Oppression’ 
[Sortovuodet], began during the supposedly ‘liberal’ reign of Alexander II.” 
Although the Russians “paradoxically” “favoured” the Finnish language, which 
they did not regard as a threat, the “attitude of Russian ministers became less 
favourable towards Finland’s separate development” once Alexander III ascended 
to power (Jussila 1999: 64).
In 1889, Johannes Gripenberg, a member of the Committee for Finnish Affairs, 
described the Russian situation regarding Finland in the following manner: “It 
would seem as if Russian statesmen have only just woken up to the fact that they 
are now faced with a quite new and remarkable phenomenon which has grown 
and matured silently whilst their predecessors were either sleeping the sleep of
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indifference or were looking the other way. They are surprised and annoyed to see 
that small embryonic state which Alexander at the stormy dawn of the century 
hastily created ‘somewhere the other side of Viborg’ now grown into an 
autonomous state within the course of three-quarters of a century, and possessing 
all the attributes of such a state in more or less fully developed order” (Cited in 
Kirby 1995: 181). Thus, although Finland had enjoyed a privileged position 
within the Russian empire for decades, that position was in question by the end of 
the nineteenth century.
The situation did not improve with the accession in 1894 of Nicholas II, described 
by Nordstrom (2000: 200) as being “equally narrow-minded and inept” as 
Alexander III. Similarly, Jussila (1999: 66) writes, “The death of Alexander III 
and accession of Nicholas II in 1894, caused no fundamental changes in Russia’s 
policy towards Finland.” Under the rule of Nicholas II and Nicholas Bobrikov, the 
governor-general of Finland, the “February Manifesto” (Helmikuun Manifesti) 
was implemented.” According to the Manifesto, issued on 15 February 1899, the 
Finnish Diet would lose the power to veto legislation and would, as Jussila (1999: 
69) writes, have “only . . .  a consultative role.” While the Manifesto came as a 
shock to the Finnish public, it had been in development for some time, with hints 
of what was to come available to members of the ruling elite (cf. Kirby 1995: 181- 
182, Jussila 1999: 70-72). Although the Finnish response to the Manifesto was 
“divided,” mounting tensions between Finns and Russians led to the assassination 
of Bobrikov in 1904 by Eugen Schauman, a young official (virkailija), who then 
killed himself (Nordstrom 2000: 200, cf. Jussila 1999: 77). Bobrikov had been 
particularly unpopular among the Finns and is characterised by Kirby (1995: 182) 
as “[t]he personification of Russian oppression in Finnish eyes.”
Despite arguing for the Manifesto’s lack of historical significance per se, Jussila 
(1999: 72) writes, “In Finnish popular consciousness images of the February 
Manifesto remain powerful and dramatic.” In particular, this was done through the 
incorporation of images of the Manifesto into art, notably “Edvard (Eetu) Isto’s 
celebrated painting ‘Hydkkays’ (The Attack), a copy of which found its way into 
almost every home” (Jussila 1999: 72). Jussila (1999: 72) describes the painting as 
follows: “It depicts the large two-headed Russian eagle tearing the book of Laws
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(‘Lex’) from the hands of the Finnish maiden on a stormy beach.” Although the 
degree to which it “found its way into almost every home” may be debatable, it 
demonstrates the way in which Finnish artists participated in the construction (or 
reconstruction, depending on one’s perspective) of a Finnish identity during the 
nineteenth century.
The role of the intellectuals in Finland, who worked to establish a national identity 
through the promotion of the Finnish language and the construction of a unique 
mythical golden age, stands in contrast to the developments in Sweden during the 
same period. In Sweden, there were authors such as August Strindberg and artists 
such as Carl Larsson, who were productive during that period. However, their 
motives and role in society were very different from those found in Finland during 
the nineteenth century. Whereas the emphasis in Finland was on building a unique 
national identity through a distinctively Finnish mythical past, Swedish artists 
during the nineteenth century focused on the construction of a Scandinavian 
identity (rather than a purely nationalistic Swedish one -- although national and 
Scandinavian identities were not mutually exclusive). According to Kirby (1995:
5), “There developed a strong sense of Scandinavian solidarity, even though the 
bolder vision of the Scandinavists of the mid-nineteenth century remained 
unfulfilled.” Thus, while these Swedish artists were involved in identity 
construction, this was done by developing ties with neighbouring countries, 
whereas in Finland the focus was on the uniqueness of the Finnish nation.
Furthermore, Sweden was blessed with many internationally acclaimed inventors. 
A notable Swedish inventor was L. M. Ericsson, who in 1877 repaired Bell 
telephones, but by 1878 was constructing his own and drove Bell’s products 
almost completely out of the Swedish market (Kirby 1995: 306). Others included 
Asea’s founder, Jonas Wenstrom, who invented the three-phase electrical motor, 
and Separator AB’s Gustaf de Laval, inventor of the centrifugal separator and 
turbo-generator (Kirby 1995: 306-307). These individuals increased the profile of 
Sweden internationally and raised Sweden’s national self-confidence. In 
comparison to Sweden, “Finland produced far fewer indigenous inventions, but 
was highly receptive to new ideas and quick to adapt in key areas, such as 
electrification or the chemical pulp-processing industry” (Kirby 1995: 307).
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Although Finland was the recipient of less foreign investment than Sweden was, 
Finland’s performance was “rather better than the Russian empire as a whole, with 
growth rates between 1870 and 1914 among the highest in Europe” (Kirby 1995: 
307).
For Finland, the dramatic events of the nineteenth century, which had a profound 
impact on its institutions, political culture, and national identity, were followed by 
similarly important experiences in the twentieth century. One aspect of the 
development of a unique Finnish identity was the events of the early twentieth 
century prior to the declaration of Finnish independence in 1917. Following a 
strike in Russia in October 1905, there was a one-week strike in Finland in early 
November that started with a strike by workers on the Finnish railroad to St. 
Petersburg and then spread to the rest of Finland (Klinge 1996: 416). On 4 
November 1905 the public gathered by the Helsinki railway station to select a 
temporary Finnish government, a sign, according to Klinge (1996: 421), of a 
national revolution. On the same day, the tsar issued the November Manifesto, 
which “temporarily suspended” the February Manifesto and “nullified the 1901 
conscription law together with other decrees issued after the February Manifesto” 
(Jussila 1999: 80). The strike, which ended on 5 November, was important for the 
development of Finland’s SDP; in fact, it “swelled the ranks of the party” and 
“created a tradition of direct action, which was to be revived once more in 1917” 
(Kirby 1995: 253). There was a “new sense of optimism” in Finland and Russia in 
1905 and 1906, when the many improvements in the Finnish situation included 
the introduction of a new governmental law granting rights such as, for instance, 
universal suffrage (Nordstrom 2000: 201).
Yet, these developments should still be seen in the context of increasing tensions 
between Finland and the Russian empire during the first two decades of the 
twentieth century and a process that moved Finns increasingly closer to their 
independence in 1917 (cf. Tiilikainen 1998a: 126). According to Nordstrom 
(2000: 201), the hopes of the Finns, having been raised during the reforms of the 
early twentieth century, were “quickly dashed,” and by 1908, the Russians “set 
about withdrawing the gains nationalists and liberals had made.” Arter (1999: 28) 
argues that the “political modernisation achieved in 1906-07 flattered to deceive”
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and was part of a period of “sham democracy [which] ended with the collapse of 
czarism in Russia in 1917.”
There were also consequences for the Finnish parliament and the role of the 
Swedish-speaking minority. In the early twentieth century, the four estates were 
abolished in Finland, an event that had occurred about half a century earlier in 
Sweden. Kirby (1995: 235) writes, “The Swedish-speaking upper-class element in 
Finland accepted with good grace the abolition of the four estates, which had 
given them a disproportionate say in the affairs of the nation, and were able within 
a short space of time to weld together a highly effective minority Swedish 
People’s Party [Svenska Folkpartiet, SFP], with almost 50,000 members in the 
autumn of 1906.” One might even characterise the Swedish-speaking elite in 
Finland as “adaptable” (Kirby 1995: 235).
Kirby (1995: 337) argues that the SFP’s “creation in 1906 . . . was a tacit and 
intelligent acceptance of their new status as a linguistic minority whose only home 
was Finland.” Prominent Swedish-speaking Finn Rabbe Wrede elucidated the 
Swedish-speaking Finns’ solidarity with their Finnish-speaking compatriots as he 
argued that “we are bound to this Finnish Finland and its wellbeing is our 
wellbeing, its misfortunes and ruin our misfortunes and ruin” (Cited in Kirby 
1995: 337). Kirby (1995: 337) argues, “This was a bond tacitly acknowledged on 
both sides of the language divide, one sufficiently strong to ensure that the rights 
of the minority in an officially bilingual state have been respected to the present 
day.”
Although agrarian/centre parties were formed in both countries in the early 
twentieth century, there were differences between the Finnish and Swedish parties 
despite obvious similarities. The Finnish Agrarian Union (Maolaisliitto) followed 
the example of the equivalent Swedish party (Centerpartiet, previously 
Bondefdrbundet and then Landsbygdspartiet Centerpartiet) in changing its name 
to become a Centre Party (Keskustapuolue) in 1965. According to Kirby (1995: 
393), this was done in an attempt “to win the votes of the new urban middle 
classes” but “[i]n this endeavour it [the Finnish party] has proved markedly less 
successful, a circumstance which may be ascribed to the fact that the Swedish
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Centre, as a party of opposition until 1976, has had more freedom to manoeuvre 
and to project a new image than has the Finnish party, which as a party of the 
government has had to defend the farming interest against the urban consumer and 
industrial lobbies of the socialists and conservatives.”
Although less successful in winning urban middle class votes than its Swedish 
counterpart, the Finnish agrarian/centre party played an important role in Finnish 
politics. According to Kirby (1995: 387), “The principal party of government in 
Finland remained the Agrarian Union, though coalitions were the norm, and non- 
party governments of civil servants not infrequent.” The tables of Prime Ministers 
and their parties in the Appendix demonstrate the greater frequency with which 
the Finnish agrarian/centre party held the leadership as opposed to its Swedish 
sister party during the twentieth century. Notably, whereas the Finnish party was 
able to “maintain a reasonable level of support at the polls” during the 1970s, the 
Swedish party was not as successful (Kirby 1995: 393). Jungar (2000: 92-93) also 
notes the importance of the Centre Party in twentieth century Finnish politics, as 
she writes, “The Centre in Finland participated in almost every post-war cabinet 
until 1987, and was only in opposition during brief periods.”
There were also differences in the extreme right in the two countries, with a 
noteworthy example of difference being the existence in Finland of the Lapua 
movement (Lapuan liike), which was without an equivalent in Sweden. Kirby 
(1995: 323) characterises this movement as follows: “The Lapua movement was 
at the bottom little more than a crude form of anti-communism, which served the 
interests of a diverse group of politicians and employers anxious to smash the 
trade unions. The People’s Patriotic Movement (IKL [Isanmaallinen 
Kansanliike]) which was founded in April 1932 in the spirit of Lapua was in fact 
rather different, drawing its leadership and active supporters from the ranks of the 
educated, and much of its initial inspiration from the student activism of the 
previous decade, when the Academic Karelian Society [Akateeminen Karjala- 
Seura\ had set the tone of university politics.” Yet, Kirby (1995: 329) argues, “In 
Finland, the post-civil war constitutional system was never seriously threatened by 
the forces of the communist left.” He also writes, “The Lapua movement, with its 
violence against the person and its crude demands, was a bludgeon to crack a nut
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already effectively contained by the police and the employers’ organisations; but 
its rowdyism also threatened to disturb the body politic in ways unacceptable to 
the establishment” (Kirby 1995: 329). According to Kirby (1995: 329), “The 
leadership of the movement disintegrated amidst a cloud of scandals and a haze of 
alcoholism. Its putative successor, the IKL, was little more than a refuge for 
russophobes, anti-socialists and admirers of fascism. Working within and with the 
system it affected to despise, it was never a serious threat to the Finnish body 
politic.”
The situation in Sweden, however, was in contrast to that which existed in 
Finland. Kirby (1995: 332) describes the extreme right in Sweden as “fragmented 
and marginal.” He argues, “The Swedish Right (Hoger) and a section of the 
Farmers’ Party were unhappy with the constitutional changes brought about in 
1917-18, though they were less hostile to organised labour than their counterparts 
in Finland and Norway” (Kirby 1995: 332).
A more significant difference between Finland and Sweden was that Finland 
became an independent state far later than Sweden. Finland declared its 
independence on 6 December 1917, after the collapse of the Russian tsarist 
regime. Yet, Seppo Hentila (1999: 103) argues that the selection of 6 December as 
Finnish Independence Day {Itsenaisyyspaiva) was arbitrary; 4 December (when 
Pehr Evind Svinhufvud presented a government statement to the parliament) or 15 
November (when the Eduskunta “declared itself the repository of supreme 
power”) could also have been appropriately chosen instead. The mere feet that 
Finland became independent later than Sweden had an impact on its identity; the 
manner in which Finland became independent and the struggle the Finns endured 
to maintain that independence also influenced their identity. The continuing 
difference can be demonstrated by the fact that, even at the end of the twentieth 
century, Finland’s independence day was a national holiday when most employees 
did not work, whereas the closest Swedish equivalent (6 June, Nationaldageri) 
was a less celebrated and less serious event.
The suffering endured by the Finns during the first half of the twentieth century 
was without equivalent in Sweden. The beginning of Finland’s independence was
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a particularly difficult time, as the country was immediately involved in a bitter 
war that began during the night between 27 and 28 January 1918 and has been 
characterised both as a civil war and as a war of independence. Commenting on 
the disagreement on the categorisation of the 1918 struggle, Fred Singleton (1998: 
110-111) writes, “Finnish national historians see the events of 1918 not as a civil 
war, but as part of a war for independence. They draw attention to the help given 
to the Reds by the Russians and stress the fact that the Red leaders who took 
refuge in Russia founded the Finnish Communist Party in Moscow and remained 
as tools of the Comintern until they were either wiped out in Stalin’s purges or, 
like . . . [Otto Ville] Kuusinen, appeared in 1939 as members of the ‘Democratic 
Government of Finland’ [Suomen Kansanhallitus] which was to rule the country 
when the Red Army won the war.” According to Nordstrom (2000: 202), “The 
war, which was a civil war in the sense that it pitted Finns against each other and a 
war of independence in that it involved getting Russian forces out of Finland, 
lasted four months. It exacerbated the divisions within Finnish society and left 
deep scars.”
Also characterising the struggle as a civil war, Kirby (1995: 6) notes the 
seriousness of the war and asserts, “The civil war of 1918 split Finnish society 
asunder.” The war even impacted on Finnish identity. According to Kirby (1995:
6), the war “cast into doubt all the assumptions of a poor but loyal and God­
fearing people upon which the ‘nationalist idyll’ had been based.” Despite the 
difficulties that the war meant for the Finns and for Finnish society, the nation 
emerged as an intact democracy, and the end of the civil/independence war was 
celebrated on 16 May 1918, when Gustaf Mannerheim rode in a victory parade 
through Helsinki.
Despite these divisions in Finnish society, the Finns had already created some 
sense of national identity, which helped to unite the country. Indeed, this Finnish 
identity helped to ensure Finland’s emergence as a unified democratic state at the 
conclusion of the war. In fact, Finland was a remarkably inclusive state (and 
nation), despite divisions based primarily on linguistic ties. According to Kirby 
(1995: 5), “Of the states which emerged on the western frontiers of Soviet Russia 
in the collapse of empires at the end of the first world war, it was Finland which
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had the most fully-developed and coherent form of state and national identity.” 
Stressing the importance of this Finnish identity, Kirby (1995: 5) writes, “In the 
long run, it was that [identity] which united the Finns as they ensured that the 
scars of the civil war which erupted at a time of revolutionary upheaval, political 
uncertainty and social misery, would heal, not fester.”
The scars and suffering endured by Finland during these years was in contrast to 
the situation in Sweden, which remained at peace. Finland, unlike Sweden, 
emerged with an identity based on a legacy of endurance in the face of warfare, 
threat, and struggle, as well as on a unique (and partly mythical) history, language, 
and culture that distinguished Finns from their neighbours. This uniqueness was to 
be further accentuated during the years immediately following the 
civil/independence war, when Finland developed a new constitution, which was 
ratified on 17 July 1919. In particular, the replacement of the position of the 
king/tsar with that of the President was an institutional choice that would impact 
on the future development of Finnish history, culture, and identity.
Furthermore, while the Swedes were able to enjoy peace during the twentieth 
century, the Finns (even after the conclusion of their civil/independence war) were 
subjected to years of warfare, bloodshed, and territorial loss that were unparalleled 
in Sweden. The next major crisis for Finland after the struggles associated with its 
independence was the Winter War (Talvisota), which began when the Soviet 
Union attacked Finland on 30 November 1939, to the surprise of the Finnish 
government (Hentila 1999: 181). The Winter War involved a difficult contest 
between the Finns and the Soviet Union, which would become an important 
historical memory for the Finnish nation. When the war ended with the Peace of 
Moscow signed on 12 March 1940, Finland lost ten percent of its territory. Many 
lives were lost (25,000 Finnish men were killed) and 45,000 Finns were wounded, 
10,000 of them so seriously that they became “permanent invalids” (Singleton 
1998: 126). Kirby (1995: 361) terms the costs in both lives and territory “a severe 
blow.” According to Kirby (1995: 360-361), “In many ways, the experience of the 
Winter War had served to draw the nation together and to help heal old wounds. If 
the spirit of unanimity and reconciliation was perhaps less wholehearted than is 
commonly believed, survival of the ordeal did much to strengthen the ties of
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national identity.” By the conclusion of the Winter War, Finland was largely a 
unified country despite earlier divisions between the Finnish and Swedish- 
speakers and between the Reds and the Whites.
The following year Finland was once again at war with the Soviet Union. During 
the Continuation War (Jatkosota) from 1941 to 1944, Finland joined with 
Germany in an (unsuccessful) attempt to regain the territory lost in the Winter 
War. At the end of the Continuation War, Finland lost additional territory, 
including manufacturing centres in Karelia and the historic city of Viipuri. Finland 
lost “a third of its hydroelectricity, a quarter of its chemical pulp production, 12 
per cent of its productive forests and 9 per cent of its arable land” and was forced 
to pay reparations to the Soviet Union (Singleton 1989: 151-152). Kirby (1995: 
367) writes, “The terms of the armistice agreed to by the Eduskunta on 19 
September [1944] were severe.” As Sihvo (1989: 71) points out, “One hundred 
percent of the population which returned to their home districts during Finland’s 
reoccupation of Karelia in the Continuation War . . .  had to leave again, in itself an 
historically unprecedented movement of population as a consequence of war.” 
Finns were thus faced with the integration of about 400,000 Karelians into the 
remaining areas of Finland (Sihvo 1989: 72). They were also forced once again to 
face the loss of an area that had been the inspiration for much of the Finnish 
national identity.
Yet, W. R. Mead (1989: 9) argues that “whatever the adventures or misadventures 
others attributed to Finland in the Continuation War, it was the Winter War that 
struck the lasting picture — a latter-day Thermopylae for those without, a sacred 
myth for those within.” Clearly, Finland’s wartime experiences impacted heavily 
on Finland and would continue to influence the nation in many ways, including 
impacting on Finnish foreign policy and political culture. Salolainen argues that 
the Winter War had a lasting impact on Finnish foreign policy by teaching Finns 
firmness in international relations and solidifying and consolidating Finland’s 
independence.23 Similarly, Mats Bergquist, Sweden’s ambassador to Finland 
between 1992 and 1997, also regards Finland’s wartime experiences as having had
23 Interview with Salolainen on 16 December 1998.
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a lasting impact on the country. Bergquist believes that Finnish historical 
experiences during the Winter and Continuation Wars were among the factors that 
led to differences between Finnish and Swedish political culture.24 Jaaskinen 
believes that historical experiences taught Finns that compromise is the only way 
to get anything and also meant that Finns were better prepared to deal with crises 
and reformulate positions or reach compromises if necessary, both in the EU and 
otherwise. As the name “Continuation War” suggests, this war should be viewed 
together with the Winter War as part of a continuing theme of war, threat, and 
struggle that pervaded Finland’s historical experiences during the first half of the 
twentieth century and left a lasting impact on the nation’s identity and culture.
Following the Continuation War, there were changes in the Finnish political 
scene. According to Kirby (1995: 368), “A number of organisations deemed to be 
fascistic or anti-Soviet, such as the parliamentary Suojeluskunta, the Academic 
Karelia Society and the Patriotic People’s Front (IKL), were banned; the 
Communist Party was legalised, political prisoners and internees released and 
surviving exiles (but no t . . .  Kuusinen) allowed to return from the Soviet Union.” 
Despite these changes, Kirby (1995: 368) argues, “The effects of this scene- 
shifting on the political stage were less dramatic than contemporaries believed, 
and certainly less profound than the changes wrought in eastern Europe. The 
emergence of the communists from the underground, their initial electoral success 
under the banner of the Finnish People’s Democratic League (SKDL [Suomen 
Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto]) and their participation in government did not 
break the mould of political continuity.” Social democracy continued to survive in 
Finland: “The social democrats managed to prevent a communist takeover of then- 
party, and fought a successful anti-communist campaign within the trade union 
movement” (Kirby 1995: 368).
Furthermore, according to Kirby (1995: 385), “In Finland, the wartime experience 
was decisive in reshaping attitudes towards social welfare provision. The 
underlying assumption, that poverty was an individual failing, could no longer 
stand up in a situation where those who suffered were often the dependants of
24 Interview with Mats Bergquist on 18 December 1998.
25 Interview with Niilo Jaaskinen on 12 February 1998.
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those on active service. Several voluntary organisations sprang up during the 
Winter War, and these were to play a major role in keeping up morale and the will 
to fight on.” “Change and adaptation” marked Finland during the “difficult 
decade” of the 1950s (Kirby 1995: 385). The war reparations that Finland was 
obliged to pay to the Soviet Union had a tremendous impact on the development 
and structure of the Finnish economy during the postwar years (cf. Kirby 1995: 
386).
The first half of the twentieth century for Sweden was very different than it was 
for Finland. Although there were also changes in Sweden during the early 
twentieth century, they were of a very different nature from those that took place 
in Finland during the same period. Norway left the Swedish kingdom in 1905 
“without bloodshed or internal convulsions” (Kirby 1995: 185). The separation of 
Norway from Sweden and the tensions preceding it led to increased nationalism in 
both countries. According to Kirby (1995: 186), “Bjomstjeme Bjomson’s demand 
for the Norwegian people to be the master in Norway was echoed across the 
border by the cry of ‘Sweden for the Swedes’, uttered by those fearful of the 
consequences of foreign competition at a time of agricultural crisis and industrial 
uncertainty.” Although Kirby (1995: 189) argues that “[t]he more belligerent 
forces of the Great Swedish nationalism of the 1890s failed to coalesce,” he 
asserts that “[t]he relatively tranquil constitutional and political development of 
the three northern kingdoms [Sweden, Denmark, and Norway] and the impressive 
economic, cultural and social achievements made during the first half of this 
century have immeasurably strengthened the ‘Scandinavian’ image” (Kirby 1995:
5).
There were further changes to Swedish political institutions when the Riksdag 
underwent reforms between 1919 and 1921. In addition to reforms that included 
the granting of universal suffrage to Swedes over the age of twenty-three (with a 
few exceptions), the First Chamber of the parliament was reformed so that it was 
no longer “the preserve of the wealthier property-owning classes or the instrument 
of conservatism upon which the right (including the king) could rely” (Kirby 
1995: 271). The reforms also limited the king’s power “by allowing both
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chambers henceforth to choose their own Speakers, and the county assemblies 
(Landsting) to appoint their own leaders” (Kirby 1995: 271).
Other differences between Finnish and Swedish development in the first half of 
the twentieth century can be found in their developing party systems and labour 
movements. Despite the existence of social democratic parties and labour 
movements in both Finland and Sweden, there were differences between them, 
and the general nature of their party systems differed as well. Kirby (1995: 253) 
argues that “the Finnish labour movement, although numerically impressive, was 
relatively young and inexperienced” in comparison with its Scandinavian 
counterparts. He further explains, “Party politics as such in Finland dated only 
from the parliamentary reform of 1906, and there was no liberal bourgeois party 
with which the social democrats could make common cause” (Kirby 1995: 253).
In addition, despite the emergence of social democracy in both countries, in 
Sweden the social democrats were clearly the leading party, even more so than in 
Finland. According to Kirby (1995: 383), “As the party of government from 1933 
to 1976, the social democrats were in a powerful position to realise their 
proclaimed desire for Sweden to become a ‘strong society’ (the term used by the 
postwar prime minister Tage Erlander; his predecessor Per Albin Hansson had 
spoken of a ‘people’s home’ (folkhemmet) in the late 1920s to describe the social 
democratic vision of security and solidarity).” The Social Democrats’ dominance 
of Swedish politics during the twentieth century can be seen in the Appendix, 
where Swedish Prime Ministers between 1905 and 2000 are listed, and many of 
them represented the SAP. Describing the nature of the SAP, Kirby (1995: 383) 
asserts, “Security (trygghet) was the underlying theme of much of the party’s 
thinking and policies.”
Indeed, Swedish social democracy and corporatism made particular strides during 
the first half of the twentieth century. According to Kirby (1995: 310), “Social 
democracy became the major political force in Scandinavia during the thirties.” 
As Kirby (1995: 304) also notes, “The agreement concluded in 1938 between 
representatives of labour and industry at Saltsjobaden was widely regarded as a 
model for industrial relations.” Finland, on the other hand, “lagged a long way
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behind Sweden” (Kirby 1995: 304) and was “industrially underdeveloped” 
(Soderpalm 1975: 275). Suggesting the likely reasons for this, Kirby (1995: 304) 
writes, “The civil war had left a bitter legacy of hostility and suspicion towards 
workers’ organisations, which were in any case weakened by the power struggles 
of communists and socialists, and employers preferred to rely on lockouts and 
strikebreakers rather than negotiations.”
The Finnish SDP, in contrast to the Swedish SAP, was more “isolated” before 
1917 in part due to “[t]he lack of a reform-minded party resting on popular 
support” (Kirby 1995: 275). Then, during the 1920s “the bitter legacy of the civil 
war hindered the development of such political alignments” (Kirby 1995: 275, cf. 
Soderpalm 1975: 275). Despite the party’s rapid “recovery” after the civil war, as 
demonstrated by its returning to being the Finnish parliament’s largest party with 
eighty seats following the March 1919 elections, the party was plagued by 
“mounting dissatisfaction” with its leadership (Kirby 1995: 320). Furthermore, as 
Kirby (1995: 320) writes, “Success in elections for the social democrats was 
rarely translated into government office.” In Sweden, on the other hand, the social 
democrats were more powerful and involved in the creation of a modem social 
democratic welfare state.
Overall, the Finnish left was less influential in the twentieth century than was the 
case in Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries. Kirby (1995: 387) asserts, 
“In spite of the resurgence of the labour movement in Finland during the 
immediate postwar years, the left did not achieve the degree of political 
dominance here that it did in the Scandinavian countries.” Similarly, Sven Anders 
Soderpalm (1975: 275) argues that in Finland “the Social Democrats were weaker 
than in the rest of Scandinavia.” The differences between Finland and Sweden 
also provoked tensions between them. According to Kirby (1995: 304), “The 
lower wage levels in Finland and the reactionary attitudes of certain influential 
employers occasionally prompted hostile comment in Sweden, where it was 
feared that the Finnish timber or paper exporters would be able to undercut 
prices.”
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Although trade unions developed in both countries in parallel with the growth of 
social democratic parties, there were differences here, too. In fact, the differences 
between Finnish and Swedish social democracy also spilled over into “the trade 
unions and other workers’ organisations, which were . . . less well established in 
public life [in Finland] than their Scandinavian counterparts” (Kirby 1995: 387). 
Kirby (1995: 253) writes, “Trade unionism [in Finland] remained weak, poorly 
funded and organised, and Finnish employers were noticeably more reluctant than 
their Scandinavian counterparts to enter into collective bargaining arrangements. 
The powerful labour leadership in Sweden was able to control and channel 
economic grievances in the spring of 1917; the Finnish labour leaders spent much 
of their time exhorting workers to observe discipline, and not to pitch their 
demands too high.” In fact, the chair of Finland’s central trade union organisation 
commented that “union officials were threatened, even attacked, if their tactics 
were not in line with the workers’ own ideas . . .  the central organisations were 
forced to follow, and the net result was that illegality became recognised as the 
law” (Cited in Kirby 1995: 253). The trade union movement in Finland continued 
to be weaker than in Sweden, and was also more divided. Jungar (2000: 296) 
argues that “inter- and intraparty conflicts within the left [in Finland] have also 
been reflected in the trade unions. In the SAK [Suomen Ammattiliittojen 
Keskusjarjesto, the Finnish Federation of Trade Unions], the central organisation 
of the labour unions, the conflicts between communist- and social democratic- 
dominated sections have periodically been very deep.”
The situation for Swedish trade unions was different from that found in Finland. 
Hermansson (1993: 95) asserts, “The trade unions’ central organisations have a 
position in Swedish society that is without an equivalent in any other land.”26 In 
fact, the gulf between Sweden and its neighbours is regarded as so large by 
Hermansson (1993: 95-96) that he argues, “One must look to the former 
communist regimes in Eastern Europe to find statistics that can compare with
26 Translation of: “De fackliga centralorganisationerna har en stallning i det svenska samhdllet 
som saknar motsvarighet i varje annat land”
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LO’s [Landsorganisationen, the Confederation of Trade Unions] organisation rate 
of more than 90 per cent.”27
Along with social democracy, corporatism, and trade unions came the welfare 
state, and here again there were differences to be found between Finland and 
Sweden. The welfare state developed earlier and more rapidly in Sweden than it 
did in Finland. According to Kirby (1995: 309), “Finland was . . . noticeably 
behind developments elsewhere in Europe, and did not produce its first effective 
legislation on old-age pensions until 1937 (state-sponsored sickness insurance was 
not introduced until 1963).” Kirby (1995: 393) argues that “[t]he foundations of 
the modem Finnish welfare state were . . . laid by the two centre-right 
governments which held office between 1962 and 1966.” On the other hand, by 
the 1960s the Swedish welfare state had already been developed and the “Swedish 
model” was known around the world. According to Milner (1989: 11), “In the 
1960s few doubted that Sweden was creating a prosperous society in which 
everyone had enough to eat, a job, and a decent place to live, and where 
differences in income and education were being relentlessly narrowed.”
Finland also lagged behind Sweden developmentally during the twentieth century. 
Kirby (1995: 303) points out the differences between their development: “Finland 
was still predominantly an agrarian country in the 1930s, and did not experience 
real industrial expansion until after the Second World War, though growth rates in 
its major export industries during the interwar years were sizeable. Sweden was 
already a net exporter of capital before the First World War.” Notably, Sweden 
became a major exporter with “a third of the industrial workforce . . .  employed in 
export industries” (Kirby 1995: 303). Furthermore, Swedish exports were “high- 
quality goods, often of Swedish invention or development, such as milking 
equipment, steam turbines, telephones, armaments and electrical machinery” 
(Kirby 1995: 303-304).
It was only during the latter part of the twentieth century that Finland was able to 
approach and in some areas even surpass the development in Sweden. Alapuro
27 Translation of: “Man maste soka sig till de forna kommunistregimerna i Osteuropa for att hitta 
sijfror som kan mata sig med landsorganisationens mer an 90-procentiga organisationsgradn
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(1989: 160) sees the 1960s as a “breakthrough” for Finland, the time when the 
country “finally became an industrialised society.”28 He also argues, “In the 1960s 
Finland began to return culturally and politically to that Scandinavian mainstream 
of which it had always been a part in terms of the country’s social and 
administrative structure” (Alapuro 1989:162).
The Swedish welfare state was also more deeply connected to national identity 
and sovereignty than was the Finnish. According to Gould (2000: 201), based on 
his study of Swedish social policy, “Concern about [the welfare state] . . . was 
often expressed in terms of national sovereignty. It was, and is, a source of 
national pride -- something the Swedes felt they were better at doing than other 
countries. It was a way of ensuring that all Swedish citizens belonged. Everyone 
contributed, everyone benefited.” However, as Gould (2000: 201) also asserts, 
“The degree to which this picture represented a genuine reality or a mythical 
golden age is open to debate, but this is how it is remembered.”
Although Swedish social democracy and the welfare state are often regarded as 
being intimately intertwined, Kirby (1995) cautions against giving the Swedish 
social democrats full credit for the development of the Swedish welfare state. He 
argues, “In fact, the foundations of modem welfare in Sweden were laid down 
whilst the Social Democratic Party was yet in its infancy” (Kirby 1995: 388). 
Kirby (1995: 388) further adds, “The universality and apparent solidarity of the 
social welfare reforms enacted in postwar Sweden are also attributed more to 
wishes of the middle classes and their political representatives to benefit from the 
state’s largesse than to the redistributionalist principles of social democracy. 
Though not without its merits -- particularly in questioning assumptions about the 
motives and aims of the politicians who helped formulate the legislation -- this 
line of argument tends to underestimate the underlying desire for security which is 
probably the main cement of solidarity.”
Furthermore, although both countries wished to remain neutral during the Second 
World War, Finland (as discussed above) was drawn into war with Russia,
28 It should be noted that the term “industrialised society” is a contentious one and that whether or 
not Finland may be considered to have become such a society depends on the term’s definition.
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whereas Sweden survived the 1940s with far less cost. Kirby (1995: 382) writes, 
“Although by no means unaffected by the war, which had meant additional 
spending on defence, reductions in trade, rationing and higher taxes, the country 
nevertheless emerged in rather better shape than its neighbours to tackle the 
problems of postwar reconstruction. The steady accumulation of national wealth 
had transformed it from an impoverished agrarian land into a modestly prosperous 
country.” These transformations had an important impact on Sweden’s identity as 
well as its image in the international arena. Mikael af Malmborg (2001: 143) 
writes, “The experience of the two world wars forged a consensus in Swedish 
politics and intellectual life on the need for an independent armed national 
neutrality, in the absence of universal collective security.” According to Kirby 
(1995: 382-383), “With prosperity, it has been argued, came a new image: 
Sweden as a ‘modem’ state, hailed by progressive outsiders such as the American 
Marquis Childs or socialist refugees of the International group in wartime 
Stockholm as the model for the future.”
In the wake of the Second World War, institutional differences between Finland 
and Sweden that had developed after Finland’s independence became increasingly 
significant, most notably the office of President. The Finnish President was 
responsible for foreign policy and came to have a strong hold over both the 
Finnish elite and the general public. Kirby (1995: 387) also takes notice of this 
distinctive feature of Finnish politics, writing, “In contrast to the other Nordic 
countries, Finland has a powerful head of state, who plays an active role in 
government. Urho Kekkonen, president from 1956 until his resignation on 
grounds of ill-health in 1981, was a supreme example of this. It would not be an 
exaggeration to say that he had a far more decisive say in the formation of 
government than did the electorate, or that he was prepared to use his self- 
appointed role as the chief architect of the postwar Soviet-Finnish relationship to 
exclude from office individuals or parties deemed to be unacceptable.”
Although, as discussed above, Finland and Sweden were both neutrals during the 
Cold War and both felt the constraints of their geographic location between East 
and West, their situations also demonstrated important differences. These 
differences between the Finnish and Swedish situations were visible from an early
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stage, notably when Sweden accepted Marshall Aid, whereas Finland, under 
pressure from the Soviet Union, refused it. As a result, Sweden was involved in 
the founding of the related Council of Europe and thus began systematic Swedish 
involvement in international groupings. The UN was a particularly important 
forum for Sweden and “support for the UN became the keystone of [Osten] 
Unden’s foreign policy when he led his nation into UN membership in 1946” 
(Silva 1998: 139). Although Finns were also active in international organisations 
during the Cold War, their participation came later than that of the Swedes and 
was more constrained by a desire not to threaten good relations with the Soviet 
Union.
Furthermore, Finnish domestic as well as foreign policy was influenced by the 
USSR to a far greater extent than was the case in Sweden. According to Nevakivi 
(1989: 142), “Finland’s credibility underwent a particular trial in 1958 when the 
communist-led People’s Democratic League [SKDL], which had won in the 
elections, was kept out of the government by President Kekkonen’s appointment 
of a cabinet dominated by the social democrats and the conservatives.” This was 
the beginning of what was known as the Night Frost Crisis (Yopakkaset), which is 
characterised by Kirby (1995: 424) as the “first major test” of the FCMA Treaty 
and was “brought to an end only after the Agrarian Union withdrew from the 
socialist-led coalition government, causing its collapse in January 1959” (Kirby 
1995: 424). In the aftermath of the Night Frost Crisis, the Finnish social 
democrats were “thrown into the political wilderness after the collapse of the 
government in 1959” (Kirby 1995: 425). However, upon their return to office in 
.. 1966, the social democrats “stood foursquare behind the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line 
of good relations with the Soviet Union -- a necessity which gradually became an 
orthodox doctrine to which all parties seeking office had to subscribe” (Kirby 
1995: 425). The crisis is thus a clear example of the Soviets’ influence on Finnish 
domestic politics during the Cold War Era. In the 1958 Night Frost Crisis as well 
as in the crisis over Cuba in the beginning of the next decade, “President 
Kekkonen resorted to personal discussions with the Soviet leader Nikita 
Krushchev” (Kirby 1995: 425).
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These instances demonstrate the importance of the office of the President for 
Finnish politics as well as the hierarchical nature in which foreign policy was 
handled, particularly during the Kekkonen years. Kirby (1995: 425) argues, 
“Finland undeniably obtained a number of advantages from this policy. By 
satisfying the basic security concerns of their eastern neighbour, the Finns were 
able to develop and extend vital trade links with their major Western markets, and 
to play an active part in the process of detente during the early seventies, when 
Helsinki hosted the European Security Conference and strategic arms limitation 
talks.” Although the Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line certainly had advantages for 
Finland, it had costs as well; in fact, according to Kirby (1995: 426) the “price” 
the Finns paid was “high.” Although Kirby (1995: 426) acknowledges that “[i]t 
may be the case that Kekkonen’s foreign policy helped strengthen the Finns’ own 
confidence in their country’s future,” he also argues that “in many respects, that 
confidence rests on insecure foundations.”
Furthermore, Finland’s historical experiences as a Grand Duchy of the Russian 
empire may have influenced the behaviour of Finnish policy-makers during the 
Cold War. According to Kirby (1995: 426), “Self-censorship, a rather egregious 
subservience and a willingness to work and if necessary intrigue with Russian 
officials may be characteristics inherited from the tsarist era as much as they are 
the unpleasant consequences of the former president [Kekkonen’s] love of power; 
but they distorted the party political system, ruined the careers of many promising 
people who refused to toe the line, created a bad impression abroad, and probably 
weakened the credibility of Finland’s claim to neutrality.”
Another example of the Soviets’ impact on Finnish policy is the 1961 Note Crisis 
(Noottikriisi) when Krushchev proposed Finnish-Soviet consultations based on the 
FCMA Treaty. The crisis, although it demonstrated the extent to which the Finns 
were constrained by their Soviet neighbours, also had positive consequences for 
the Finns in terms of their relationship with the USSR. According to Kirby (1995: 
425), “After the 1961 note crisis, the Finns were able to avoid further moves 
towards more intimate military arrangements with the Soviet Union.” It was also 
another example of the developing Finnish diplomatic skills as well as the 
importance of the role of the Presidency in Finnish politics. According to
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Singleton (1998: 139), Kekkonen “deftly turned the so-called Note Crisis to his 
advantage by letting it be known that Krushchev would not feel any need to press 
the issue if Kekkonen, rather than his Social Democrat sponsored opponent, Olavi 
Honka, were returned in the presidential election. Honka withdrew his 
candidature.” That the Soviet pressure led to the withdrawal of Honka’s 
candidature, however, demonstrated the hold that the Soviets held on their Finnish 
neighbours. The Soviet constraint imposed on Finland was thus unlike that found 
in Sweden, which was regarded by the West as more independent and of greater 
international stature than its neighbour to the East.
Furthermore, despite traditions of neutrality in both countries, there were 
important differences here as well, which had their root in the two states’ differing 
historical experiences. Whereas, until the mid-1980s, neutrality and stable 
relations with Russia/the Soviet Union were the main components of Finland’s 
foreign policy (Vayrynen 1993: 72), Swedish foreign policy, also marked by 
neutrality, had a more moralistic tone and was strongly connected to the 
development of the Swedish welfare state. According to Unto Vesa (1998: 47), 
“In the UN context the [Finnish] slogan was that ‘we would see ourselves rather 
as physicians than judges.’ Rather than condemning this or that country -- 
although Finland condemned activities that were against international law -- she 
preferred to introduce and design constructive or curative measures and search for 
compromises whenever possible.” The more moralistic Swedes, on the other hand, 
behaved more like judges. According to Jaaskinen, Finland never had the role of 
moral superpower that Sweden did. Furthermore, Finns never viewed Finland as a 
model in the way that Swedes viewed their own country as a model. Rather, Finns 
viewed Sweden as a model. Indeed, Jaaskinen argues that Finns have traditionally 
had an inferiority complex while Swedes have had a hidden superiority.29
Whereas Finnish neutrality was a relatively new concept originating in the wake 
of the Second World War, Swedish neutrality was, according to Lee Miles (1997: 
41), “a relatively old and deep-seated concept, originating from 1814 and lasting 
in its most complicated form until 1991.” Finland’s neutrality had its roots in the
29 Interview with Jaaskinen on 12 February 1998.
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FCMA Treaty with the Soviet Union, whereas Swedish neutrality was “not 
guaranteed by any international treaty and was not part of international law” 
(Miles 1997: 41). For Finland, however, the FCMA Treaty was both an element of 
Finnish neutrality and also a constraint on Finland’s ability to conduct a fully 
independent foreign policy and even on domestic policy, as is demonstrated by the 
1958 and 1961 crises discussed above. Despite, and also because of, these 
constraints, neutrality defined Finnish foreign policy during the Cold War period. 
According to Ole Waever (1992: 90), “For Finland, neutrality was not seen as an 
end in itself or as the ideal policy; it was the best Finland could get. There were 
fewer connotations of inherent virtue than for the Swedes, and rather more of ‘the 
Western-most possible.’”
Although Finland and Sweden both deepened their involvement in the process of 
European integration in the 1990s by joining first the EEA and then the EU, there 
were also significant differences in this regard. In particular, there were 
differences in the way in which such integration was perceived by the public as 
well as by policy-makers. For Sweden, its role in the broader international 
community was seen as potentially threatened by EU membership, whereas for 
Finland this was not the case. Ekengren and Sundelius (1998: 134) note that “it 
was argued that the Swedish international role as mediator and bridge-builder in 
various global conflicts would become less credible if the government were to 
subject itself to the collective will of the [European] Community. The visible 
foreign policy profile of Sweden, including its unique development assistance 
programme, would be eroded through membership.”
Whereas much of the debate in Finland related to what the EU could do for 
Finland, in Sweden there was more discussion about what Sweden could do for 
the EU. Ekengren and Sundelius (1998: 140) argue that in Sweden “a missionary 
zeal could be discerned in the referendum campaign. From a social democratic 
point of view, the task ahead was to infuse the rest of the Union with the 
progressive values and positive experiences of the time-tested Swedish version of 
the good society. The domestic record of achievements in many areas could be 
externalized upon the wider European scene, to direct benefit for other countries 
and indirectly also of value to the Swedish people.” Citing then (social
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democratic) Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson’s October 1994 argument that 
Swedish EU membership would contribute to making the EU “a progressive force 
in world affairs,” Ekengren and Sundelius (1998: 140) assert that “the Swedish 
government was bent on having an influence upon European policy-making in 
many issue areas.”
As noted previously, the political elites in both Finland and Sweden had a difficult 
task of satisfying national, Russian, and EU desires in the run-up to their 
membership in the EU. The Finnish elite was particularly astute in this matter. 
According to Lauri Karvonen and Bengt Sundelius (1996: 254), “Finland’s 
foreign policy leadership pursued with great skill the art of having its cake and 
eating it too.” The Finns’ diplomatic skills may have been the result of many years 
of balancing Russian/Soviet concerns with Finnish interests. For Swedes, 
satisfying their electorate was more important than pleasing Russia.
There were also differences in the Finnish and Swedish debates on EU 
membership regarding the role of identity. Identity was a more salient issue in the 
Finnish debate on EU membership than in the Swedish one. Raunio and Wiberg 
(2001: 67) argue that “perhaps most importantly” those in support of Finnish EU 
membership argued that EU membership “would place Finland firmly in the 
context where she historically and culturally belongs -- among West European 
countries.” Similarly, Arter (1995: 362) argues that for Finland the decision on 
whether or not to join the EU was “a question of identity -- Finland’s identity in 
the ‘New Europe.’” It was, according to the title of Arter’s (1995) article, “a vote 
for the West, not for Maastricht.” Even Esko Antola (1999: 6), who stresses the 
economic motivation for Finns to join the EU, claims that “cultural identity, the 
need to show that Finland belongs to the West, was also a conspicuous element in 
the arguments.” Tiilikainen (1998a: 164) also writes about a “new Finnish 
identity,” which she suggests “seems to be based upon the old State-centric 
identity adapted to new conditions.”
Although Sweden was influenced by its historical experiences and identity, their 
impact was different in Sweden than in Finland. For Sweden, the history of being 
a great power in the seventeenth century and of being a model welfare state during
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the twentieth century continued to have an impact once the country joined the EU. 
According to Lee Miles and Bengt Sundelius (2000: 33), “Sweden has regarded 
itself as an important actor in the Nordic region. As the Nordic state with the 
largest population, the country has been able to exert influence on its neighbours, 
both economically and politically.” Furthermore, they write, “Sweden has been 
seen traditionally as one of the leading, if not the leading, power in the Nordic 
region. Partly this derives from Sweden’s history and cultural heritage as a once 
imperial power, whose influence stretched right across the Nordic region and the 
Baltic Sea, and the fact that there has always been a healthy competition between 
Denmark and Sweden for the title of ‘Nordic champion’” (Miles and Sundelius 
2000: 34).
An important difference between Finland and Sweden, which impacted on their 
EU debates, was in the area of agricultural policy. Although Sweden shared with 
Finland a concern for Arctic agriculture, the Swedish situation differed 
significantly from the Finnish one in terms of agriculture. Although Swedish 
agricultural policy resembled the CAP during the 1980s, major reforms of the 
agricultural sector were undertaken in Sweden just prior to EU membership. 
According to Rabinowicz (2000: 180), “By moving Swedish agriculture in a more 
liberal direction than the existing CAP, the Swedish reforms actually made EU 
accession more complicated since the country’s agricultural sector needed to be 
re-regulated again.” In fact, Rabinowicz (2000: 182) argues, “No other OECD 
[Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development] country (excluding 
New Zealand as an important exemption) had attempted such a radical 
deregulation of agricultural policy. The Swedish reform was, in particular, much 
more fundamental than the 1992 CAP reforms that were to follow.” Thus, 
Rabinowicz (2000: 187) writes, “It can be observed that the EU was, for the first 
time, confronted with a situation in which joining the EU would result in 
worsening conditions for agriculture within a new member country (or at least 
some of its regions)” (emphasis in original). Unlike the Finnish farmers and the 
Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners (.Maa- ja  
Metsataloustuottajain Keskusliitto, MTK), the Swedish farmers and the 
Federation of Swedish Farmers (Lantbrukarnas Riksforbund, LRF), “were 
generally pleased with the negotiated agreement, but this is hardly surprising
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given the role the LRF played in the accession process. Moreover, the alternative 
to the accession agreement -- the continuation of the domestic reform process -- 
was not very attractive to Swedish farmers. Therefore, Swedish farmers supported 
full EU membership in sharp contrast to their colleagues in other EFTA applicant 
countries” (Rabinowicz 2000: 189).
In contrast to the situation in Sweden, agriculture presented other problems for 
Finland and was a particularly difficult issue. According to Raunio and Wiberg 
(2001: 66), “By far the most difficult task was making Finnish agriculture 
compatible with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).” Despite the special 
provisions for agriculture in far northern climates, which benefited both Finnish 
and Swedish farmers, in Finland MTK “was not satisfied . . .  and as a result spoke 
against membership in the referendum” (Raunio and Wiberg 2001: 67).
Even before Finland joined the EU, it distinguished itself from Sweden in terms of 
the degree to which it was willing to adapt to the EU. As is discussed in chapter 
six, the Finnish declaration on public access to documents was less threatening to 
the EU than was the Swedish one. Similarly, Raunio and Wiberg (2001: 67) point 
out, “Unlike Denmark and Sweden, Finland had stated that it would accept the 
Maastricht Treaty without reservations.” In addition, “Sweden (and Austria) . . . 
insisted on a (legally non-binding) declaration, which was attached to the 
Accession Treaty stating that the right to choose its sources of energy would not 
be affected by EU membership” (Molin and Wurzel 2000: 167).
Moreover, the Finnish parties were more unified than their Swedish counterparts 
on their views regarding EU membership. According to Tiilikainen (1998a: 163), 
“Only one of the key parties in Finland, the agrarian Centre Party faced the 
decision disunited” (emphasis in original). Furthermore, she asserts, “A typical 
feature of the Finnish decision to join the European Union was that it was 
supported by a majority of the political elites who, just a few years earlier, had 
denied the membership option categorically in the name of a realist world-view” 
(Tiilikainen 1998a: 163). Discussing the Finnish situation, Raunio and Wiberg 
(2001: 67) argue, “Government behaviour in the membership negotiations was 
characterized by flexibility driven by the imperative of achieving Union
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membership. This approach can at least partially be explained by two factors: the 
depression of the early 1990s which had exposed the vulnerability of the national 
economy, and the broad consensus between government and opposition, as the 
leadership of the main opposition party . . . [the SDP] was also in favour of 
membership.” One might therefore argue that the Finnish elite, including the 
political parties, adapted during the early 1990s to the new situation in the post- 
Cold War world and adopted a largely unified position of supporting Finnish EU 
membership. In Sweden, on the other hand, there were deep divisions not only 
between but also within the major political parties, including the SAP, which was 
divided on the topic of European integration at the elite as well as the mass level.
Prior to 1995, many analysts both inside and outside Sweden, who were predicting 
Finnish and Swedish behaviour in the EU, expected to see Sweden taking more of 
a leading role than Finland (and Denmark). Par Stenback (1995: 27) explains that 
“[i]t was generally estimated that Sweden will be the active EU country,” whereas 
“[l]ess was . . . expected of Finland.” According to Mouritzen (1993: 391), 
“Finland, unlike Sweden, would seem to be content with periphery status once 
inside the EC (i.e. less emphasis on offensive power).” Waever (1992: 90-91) 
writes that “it is far from clear that Finland will be welcome in an EC aspiring to a 
security and defence identity and to political union.” Similarly, Nikolaj Petersen 
(1997: 174) asserts, “Prior to Sweden’s membership, it was expected and 
sometimes feared in Denmark, that Sweden would enter the Community and 
rapidly cedi the Nordic tune. It was also a widespread feeling in Sweden itself that 
Sweden would become an active participant in the Union, intent on making its 
influence felt over a broad sweep of issues.”
Yet, by the late 1990s, the general opinions of Finnish and Swedish positions as 
EU members differed from the original expectations. In Swedish academic and 
journalistic circles Sweden was seen as failing to fulfil its hopes of being an 
influential EU member and instead as taking a back seat to its Nordic neighbour to 
the East. Swedish political scientist Magnus Jemeck (1999: 240) argues that the 
expectations of Swedish influence within the EU that were seen in 1994 were not 
transformed into reality. According to his arguments, Sweden instead evolved into 
a more reluctant European partner than had been expected, particularly in relation
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to Finland (and Austria). Karl Magnus Johansson (1999a: 288) agrees that Sweden 
did not live up to the expectations held by Swedes (and others) that Sweden would 
be an active and offensive player within the EU.
Even in the Swedish media one found an acceptance of the argument that Sweden 
had become a more reluctant EU member than Finland and did not live up to 
expectations. In an article in Svenska Dagbladet (one of Sweden’s main daily 
newspapers) on 27 February 1998, entitled “Finland is our big brother,”30 Mikael 
Holmstrom discusses the differences between the Swedish and Finnish approaches 
to the EU and the way in which other countries perceived them. He argues that 
within the EU core there was a view of Sweden as being “a less serious actor”
- j  i
than Finland. He cites an anonymous centrally placed EU civil servant who, 
commenting on the fact that Sweden would be the last of the three new member 
states to hold the EU Presidency, exclaimed, “The Swedes have got the most time 
to learn and they will need it!” (Cited in Holmstrom 1998)32 Another EU 
representative is quoted in the same article as saying, “Finland enters into 
cooperation with enthusiasm. Sweden is of two minds and reluctant” (Cited in 
Holmstrom 1998).33
On the other hand, the conversations in Finnish circles after Finland joined the EU 
indicated that the Finns perceived themselves, in contrast to the Swedes, as 
pursuing a pragmatic EU strategy and moving towards the EU’s core. According 
to Finnish academic Antola (1999: 6), “No doubt the most fundamental change 
during the first four years of Finnish [EU] membership has been that Finland has 
managed to place herself in the core of the European Union.” According to 
Finnish researcher Hanna Ojanen (2000: 4), “In general terms, Finland has been 
more adaptive and flexible, trying to be in the ‘core’ of the Union, whereas 
Sweden has taken a more distant position.” An article in Hufvudstadsbladet
30 Translation of: “Finland dr var storebror.”
31 Translation of: “en mindre serids aktor
32 Translation of: “Svenskarna har fdtt mest tid att lara och de kommer att behova detP’
33 Translation of: “Finland gar in i samarbetet med entusiasm. Sverige dr tvehagset och 
motvilligt.”
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(Finland’s main Swedish-language daily newspaper) on 25 June 1999 
characterised Finland as a “cooperative but tough” EU member (Lauren 1999).34
The Finnish desire to be a part of the European core, or mainstream, was also 
elucidated by Finnish policy-makers. Finnish Secretary of State Jukka Valtasaari 
argued in Tashkent in 1999 that “after joining the European Union in 1995, 
Finland made it clear that it would be in the core group, in the very centre of the 
union, and not on the periphery, by announcing that it wanted to be among the 
first nations creating the European monetary union” (Valtasaari 1999). In a speech 
in Helsinki on 24 September 1997, Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen 
argued, “Based on our two-and-a-half years’ experience of Union membership, it 
is possible to say that the vital interests Finland pursued have been fulfilled. 
Finland’s position in the new Europe is established. Finland is an equal partner, 
not any fringe country still seeking a place of its own” (Lipponen 1997). Tapio 
Raunio (1999: 155) argues that “despite the widespread unease, the political and 
business elites, lead by the Lipponen rainbow government and President Martti 
Ahtisaari, have without hesitation taken Finland into the inner core of the EU.” 
Furthermore, Salolainen regards EU membership as strengthening Finland’s 
independence and argues that “Finland has never been a more important player 
than we are today.” Using the analogy of Finland and Sweden as brothers, 
Salolainen argues that, although Finland was historically Sweden’s younger 
brother, by the late 1990s the two countries were twins.
Support for the greater Finnish than Swedish prioritisation of following the EU 
mainstream can be found in their voting records in the Council of Ministers. 
Between 1 July 1995 and 31 December 1999, a period which lies fully within the 
time analysed in this thesis, Sweden voted more often against the winning 
majority than Finland did (Raunio and Wiberg 2001: 80). The average number of 
negative votes per year during this period was 3.8 for Sweden and 1.4 for Finland. 
When abstentions were also included, the number of negative votes plus 
abstentions was 4.0 for Sweden and still only 1.4 for Finland. The EU average
34 Translation of: “samarbetsvilligt men
35 Interview with Salolainen on 16 December 1998.
36 Interview with Salolainen on 16 December 1998.
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was 3.4 negative votes and 4.8 negative votes plus abstentions. Despite the fact 
that Sweden’s figures were close to the EU mean, there were only five of fifteen 
EU members that voted more often against the winning majority than Sweden did, 
and all of them had been members of the EU for far longer than Sweden had. 
Germany, with 9.8 negative votes and 12.8 negative votes plus abstentions, had 
the highest scores, followed by Italy with 6.8 and 9.4, the UK with 5.4 and 8.0, the 
Netherlands with 5.2 and 6.0, and Denmark with 4.0 and 4.6 votes. On the other 
hand, Finland was at the other end of the table, with only tiny Luxembourg voting 
less often against the winning majority than Finland with 0.8 negative votes in 
contrast to Finland’s 1.4. However, when abstentions and negative votes were 
considered, Luxembourg’s average of 2.0 votes actually exceeded the Finnish 
average of 1.4 (Raunio and Wiberg 2001: 80).
These statistics demonstrate significant differences between the Finnish and 
Swedish approaches to the EU. Raunio and Wiberg (2001) argue that these 
statistics regarding voting in the Council show that “[t]he Finnish approach [to the 
EU], at least on the elite level, has thus been co-operative and pragmatic.” The 
statistics demonstrate that Sweden, on the other hand, voted more often against the 
winning majority in the Council than Finland did, placing Sweden with those 
member states that voted least often with the Council and Finland with those that 
were most cooperative. Discussing the Finnish approach in general terms, 
Jaaskinen argues that Finnish officials have realised that offending others will not 
lead to compromise and that it is not a good strategy to act as if one is the owner 
of truth.37
Another example of Finns changing more than Swedes to fit in with the EU 
mainstream is in the area of environmental policy. According to Katarina Molin 
and Rudiger K. W. Wurzel (2000: 173), Finland lowered its environmental 
standards so that they were in line with those of the EU, whereas Sweden refused 
to do so. In terms of agricultural policy, Sweden deviated from the EU 
mainstream, notably on milk quotas. Sweden joined Denmark, Italy, and the UK 
in the “London club,” which was “committed to more radical reform of the milk
37 Interview with Jaaskinen on 12 February 1998.
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regime than the Agenda 2000 proposal formulated by the Commission envisaged” 
(Rabinowicz 2000: 196). Based on an analysis of agricultural policy, Rabinowicz 
(2000: 197) concludes, “Sweden has adopted much more radical positions than 
those of other member states. In the consensus-oriented culture of EU decision­
making, such behaviour is generally not successful.”38
Finnish and Swedish strategies and goals in the EU were seen as diverging, not 
just in terms of their degree of enthusiasm for participation in European 
integration and willingness to deviate from the mainstream, but also in terms of 
the issues they prioritised and their strategies for obtaining their goals. Writing in 
1996, Jan-Erik Gidlund and Magnus Jemeck argue that, despite the historically 
strong bond between Finland and Sweden, the two countries’ interests seemed to 
diverge on many issues within the EU. They also assert that Finland appeared to 
be pursuing a more goal-oriented and issue-focused strategy in the EU than 
Sweden was (Gidlund and Jemeck 1996: 79). Lars Nilsson and Ola Pihlblad of the 
Swedish MFA also see a difference between the Finnish and Swedish approaches 
to the EU during their first years of membership in that Finland identified a few 
key issues while Sweden tried to push forward on a wider range of issues.39 The 
broad approach taken by the Swedish policy-makers initially, however, became 
more focused by the end of 2000, as is evidenced by the programme for the 
Swedish Presidency, which prioritises three issues: the “three Es” of enlargement, 
employment, and the environment (Sweden 2000).
An analysis of implementation, however, demonstrates that Finland may not 
always have been a “good EU member” to the same extent that the Sweden was, 
at least in some areas. As Jonas Tallberg (1999: 68) notes, Sweden’s record for 
implementing EU directives in 1995, 1996, and 1997 was better than that of 
Finland or Austria and even above the EU average. However, the major reason 
why the Finnish rate was lower than the Swedish one was the special situation that 
Finland granted to the Aland Islands, although Finland’s implementation record
38 It should perhaps be noted, however, that she suggests that it must be questioned whether or not 
this Swedish behaviour was due to the newness of Swedish EU membership and argues that the 
Swedish “tendency to adopt more radical positions has declined over time” (Rabinowicz 2000: 
197).
39 Interview with Lars Nilsson and Ola Pihlblad on 11 August 1998.
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improved from 70.5 percent in 1995 to 96.3 percent in 1997 (Tallberg 1999: 68). 
Despite this, Tallberg (1999: 76) argues that the Swedes were the best in the class 
of the EU members that joined in 1995 (Austria, Finland, and Sweden) when it 
came to the implementation of EU legislation. Although this distinction must be 
considered when assessing Finnish and Swedish membership in the EU, the focus 
of this study is on policy formulation rather than implementation, and the 
differences between the two countries in this respect are thus of relatively minor 
significance here. Furthermore, the dramatic improvement in the Finnish 
implementation record between 1995 and 1997 demonstrates a strong Finnish 
desire to conform, even in terms of implementation.
There were also indications of greater desire to increase and acceptance of a 
European identity in Finland than in Sweden. The use of EU symbols in Finland 
and Sweden demonstrates the difference in their embracing of a European 
identity. According to Pertti Pesonen (1998: 36), “It seems that Finland, both the 
state and the citizenry, accepted EU membership and its norms more easily than 
Sweden. Even the EU symbols, notably the flag, are displayed much more often in 
Finland than in Sweden.” Presenting a similar argument, Johansson (1999b: 12) 
claims that the EU flag is rarely seen in Sweden in comparison with the other EU 
member states. Beethoven’s ninth symphony, the European hymn, is played at 
party congresses in Continental Europe but, according to Johansson (1999b: 12), 
never in Sweden.
The institutional changes in Finnish and Swedish policy-making due to EU 
membership differed, notably in the national parliaments. In the Finnish 
parliament, the Grand Committee (Suuri valiokunta) was given the additional task 
of considering EU matters, whereas in Sweden a new EU Committee called the 
Advisory Committee on European Affairs (.EU-namnden) was created. According 
to Olof Ruin (2000: 56), “This committee was established explicitly as a 
consequence of Swedish EU entry; it was originally proposed by the commission 
that looked into the constitutional problems connected with this entry and later 
endorsed by the Riksdag itself. The committee is modelled after the special 
European committee existing in the Danish parliament (Markedsudvalget), 
although the Swedish counterpart is given much less formal power than the
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Danish original.” Ruin (2000: 56) asserts, “The Swedish committee is not, and 
unlike the Danish one, entitled to bind the government explicitly but its views 
have to be heard before decisions are taken.” Despite this, Ruin (2000: 57) argues 
that the Swedish government normally followed the decisions of the Advisory 
Committee. Discussing the Finnish situation and the status of EU-related “U 
affairs,” Tiina Kivisaari (1997) argues, “Due to the principle of accountability to 
Parliament, the view expressed by the Grand Committee is politically binding on 
the Government.”
Finland and Sweden also faced somewhat different structures in terms of political 
parties in the government and parliament between 1995 and 2000. Although 
Finland and Sweden both acquired new social democratic governments close to 
the time that they joined the EU, there were differences. In particular, the Finnish 
government that came to power in March 1995 was known as a “rainbow 
coalition,” consisting of five parties including the SDP as well as the Green 
League (Vihrealiitto, VIHR), the Left Wing Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto, VAS), the 
National Coalition Party (Kansallinen Kokoomus, KOK), and the SFP. During the 
entire period between 1995 and 2000 Finland was led by a “rainbow coalition” 
government under the leadership of Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen. The 
President for the majority of the period was Martti Ahtisaari, although Taija 
Halonen, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, assumed the Presidency in 
March 2000.
According to Raunio and Wiberg (2001: 72), “With no single party forming the 
cabinet (as in Sweden) or even controlling anywhere near the majority of 
Eduskunta seats, no party alone or the opposition has any realistic chance of 
radically altering national (European) policy without the support of the other 
parties.” In Finland, the parties worked together to generate national positions on 
EU matters, both in the government and in the parliament. Raunio and Wiberg 
(2001: 72) write, “Importantly, basically all information on EU matters is 
distributed equally to both government and opposition MPs. The goal of the 
Eduskunta and the Grand Committee has been to involve all party groups in 
processing European issues, with the aim of manufacturing broad parliamentary 
consensus on national EU policy. This not only facilitates efficient scrutiny of
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government behaviour, but also provides consistency and long-term legitimacy for 
policy choices.” Jaaskinen points out that the division between the opposition and 
the government is greater in Sweden than in Finland. Furthermore, whereas the 
dividing lines between political parties have been clear in Sweden, they have been 
less so in Finland.40 Bergquist has suggested that the greater cooperation seen 
between Finnish parties as opposed to their Swedish counterparts is a result of the 
two countries’ differing historical experiences, not least Finland’s wartime 
experiences 41
There are thus a range of differences (of varying degrees of importance) between 
Finnish and Swedish behaviour inside the European Union as well as in their 
experiences prior to joining, their institutions, their cultures, and their identities. 
Despite the existence of these differences, they are concentrated around several 
major points that are particularly relevant for this study. The differences in their 
historical experiences are critical, particularly the following points:
• Finland was separated from Sweden in 1809 and, although it retained 
much of the institutional structure of Sweden, was forced to develop or 
adapt its institutional structure and build a separate Finnish identity.
• Finland emerged far later than Sweden as an independent country and was 
more at threat of losing that independence, even once it had been achieved.
• Finns endured warfare in the twentieth century that imposed costs on the 
country and affected its institutions and development; Sweden did not 
endure the same kind of suffering.
• Finns were more constrained by Russia/the Soviet Union, even during the 
second half of the twentieth century; the Night Frost and Note Crises are 
examples of this pressure that do not have parallels in Sweden.
These details should, of course, be considered in the broad context of the two 
countries’ historical experiences. For Finland, warfare, struggle, and threat 
marked its history to a greater extent than was the case with Sweden, which had a 
more secure and peaceful historical development, particularly during the twentieth
40 Interview with Jaaskinen on 12 February 1998.
41 Interview with Bergquist on 18 December 1998.
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century.
These historical differences led to differences in the institutions of the two 
countries, primarily in terms of the establishment in Finland (but not in Sweden) 
of the office of President, which developed when Finns were forced to replace the 
Swedish monarch/Russian tsar with a new head of state upon independence. The 
existence of this office in combination with the historical experiences endured by 
Finland during the twentieth century, particularly in their relationship with the 
Soviet Union, led to a hierarchical method of decision-making. This affected 
Finnish political culture as a whole, as both the public and policy-makers accepted 
the mandate of the President to make decisions on behalf of the country, often 
without consultation. Finland’s experiences and institutions also affected the 
formation of a Finnish identity, in which Finland’s position as a Western 
European country was less certain than was Sweden’s. On the other hand, national 
identity assumed a greater importance for Finns than it did for Swedes. 
Furthermore, uniqueness (particularly in terms of distinguishing itself from its 
neighbours) was a more important element in the construction of Finnish identity 
than was the case for Sweden.
Due to historical experiences, Swedish institutions differed from those in Finland, 
notably in terms of the lack of a President in Sweden. Whereas Finland was cut 
off from the Swedish monarchy and forced to adapt, this was not the case in 
Sweden. The monarchy itself was not of particular importance during the 
twentieth century, but the lack of a strong President, as was the case in Finland, 
was a notable difference between the two countries. As Bergquist points out, 
“Sweden had during the Cold War a livelier debate culture,” whereas in Finland 
people have been more accustomed to “decisions taken in more hierarchical 
fashion.”42 These institutional and cultural differences continued to have lasting 
impact on the two countries. Furthermore, Swedes, unlike Finns, did not need EU 
membership to confirm their identity as a Western European country. All of these 
examples demonstrate significant differences between the two countries.
42 Interview with Bergquist on 18 December 1998.
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Consequences for this Study
The existence of both similarities and differences between the Finnish and 
Swedish cases has now been established. It has also been demonstrated that 
historical experiences have affected institutions and that history and institutions 
have in turn impacted upon culture and identity in the two countries concerned. 
(Certainly, however, this is not entirely a one-way process, as identity can in turn 
shape future experiences, which eventually become historical experiences, but the 
general direction is nevertheless clear.) The task now is to assess briefly the 
relevance of these similarities and differences and the suitability of these countries 
for a “most similar systems” research design.
Jakobson (1998: 94) describes Finns and Swedes as “[t]wo peoples divorced after 
a long marriage and pulled apart by forces beyond their control.” He argues that 
they “have a complex relationship of shared values and sharply different 
experiences. They are strongly bound by their common heritage of law, religion, 
and culture; countless family ties; their growing economic interdependence; the 
use of Swedish as the language of communication between Finns and Swedes; and 
the current presence of a large Finnish-speaking minority in Sweden. Yet the 
geopolitical divide between Finland and Sweden, and the two centuries of 
separation caused by it, have left deep marks on both countries” (Jakobson 1998: 
94-95). To use a different metaphor from the one of a married couple put forth by 
Jakobson (1998), one could envision Finland and Sweden as conjoined twins. 
Although initially growing up together, they were then separated from each other 
after many years of sharing the same blood and living as interconnected parts of 
one body that moved in unison. At the time of separation, Sweden was the 
stronger, larger twin that continued with the self-confidence it had always known, 
whereas the weaker twin, Finland, needed to develop its own strength and 
identity.
Due to their similar beginnings, their institutions were largely similar, even as the 
twenty-first century dawned. Although institutions are typically important in 
shaping policy formulation (as is highlighted, for instance, by the new institutional
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theories examined in chapter two), the similarities between Finnish and Swedish 
institutions outweighed their differences. The main differences between their 
formal institutions included the existence of a President in Finland and the lack of 
such a position in Sweden. This difference was the result of differences in their 
historical experiences and led to differences in the political cultures of the two 
countries. In particular, the Finnish decision-making style was more hierarchical 
than the Swedish. This distinction also developed as a result of the two countries’ 
differing positions in the Cold War. The Finns, more under the shadow of the 
USSR than the Swedes, had to develop negotiating strategies where one person 
had great powers in dealing with the Russians. Bergquist also argues, “The extent 
and nature of Finland’s trade with the Soviet Union contributed to the need for a 
more hierarchical decision-making culture.”43 The office of the President and the 
nature of its two most prominent Cold War occupants, Paasikivi and Kekkonen, 
facilitated this culture of top-down decision-making controlled by a strong 
President.
The hierarchical nature of Finnish foreign policy, due initially in part to the 
historical experiences of negotiating with the Soviets and the office of the 
President (itself a result of history), had lasting consequences. According to 
Karvonen and Sundelius (1996: 258), “Finland’s foreign policy leadership has 
held a centralised decision-making capacity, which many state leaders would 
envy.” Karvonen and Sundelius (1996: 258) argue that “EU membership became a 
Finnish reality partly due to this capacity to control the political elites and thereby 
public opinion.” According to Lipponen, “Finnish diplomacy is clearly successful, 
and we will continue according to our traditions. It can be worthwhile to repeat 
Kekkonen’s principles once again: we shall not be judges, but rather physicians” 
(Cited in Lauren 1999).44 As other institutions are so similar or are essentially 
merged with culture and/or identity (e.g. decision-making style could be 
considered an institution, even though it is here regarded as a part of political 
culture), the main relevant factor in terms of institutions for this project is the
43 Interview with Bergquist on 18 December 1998.
44 Translation of: “Finldndsk diplomati dr bevisligen framgdngsrik, och vi ska fortsdtta i enlighet 
med vara traditioner. Det kan vara pd sin plats att an en gdng upprepa Kekkonens principer: vi 
ska inte vara domare, utan lakare.n
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presence or lack of a President.
Aspects of Finnish and Swedish political culture could be observed long before 
the two countries joined the European Union. A vital difference was one alluded 
to in the discussion of institutions above: the degree of hierarchy. This difference 
continued to have an impact on the behaviour of policy-makers once they joined 
the EU. The more hierarchical Finnish method was more easily applied to EU 
policy-making, where national positions had to be formed at an early stage and 
then maintained consistently on a broad range of issues. For the Swedes, who 
placed more emphasis on political consensus and public opinion, the EU’s system 
presented more of a challenge.
There were also vital differences in the two countries’ national identities, which 
were a result of their differing historical experiences and influenced their EU 
policies. Finland’s position as a member of the community of Europe, and 
particularly Western Europe, was less certain than was Sweden’s position. 
Tiilikainen (1998a: 116) writes about the characterisation of Finland throughout 
history as a “borderland,” an “element in Finnish political identity that can be 
derived from medieval times.”
There were indications that Finland was therefore more eager to ensure its 
position as a mainstream EU member and to make necessary adaptations more 
than Sweden was. This would seem to confirm Antola’s (1999: 8-9) assertion that 
“Finland is a member of the ‘Diplomatic Republic of Europe,’ which consists of 
written and unwritten rules and norms that compose a common framework for 
appropriate behaviour for the members of the republic. This membership, more 
than anything else, has shaped Finland’s expectations and priorities in foreign and 
security policy.” Such an analysis would also fit with an international regime 
theory explanation, where Finland is viewed as conforming to the EU “regime.” 
The extent to which Swedes, on the other hand, regarded the EU as a regime to 
which they needed to conform in order to maximise their influence is more 
questionable. The implications for adaptation are, at this point, less clear and will 
require the empirical evidence of the following chapters. Certainly the Swedes 
also adapted (i.e. changed their own policies and positions) in some ways in order
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to ensure that they would benefit from EU membership and be able to shape EU 
policies.
On the whole, then, the similarities between the two countries do outweigh the 
differences. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to find two more similar countries, 
particularly for an analysis of new EU member states. Their common history as 
part of the same kingdom is an important part of their similarity, but the common 
features continued in many respects after the separation of Finland from Sweden. 
The task of the remaining portion of this thesis will thus be to analyse how the 
differences identified above impacted upon the nature and extent of Finnish and 
Swedish adaptation to the EU in terms of the national formulation of EU policies.
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SECTION II: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
Chapter Four: Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is an area where one might expect to see 
significant differences between Finland and Sweden due to the fact that Finland 
adopted the European single currency, known as the Euro, in the first wave in 
January 1999, whereas Sweden did not. Yet, the issue may not be as simple as it 
initially appears. This chapter includes a discussion first of the similarities 
between the Finnish and Swedish strategies and goals concerning EMU between 
1995 and 2000; despite their differing choices, there may, indeed, be similarities. 
Attention is then turned to the expected differences between the two countries’ 
approaches, which may not be as clear-cut as expected. Finally, the extent and 
nature of Finnish and Swedish adaptation to the European Union (EU) in this 
policy area is assessed.
Two Similar Approaches
Neither Finland nor Sweden was a participant in the decision to create a single 
European currency. Instead, the project grew out of the Werner Plan, developed in 
1969.45 However, when they decided to become EU members, both Finland and 
Sweden agreed to participate in EMU. The newcomers had no choice in the matter 
because EMU formed a part of the acquis communitaire that the EU required the 
new member states (Austria, Finland, and Sweden, as well as Norway had it 
decided upon membership) to accept.
EMU had three stages, of which two began before Finland and Sweden joined the 
EU. The first stage was developed in the Delors report, which was submitted in 
April 1989. On 1 July 1989 this first stage of EMU commenced; this entailed fully
45 Provisions for EMU were noticeably absent from the Treaty of Rome because it was assumed at 
the time that it was drafted that the Bretton Woods system would be sufficient.
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liberalising capital movement within the existing member states. The second 
stage, when the European Monetary Institute (EMI) began coordinating monetary 
policies in an institutionalised manner, started on 1 January 1994. The third stage 
entailed the adoption of the single currency. The criteria that member states 
needed to fulfil in order to participate in the third stage and adopt the Euro were 
set out in the Treaty on European Union (TEU, also known as the Maastricht 
Treaty). When the Treaty entered into force on 1 November 1993, all member 
states (except Denmark and the United Kingdom (UK), which had both negotiated 
national opt-outs) were bound to participate in the first wave if they met the 
criteria. When the third stage began on 1 January 1999, the European Central 
Bank (ECB) replaced the EMI, and the Euro became the currency of all eleven 
participating member states (despite the fact that Euro notes and coins were not 
planned for introduction until 2002). Because the first two stages had already been 
launched when Finland and Sweden joined the EU, their input into the process and 
their national EU policies were limited to stage three, and thus the term “EMU” is 
hereafter used to refer to the third stage.
Both Finnish and Swedish policy-makers took actions from an early stage to 
ensure that they would at least have the option of participating fully in EMU in the 
first wave. For instance, the Finnish government made it known already in 1993 
that it actively strove to be one of the first countries to fulfil the criteria necessary 
for participation in EMU. The government again emphasised in the spring of 1995 
its goal of adopting the Euro in the first wave if such participation was appropriate 
(Statsradet 1998).
Swedish policy-makers also made it clear from an early point that they would try 
to ensure that they would also be able to join in the first wave if desired. In a 
speech at the Olof Palme International Centre on 2 October 1996, Swedish Prime 
Minister Goran Persson explained that the decision had been taken to try to put the 
Swedish economy in order by 1997, so that Sweden would have the option of 
participating in EMU’s third stage if it wished to do so (Persson 1996b). Mats 
Kinnwall (2000: 153) argues, “The self-imposed ‘strait-jacket’ in the form a 
commitment to fulfil the Maastricht criteria for fiscal policy actually worked.”
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There were even changes made to Swedish institutions in preparation for a 
possible adoption of the Euro. A suggestion to make the Swedish Central Bank 
independent was presented in August 1997 (Hojelid 1999: 92). As Kinnwall 
(2000: 146) explains, “The EMU question . . . places pressure on Sweden to 
become further Europeanized” and led Sweden to reform “its constitution, 
especially the legislative framework governing the Riksbank. In short, the 
Riksbank has become more independent relative to the Swedish political system.”
As part of their preparations and decision-making processes, both Finland and 
Sweden commissioned expert reports prepared by academics on the consequences 
of EMU participation in order to assist in deciding whether or not to be a part of 
the first group to adopt the Euro. Sweden was the first of the two countries to 
commission such a report. In October 1995, the Swedish Ministry of Finance 
(Finansdepartementet) commissioned a group (chaired by Lars Calmfors, a 
professor of economics at Stockholm University) to analyse the potential 
consequences of Swedish participation in EMU’s third stage. The following 
month (November 1995), the Finnish Council of State (Valtioneuvosto, or 
Statsradet) commissioned a group (headed by Jukka Pekkarinen, director of the 
Labour Institute for Economic Research, Palkansaajien Tutkimuslaitos) to prepare 
their report. Each expert group met many times; the Finnish group met on twenty- 
five occasions, while the Swedish group met nineteen times (Pekkarinen et al. 
1997: 7, Calmfors et al. 1996: 434).
There was also an interconnection between the two reports, with the Finnish 
group, in particular, relying on the work done by the Swedish experts. The Finnish 
expert group, headed by Pekkarinen, explains, “[T]he great importance attached 
by the Finnish expert working group to the Calmfors Committee should be 
underlined. The numerous comprehensive background reports relying on 
extensive international expertise that were commissioned by the Committee have 
also proved particularly valuable” (Pekkarinen et al. 1997: 17).
Both groups saw political as well as economic consequences that would result 
from EMU membership and saw both advantages and disadvantages to joining 
EMU’s third stage in the first wave. The political consequences included both the
146
additional influence that would be enjoyed by EMU participants as well as the 
threat of marginalisation for those on the outside. According to the Finnish report, 
“Because the first countries to adopt the single currency will choose the Executive 
Board of the European Central Bank and be otherwise involved in decision­
making related to the launch of Stage 3, being one of these ‘prime movers’ would 
certainly increase Finland’s authority within the EU. Staying outside would mean 
exclusion from such decision-making, though it would, of course, give us a 
chance to gain experience of the workings and impact of Economic and Monetary 
Union from something of a safe distance” (Pekkarinen et al. 1997: 13).
Although there were (as is discussed in more detail below) differences between 
the conclusions of the two groups, they did see similar economic concerns, as did 
other analysts. In particular, as Lars Jonung and Fredrik Sjoholm (1999: 683) 
discuss, both countries risked “asymmetrical disturbances, i.e. shocks that affect 
one member of a currency union differently from the other member countries” and 
“lead to increased unemployment and stagnation.” They argue that “the structure 
of the Swedish and Finnish economies exhibits unique features compared to the 
other EMU countries, which increases the risk of asymmetric shocks. Thus it 
becomes advantageous to remain outside a European monetary union, and to be 
able to counter asymmetric shocks with the help of a flexible exchange rate” 
(Jonung and Sjoholm 1999: 684). Similarly, U. Michael Bergman, Michael M. 
Hutchinson, and Yin-Wong Cheung (1997: 13) argue that “the long-standing EU 
and ‘core’ ERM members [in their study] — Belgium, Denmark and the 
Netherlands — are much more influenced by German supply shocks than are 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden.”
There were, in fact, many similarities between the Finnish and Swedish 
economies that would have suggested that both countries should have remained 
outside of Euroland or at least should have taken the same decision. Sweden’s 
Commissioner at the time, Anita Gradin, herself a supporter of Swedish 
participation in EMU’s third stage, argued in 1999 that Finland and Sweden were 
in similar economic situations prior to the Finnish and Swedish decisions on 
whether or not to adopt the Euro in the first wave. She explained that both were 
small countries, which emerged from deep economic crisis in the early 1990s and
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were dependent on the forestry and telecommunications industries. Furthermore, 
she suggested that, prior to their decisions on EMU, outsiders valued the two 
countries equally because both had approximately the same interest rate level 
(Gradin 1999).
The “low degree of diversification” in Finland and Sweden is also pointed out by 
Jonung and Sjoholm (1999: 687), who rely on statistics for the period between 
1989 and 1993. They also note that both countries were more heavily dependent 
on the forestry and engineering industries than the other EU countries were, 
whereas Finland and Sweden relied less on the food products and textiles 
industries than did their EU colleagues (Jonung and Sjoholm 1999: 688). In 
addition, Jonung and Sjoholm (1999: 687) observe a relatively low level of wage 
flexibility in Finland and Sweden. They also note, “A high degree of inflexibility 
in wages and prices, and a low degree of product diversification, argue against 
participation in a monetary union. The calculations above thus indicate that 
Sweden and Finland are not very suitable candidates for the European monetary 
union” (Jonung and Sjoholm 1999: 689). Furthermore, the manufacturing 
structures of Finland and Sweden were more similar to non-EU members such as 
the United States (US) as well as to each other than they were to EU members 
such as Italy (Jonung and Sjoholm 1999: 691).
Similarly, in terms of economic growth, there was again a stronger correlation 
between Finland and Sweden as well as between these two countries and non-EU 
countries than there was between the two Nordic neighbours and those set to 
participate in EMU (Jonung and Sjoholm 1999: 692). Jonung and Sjoholm (1999: 
695) also point out similarities between the two countries’ historical fiscal policy. 
They explain, “Historically, Sweden and Finland pursued rather similar fiscal 
policy during the 1960s and 1970s,” although they do note that “in the 1980s and 
1990s Sweden and Germany had a more similar fiscal policy” (Jonung and 
Sjoholm 1999: 695).
Both countries pursued devaluation strategies during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Kinnwall (2000: 147) terms the 1970s “a disappointing decade for the Swedish 
economy.” Major devaluations to the Finnish markka took place in 1977-1978,
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1982, and 1991-1992, although there had been earlier devaluations in Finland in 
1931, 1949, 1957, and 1967 (Rehn 1996: 53). Discussing the Swedish situation, 
Kinnwall (2000: 147) writes, “While the devaluations of 1977 and 1981 were 
completely ‘defensive’, and aimed at restoring lost competitiveness, the 1982 
devaluation was not!” Instead, “the 1982 devaluation was partly ‘offensive’ and 
an essential ingredient in the new Social Democratic government’s strategy aimed 
at ‘kick-starting’ the economy. Yet, Swedish politicians learnt something from the 
failures of the 1970s. Other important new ingredients in the policy mix were 
fiscal prudence and restrictive, mostly informal, wage policies” (Kinnwall 2000: 
147). According to Kinnwall (2000: 147), “To start with, this new policy -- ‘the 
third way’ — was quite successful, though monetary policy was too 
accommodating. Average GDP [Gross Domestic Product] growth in 1983-87 was 
2.7 per cent, substantially higher than in the 1970s, whilst the inflation path 
followed a sharply downward slope. However, labour costs that were relatively 
stable immediately after the devaluation started to climb. Hence, the real exchange 
rate was slowly, but continuously, creeping upwards.”
Both countries eventually experienced economic difficulties and found their 
welfare policies difficult to maintain. For Sweden, the problems became acute in 
the late 1980s. According to Kinnwall (2000: 149), “In 1987 and 1988 it became 
more and more obvious that ‘the third way’ would not succeed since price and 
wage inflation had started to accelerate dramatically . . .  and, at the same time, the 
real economy lost momentum.” The difficulties intensified in the 1990s. Kinnwall 
(2000: 149) writes, “From 1990 all of the main economic indicators began to 
move in the wrong direction and things went ‘pear-shaped’ at a horrific and rapid 
pace. Inflation reached double-digit numbers and in 1991 the economy 
experienced a recession that lasted for almost three years.” Kinnwall (2000: 149) 
claims, “The main reason why ‘the third way’ turned out to be a ‘dead end’ was 
the lack of credibility in the low inflation, fixed exchange rate regime.” December 
1992 was a particularly significant month for the Swedish economy, as it was then 
that the fixed exchange rate regime collapsed and with it “the international 
markets’ confidence in the krona. The Swedish currency depreciated by 25 per 
cent during the first four months after the currency was allowed to float”
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(Kinnwall 2000: 151). Finland also suffered economic challenges during this time, 
as is reflected by devaluations mentioned above.
On the whole, then, the arguments against Finnish and Swedish participation in 
EMU in 1999 outweighed those for their participation (when based on an 
economic analysis). Jonung and Sjoholm (1999: 696) write, “According to our 
analysis based on the theory of optimal currency areas, Finland and Sweden are 
not any obvious candidates for membership in the EMU. According to the union- 
specific criteria which we have adopted, there is no particular similarity between 
either Finland and the other EU countries or between Sweden and the other EU 
countries.”
Despite the apparent unsuitability of both Finland and Sweden for EMU based on 
an economic analysis, there were indications that the two countries themselves 
were suitable for a monetary union with each other. Based on Jonung and 
Sjoholm’s (1999: 696) analysis, “Finland and Sweden exhibit . . . common 
characteristics which indicate that they would constitute an ‘optimum’ currency 
area. The two countries have a similar economic structure, migration between 
them has been relatively great, they are situated next to each other and they are 
roughly of the same size. They show considerable cultural and political 
similarities, and they have a common history.” Although their analysis supports 
the two countries forming their own currency union, Jonung and Sjoholm (1999: 
697) admit, “If a monetary union leads to increased trade, this is an argument in 
favour of both Sweden and Finland participating in the EMU instead of forming a 
currency union of their own. Both Sweden and Finland have a major fraction of 
their trade with the EU countries, but only a minor fraction with each other.” Yet, 
this argument is weakened by the fact that Denmark and the UK, “important trade 
partners for Finland and Sweden,” were set to remain outside of Euroland initially 
(Jonung and Sjoholm 1999: 698). There were therefore not strong economic 
arguments for Finland and Sweden to participate in EMU.
One could, however, perhaps have argued that whatever decision Finland and 
Sweden took on adopting the Euro, they should both have elected the same path. 
Jonung and Sjoholm (1999: 698) write, “Finland and Sweden display strong
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interdependence as regards monetary policy. This is shown by the monetary 
development during the past 20 years. . . . The economic relationship between 
Finland and Sweden is so strong that the two countries would benefit greatly from 
cooperation as regards monetary policy.” Furthermore, “It is tempting to argue 
that not until a monetary union between these two countries is functioning well 
should any membership in EMU be considered (Jonung and Sjoholm 1999: 698).” 
They argue that the continued presence of one of the two countries inside EMU 
and one outside would “most likely create economic and political tensions 
between Finland and Sweden” (Jonung and Sjoholm 1999: 699).
Public support for EMU was also weak in both countries. Based on a survey 
undertaken by Finnish daily newspaper Helsingin Sanomat, 39 percent believed 
that Finland should be among the first countries to adopt the Euro in the beginning 
of 1999, while 52 percent said that Finland should not be and nine percent did not 
know (Sippola 1997). However, when the question was phrased so that it asked 
whether or not Finland should be a founding member of EMU if more than half of 
the EU did so, the response was more positive, with 53 percent saying yes and 40 
percent no. However, when asked what Finland should do if, at a minimum, 
Denmark, Greece, Sweden, and the UK remained outside the single currency (as 
eventually happened in January 1999), 46 percent said that Finland should still 
join, but an equal 46 percent said that Finland should not join (Sippola 1997). As 
the Swedish government pointed out in its bill on EMU (Regeringen 1997), public 
opinion in Sweden prior to the government’s decision did not support adopting the 
single currency in 1999.
Eurobarometer surveys also demonstrate the lower than average public support 
and higher than average opposition to the single currency in both countries. 
According to Eurobarometer 48, which measured public opinion between October 
and November 1997, support for adopting the Euro was only 33 percent in 
Finland, while 62 percent were opposed to Finnish participation in EMU’s first 
wave. In Sweden the figures were 34 percent for and 56 percent against, whereas 
the average for all fifteen EU member states was 51 percent for and 37 percent 
against (European Commission 1998a). These statistics thus demonstrate similarly 
low levels of support for EMU in Finland and Sweden (with a difference of only
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one percentage point between the two countries) in the run-up to the national 
decisions on adopting the Euro in the first wave. Based on the figures presented in 
Eurobarometer 48, opposition to EMU participation in Finland was considerably 
above the EU average and even surpassed the level found in Sweden. According 
to Eurobarometer 49, which measured public opinion in April and May 1998, 
Finnish and Swedish citizens were more likely to oppose EMU participation than 
the EU average. At that time 38 percent of Finnish respondents opposed adoption 
of the Euro, while in Sweden 50 percent were against, and the average for the EU- 
15 was 28 percent against (European Commission 1998b). These figures thus 
suggest that even in Finland a greater percentage of citizens were negative 
towards EMU than in the EU as a whole. This Finnish opposition was, however, 
tempered by the increased support for the Euro in Finland (53 percent in 
Eurobarometer 49), although the greater level of support may be explained by the 
fact by that point the Eduskunta and the Finnish government had already decided 
to take their country into Euroland without a public referendum.
Even policy-makers in Finland and Sweden recognised potential difficulties as a 
result of the low public support and the weak democratic legitimacy of EMU. In a 
1997 report, the Finnish Parliament’s Grand Committee suggested that the ECB’s 
independence, which made democratic control over decision-making impossible, 
was a definite weakness in the EMU project (Stora utskottet 1997: 9). For 
Swedish policy-makers, the recognition of these difficulties was part of a process 
that led to a decision not to adopt the single currency in the first wave.
Even after Finland became a part of Euroland and Sweden did not, levels of public 
support for EMU in both countries were below the EU-15 average. According to 
Eurobarometer 53 (the fieldwork for which was conducted in April and May 
2000), 49 percent of Finns supported the Euro, whereas 48 percent were against, 
while the figures in Sweden were 38 percent for and 54 percent against. The 
statistics for both Finland and Sweden showed lower levels of support and higher 
levels of opposition than the EU-15 figures of 58 percent for and 33 percent 
against. The Finnish levels of support were also considerably lower than the Euro- 
11 average of 65 percent for and 27 percent against (European Commission 2000).
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There are thus many similarities between Finland and Sweden regarding EMU. 
These include similarities in their monetary and fiscal policies and economic 
structures. Both countries took steps to ensure that they would be able to adopt the 
Euro in the first wave if they wished and commissioned academic reports on the 
topic. Furthermore, in both countries policy-makers were faced with publics that 
were more negative towards EMU than was the case in the EU as a whole (even 
after EMU’s third stage commenced in eleven member states, including Finland, 
on 1 January 1999). There are thus a range of similarities between Finland and 
Sweden in the area of EMU, despite the obvious fact that Finland adopted the 
single currency in January 1999, whereas Sweden did not.
Two Different Approaches
Despite the similarities that have just been outlined, the differences in the Finnish 
and Swedish approaches were evident from an early stage. As early as 1993, the 
Finnish government stated that Finland actively strove to be one of the first 
countries to adopt the single currency (Statsradet 1998). In fact, according to Pertti 
Salolainen, who was Chairman of the Finnish negotiating team for EU 
membership, EMU comprised about 80 percent of the Finnish EU negotiations.46 
The Swedes, on the other hand, despite their attempts to leave open the possibility 
of Swedish participation in EMU, were less committed to being in the first wave 
and were reluctant to guarantee a Swedish intent to participate.
There were even differences between the Finnish and Swedish expert reports. 
According to the Finnish report, the Swedish report differed from the Finnish one 
in that the committee preparing the Swedish report (the Calmfors Committee) 
concentrated on comparing the positive and negative aspects of EMU and then 
suggested that Sweden should remain outside EMU, at least initially. The Finnish 
group, on the other hand, did not make such a recommendation. In fact, the two 
expert reports also had somewhat different objectives and conclusions. Whereas 
the Swedish group was given the task of advising the government on the best 
action for Sweden to take, the Finnish group was not commissioned to give
46 Interview with Pertti Salolainen on 16 December 1998.
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advice. Thus, the advice presented in the conclusion of the Calmfors Committee’s 
report is without direct parallel in the Finnish report. In the conclusion of their 
report, the Calmfors Committee lists four main reasons why Sweden should not 
adopt the Euro in the first wave. They are: (1) the high level of unemployment in 
Sweden; (2) the state’s financial situation; (3) the need for time for a broad, multi­
sided, informed public debate on EMU and its consequences; and (4) that several 
other countries (in particular, Denmark and the UK, which had opt-outs) would 
likely remain outside of Euroland, at least initially (Calmfors et al. 1996: 434).
It was already clear by May 1997 that the Swedes planned not to adopt the Euro in 
the first wave (whereas the Finns had made clear even earlier their eagerness to be 
in the first group to join EMU’s third stage). The reaction that the Swedes 
received from their EU colleagues was different from that of their Finnish 
neighbours. Ann-Sofie Dahl (1999: 147) asserts that a “reason for complaint 
among Sweden’s partners on the continent surfaced when the government 
(following a debate in the Social Democratic Party [Socialdemokratiska 
Arbetarepartiet, SAP]) in May of 1997 chose to opt out of the process for 
membership in European Monetary Union, a legally speaking complicated 
position for a country which had signed all parts of the Maastricht agreement.”
In addition, although both Finland and Sweden decided to complete expert reports 
and then allow their parliaments to vote on participation in the third stage of 
EMU, their votes were very different. The Swedish decision was taken first, on 4 
December 1997, when the Riksdag passed a bill proposed by the Swedish 
government (Regeringen 1997). The Finnish decision followed soon thereafter. 
On 24 February 1998, the Finnish Council of State suggested in its report to the 
Eduskunta that Finland should adopt the Euro in the first wave for both economic 
and political reasons (Statsradet 1998: 2).
The motivations given by the governments for their decisions were decidedly 
different. According to the Swedish bill, which was submitted to the Riksdag on 2 
October 1997, “[T]he [Swedish] government does not share the conclusion of the 
report that the EMU Committee [the Calmfors Committee] did, according to 
which the reason why Sweden should wait on participating in the currency union
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is that the Swedish economy needs more time to reach a sufficient degree of 
stability in terms of public finances and unemployment” (Regeringen 1997: 68).47 
Instead, the government concentrated on the Calmfors Committee’s findings 
regarding democratic legitimacy.
The importance given to the need for democratic debate seen in the Calmfors 
report was reflected throughout the Swedish debate on EMU, both before and 
after the formal decision on participation was taken. In its bill to the parliament, 
the Swedish government explained, “Participation in the currency union must 
have a strong democratic base. EMU is to a great extent a political project. 
Participation should be seen as an expression of the political will to participate in 
a considerably deepened European integration. There is not public support for 
joining the currency union when it begins on 1 January 1999. Opinion polls and 
many other indicators give a clear picture at this time” (Regeringen 1997: 68).48
Swedes were aware of the potential political costs in terms of marginalisation, 
which were even included in a study that formed an appendix to the Calmfors 
report (Gidlund and Jemeck 1996: 6). However, for the Swedes, unlike for the 
Finns, this argument was outweighed by the lack of public support. The Swedish 
government argued, “Sweden’s influence would be greater if Sweden joined the 
group of countries that would deepen integration by starting a common currency. 
However, this aspect cannot, according to the government’s judgement, be 
weighed heavier than the lack of public support” (Regeringen 1997: 69).49
Finnish and Swedish policy-makers also took very different approaches to dealing 
with public opinion. As was discussed in the preceding section, opposition to
47 Translation of: “Regeringen delar inte slutsatsen i den analys den EMU-utredningen gjorde, 
enligt vilken skalet for att Sverige borde vanta med deltagandet i valutaunionen dr aft svensk 
ekonomi behdver ytterligare tid for att na en tillrdcklig grad av stabilitet vad gdller de offentliga 
finansema och arbetslosheten.”
48 Translation of: “Ett deltagande i valutaunionen mdste ha en stark demokratiskforankring. EMU 
dr i hog grad ett politiskt projekt. Deltagande bor ses som ett uttryck for den politiska viljan att 
medverka i en vasentligtfordjupad europeisk integration. Detfinns inte folkligt stodfor att ga med 
i valutaunionen ndr den upprattas den 1 januari 1999. Opinionsmatningar och mdnga andra 
indikationer ger harvidlag en tydlig bild ”
49 Translation of: “Sveriges inflyttande skulle bli storre om Sverige ingick i den krets lander som 
fordjupar integrationen genom att infora en gemensam valuta. Emellertid kan inte derma aspekt 
enligt regeringens beddmningfd vaga tyngre an bristen pa folkligt stod.”
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EMU was above the EU average in both Finland and Sweden, as measured by 
Eurobarometers 48 and 49. In fact, (as mentioned earlier), Eurobarometer 48, the 
research for which was conducted in October and November 1997 (i.e. in the run­
up to the Finnish and Swedish decisions on participation in EMU), shows greater 
opposition to adoption of the Euro in Finland (62 percent) than in Sweden (56 
percent).
Finland and Sweden particularly diverged on the issue of participation in the 
exchange rate mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS). In 
October 1996, Finland joined the ERM, whereas Sweden never joined. According 
to Kinnwall (2000: 152), “The bad experience of a unilaterally fixed exchange 
rate was one reason why Sweden refused to join the ‘broad band ERM’ after 
Sweden became an EU member in 1995. It is probably also one reason why 
Sweden prefers to stay outside the ERM2 mechanism prescribed for ERM 
‘outsiders’ under the present system.” This economic reason for remaining outside 
the ERM and ERM2 cannot, however, fully explain the Swedish decision on 
participation in EMU’s third stage because, according to the Calmfors report and 
the government’s bill, concerns relating to democratic legitimacy were crucial in 
the Swedish decision.
The Swedish choice on whether or not to join the ERM did, however, prove to be 
crucial in substantiating and legitimising the Swedish decision not to participate in 
the third stage 6f EMU. According to Paul de Grauwe (2000: 130), “Sweden 
decided not to join [EMU] and used a loophole in the treaty, i.e. it refused to enter 
the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS before the start of the third stage 
thereby deliberately failing to satisfy one of the entry conditions.” Similarly, the 
Finnish Council of State asserted that Sweden’s reason for not qualifying for 
EMU was that it chose not to participate in the ERM (Statsradet 1998: 6). 
According to Rutger Lindahl (2000: 114), “Within Sweden, many commentators 
perceived this [Swedish non-participation in ERM] as enabling the Commission to 
avoid a direct confrontation and also as a smooth way out of a political dilemma 
for the Swedish government.”
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Although both the Finnish and Swedish political parties disagreed about EMU, 
including even internal divisions within parties, the split in the Swedish parties 
was greater than in the Finnish ones, particularly as the decision approached. 
According to Kinnwall (2000: 155), while the Social Democrats adopted a “wait- 
and-see” policy, the Liberals (Folkpartiet Liberalerna, FP) and Conservatives 
(Moderata Samiingspartiet, M) “pushed for EMU membership as soon as 
possible.”
Discussing the role of political parties in the rainbow coalition government in 
Finland regarding the decision on adoption of the Euro, Ann-Cathrine Jungar 
(2000: 260) explains, “As the date for the final application grew nearer the two 
parties in which the internal criticism of the EMU were [sic] strongest, the Left 
Wing Alliance [Vasemmistoliitto, VAS] and the Green League [Vihrealiitto, 
VIHR], had to make up their minds: Should they leave a government that would 
take Finland into the EMU, or continue in the cabinet although many of their 
party-members opposed Finnish participation in the EMU? Hence the party- 
members were explicitly not asked to state their opinion on EMU, but rather to 
indicate if the EMU was an issue that could be compromised in order to stay in 
government.”
Eventually, both VAS and VIHR decided to remain in the pro-EMU government. 
Jungar (2000: 260) writes that in VAS “52.4 percent of the party-members 
approved of the alternative that the parliamentarians could vote in favour for the 
government position to join the EMU. In the Green League the final decision was 
taken jointly by the party-council and the parliamentary group after party-internal 
discussions and a majority of 68 percent voted in favour for a pro-EMU decision. 
With these party-internal decisions these two parties legitimised their continued 
presence in a cabinet that would bring Finland into the European Monetary Union 
in the eyes of their own members.” Thus, there was not open party or government 
conflict in Finland when the Eduskunta took the decision to lead Finland into 
Euroland in the first wave.
The position of the Finnish Centre Party (Suomen Keskusta, KESK), the leading 
party in government when Finland decided to join the EU, also had a lasting
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impact on Finland’s EMU choices and was itself largely influenced by its having 
been in the government at that time. According to Salolainen, the decision to 
adopt the Euro in the first wave (as well as to join the EU) would have been much 
more difficult had the Centre Party been in opposition because the party 
represented the farmers, and the farmers were the strongest opposition to EU 
membership. Because they were included in the government, they had the national 
responsibility, and they were less critical than they would otherwise have been.50
In Sweden, on the other hand, there was considerable division between and even 
within parties up to and after the Riksdag’s decision that Sweden would not 
participate in the first wave of EMU’s third stage. The SAP was deeply divided 
over the issue of EMU. According to Anders Widfeldt (2000: 73), “When Goran 
Persson took over as party leader and Prime Minister from Ingvar Carlsson in 
March 1996, the EMU was one of his most daunting challenges.” As Widfeldt 
(2000: 73) notes, Persson’s “government was internally split on the issue.” The 
Swedish Conservatives, on the other hand, were strong supporters of EMU. The 
Conservative Party’s leader at the time, Carl Bildt, was particularly supportive of 
Swedish participation in EMU’s third stage as well as in European integration in 
general. Other parties, however, particularly the Greens (Miljopartiet de Grona), 
were opposed.
Despite differences between and within the various Swedish political parties, all 
recognised at least to some extent the Swedish need for public debate and 
democratic legitimacy through popular support for Swedish entry into EMU 
before the decision to adopt the Euro could be taken in Sweden. This applied even 
to the Liberal Party, which was among the most supportive proponents of Swedish 
EMU membership. According to Hojelid (1999: 105, with citations from motion 
to Riksdag 1997/98:Fi5 by Liberal MP Lars Leijonborg), “The Liberal Party 
believes that public support is a necessity for membership in EMU, but that 
democracy also requires opinion-shaping and information before a decision. The 
Social Democrats’ ‘inability to take a stand’ and ‘reluctance to shape opinion at
50 Interview with Salolainen on 16 December 1998.
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all* is described as ‘one of the leadership’s low-water marks.’”51 Swedish Minister 
for Development (bistandsminister) Pierre Schori also stressed the need for 
democratic debate. According to Hojelid (2000: 263), Schori “in a conversation 
with parliament journalists on 24 March 1998 gave expression to the thought that 
Sweden ‘sooner or later’ would join the currency union EMU, it just meant first 
‘convincing the Swedish people.’”52 Mats Bergquist agrees that Swedish policy­
makers accepted that Sweden would not adopt the Euro without a referendum 
prior to the commencement of EMU’s third stage in 1999 “because the issue 
needed time to ripen” and they feared that holding a referendum “too early” would 
lead to a negative result, which would make future attempts to adopt the Euro 
more difficult.53
Even Swedish trade unions were deeply divided over the issue of Swedish 
adoption of the European single currency. According to Michael Karlsson (2000: 
84), “[A]s regards the EMU, the Swedish trade unions have been rather hesitant 
and split.” Support for Swedish EMU participation came from the Swedish 
Confederation of Professional Associations (Sveriges Akademikers 
Centralorganisation, SACO), which “concluded that Swedish EMU membership 
would be desirable for the long-term structural development of the Swedish 
economy” (Karlsson 2000: 84). Similarly, Arthur Gould (2000: 205) asserts, 
“Among trade union federations, SACO felt that Sweden would be more 
vulnerable outside EMU than within.” Furthermore, Karlsson (2000: 84) writes, 
“SACO preferred that Sweden’s participation started from the beginning of 
EMU’s third stage in 1999 in order to ensure that the country took part in the 
formation of EMU’s system of rules.”
However, a different approach was taken by LO (Landsorganisationen, the 
Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions) and TCO (Tjanstemannens
51 Translation of: “Folkpartiet anser att folkligt stod dr en forutsattning for medlemskap i EMU, 
men att demokrati ocksd krdver opinionsbildning och information innan ett stallningstagande. 
Socialdemokraternas ’oformaga att ta stdllning’ och ’vagran att bilda opinionen overhuvudtaget’ 
betecknar man som ’ett ledarskapets lagvattenmarke.
52 Translation of: “gav i ett samtal med riksdagsjoumalister den 24 mars 1998 uttryck for tanken 
att Sverige fbrr eller senare’ kommer med i valutaunionen EMU, det gdller bara forst att 
’overtyga det svenska folket.
53 Interview with Mats Bergquist on 18 December 1998.
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Centralorganisation, the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees), 
which, according to Karlsson (2000: 84), “have decided so far to play a ‘waiting 
game’ with respect to Swedish EMU membership. The main reason for delaying a 
final decision originates in both cases from a fear that Sweden will relinquish its 
traditional economic and labour market policy which secured the country’s 
welfare state.” Gould (2000: 205) writes, “LO was, like the government, unwilling 
to enter in the first round, preferring what it called the core countries to initiate the 
experiment. It was, however, concerned that the degree of labour mobility 
required to avoid more unemployment would be unattainable.” However, as 
Karlsson (2000: 84) points out, “[I]t should be noticed that 2 of the 19 individual 
member associations of LO have actually abandoned the central policy of the 
congress and taken an individual stand on the issue.” The two members to deviate 
from LO’s approach were the Swedish Metal Workers’ Union (Svenska 
Metallindustriarbetarefdrbundet) and the Commercial Employees’ Union 
(Handelsanstalldas For bund), with the first supporting EMU and the second 
opposing it. In fact, Hojelid (1999: 52) argues, “Within LO the picture can be said 
to have been very fragmented, which also then meant that that which was written 
and said from the centre was not particularly profiled.”54
Furthermore, like the government, LO was concerned about the need for 
democratic debate on the topic and public support: “EMU is not sufficiently 
debated and democratically supported among Swedish citizens in order to have 
legitimacy today” (Cited in Hojelid 1999: 53).55 However, whereas the 
government saw a wait-and-see policy as the solution to the need for democratic 
debate and legitimacy, LO saw no good solution: “The lack of debate means a 
democratic problem regardless what position one takes, either for or against 
EMU” (Cited in Hojelid 1999: 53).56 Yet, according to Gould (2000: 205), “It was 
TCO — the majority of whose members are women — which was most hostile to 
EMU. It was concerned about being trapped within a system overly concerned
54 Translation of: “Inom LO kan bilden sagas ha varit mycket splittrad, vilket da ocksa medfort att 
det som skrivits och sagts frdn centralt hall inte varit sarskilt profiler at."
55 Translation of: “EMU dr inte tillrackligt debatterat och demokratiskt forankrat bland Sveriges 
medborgare for att ha legitimitet idag
56 Translation of: “Franvaron av debatt innebar ett demokratiskt problem oavsett vilket 
stallningstagande man gor, antingen for eller emot EMU."
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with inflation, and more likely to lead to social inequality and lower social 
expenditure.”
The Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen and his Swedish counterpart Persson 
also took different approaches to the issue of EMU. Lipponen spoke early in 
support of Finnish participation in EMU, whereas Persson was initially reluctant 
to take a side on the issue and in the end only chose a “wait-and-see” policy, 
rather than actively supporting or opposing Swedish participation in EMU’s third 
stage. In fact, Hojelid (1999: 257) argues that Persson gave the first clear signs of 
his reluctance for Sweden to participate in the first wave of EMU’s third stage at 
the Florence European Council meeting in June 1996. Furthermore, according to 
Hojelid (1999: 257), “He apparently aroused great attention for his unusually 
harsh attack against the British government and Prime Minister John Major for 
their handling of ‘mad cow disease’, but also went deeper in a reasoning on the 
consequences of a single currency.”57 The combination of criticising Major and 
raising doubts about the Euro demonstrated the self-confidence of the Swedish 
leader as well as his lack of concern for the thoughts of his European colleagues, 
i.e. his unwillingness to adapt to the EU. Despite his outburst at Florence, 
Persson’s ambivalence on the issue of EMU continued. Hojelid (1999: 293) 
argues, “[M]y understanding is that it is difficult to understand, read, and interpret
f O
what he [Persson] really thinks.” The main reason for this, according to Hojelid 
(1999: 293) is: “He is genuinely uncertain!”59 This was in stark contrast to 
Lipponen’s enthusiasm for the project. Hojelid (1999: 37) asserts that Lipponen 
“has on his part had a hard time understanding the Swedish hesitancy and has not 
himself hesitated to take an early leadership in the issue.”60
The preceding section on the similarities between Finland and Sweden 
demonstrated significant economic similarities between the two countries. There
57 Translation of: “Han vackte visserligen stor uppmdrksamhet for sin ovanligt frana attack mot 
den brittiska regeringen och premidrminister John Major for dess bantering av ’galna ko-sjukan 
men gick ocksd djupare i ett resonemang om konsekvenserna av en gemensam valuta
58 Translation of: “min uppfattning dr att det dr svart att forsta, lasa ut och tolka vad han 
egentligen tycker”
59 Translation of: “Han dr genuint osakerr
60 Translation of: “har for sin del haft svart att forsta den svenska tveksamheten och har inte sjalv 
tvekat att utova ett tydligt ledarskap ifragan.”
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were, however, some significant differences between their economies, but these 
interestingly suggest that EMU membership should actually have been less risky 
for Sweden than for Finland. These differences are apparent from the differing 
economic histories of the two countries. Olli Rehn (1996) points out differences 
between Finland’s economic history and that of Sweden (and the other EFTA 
states). Rehn (1996: 53) explains that, in contrast to that of its EFTA counterparts, 
“Finnish economic history has been a long narrative of recurrent devaluations, 
preceded by failed attempts at corporatist wage moderation and economic 
stabilization. . . . The recurrent devaluations have been a principal method of 
Finnish investment-driven economic strategy, aiming at rapid industrialization and 
based on conscious growth-oriented policies.” Thus, although, as pointed out 
previously, both Finland and Sweden had devaluations, Finland relied particularly 
on this mechanism. Adoption of the European single currency eliminates the 
possibility of future national devaluations, and the Finns’ willingness to forego 
this option was a greater sacrifice than it would have been for the Swedes.
Among the reasons for the increased risk for Finland (in comparison to Sweden) 
in joining EMU was the lower degree of diversification of the Finnish economy 
and particularly the domination of the economy by one company (Nokia). In 1995, 
Nokia accounted for 40 percent of the value of the Helsinki stock exchange 
(Camegy 1995). By December 1999, Nokia was “the biggest company in Europe” 
with a market capitalisation of Euro 193 billion and was “50% more valuable than 
the entire economy of Finland” (Nuttall 2000). The Swedish economy was far 
more diversified than that of Finland, with Nokia’s competitor Ericsson being one 
of several large companies in Sweden. The Finnish economy was also more 
vulnerable than the Swedish because of Finland’s greater proximity to Russia. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union meant a major loss of international trade for Finland, 
and the Russian economic difficulties in the late 1990s also spelled problems for 
the Finnish economy.
The two countries also differed in the way in which they were affected by 
Germany’s demand shock. Bergman et al. (1997: 13) argue, “Although 
considerable short-run variation is evident, the transmission of the German 
demand shock is generally positive in Belgium, Denmark and Sweden and
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negative in Finland.” Their findings “suggest that common shocks among the 
small European economies considered in our sample [Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden] do not help explain why some countries 
have chosen to join the first group of countries starting the single currency area in 
Europe and why others have opted to remain outside. Common European 
disturbances do not distinguish the Nordic countries from the non-Nordic 
countries, nor do they distinguish long-standing EU members from the others in 
our sample” (Bergman et al. 1997: 13). They found that “[t]he countries with the 
strongest (Belgium) and weakest (Finland) linkages to Germany are both firmly 
committed to monetary union in Europe. And Denmark, with very strong 
economic linkages to Germany, plans to remain outside the single currency area” 
(Bergman et al. 1997: 16). That Finland took a great economic risk in adopting the 
Euro is also acknowledged by Xan Smiley (1999a: 16): “The Finns are risking 
quite a lot by jumping into the euro-boat. Like Ireland, they may prove more 
vulnerable than countries nearer the heart of Europe to asymmetrical economic 
shocks.”
The Finnish decision to join EMU is all the more surprising because, at the time 
that the decision was finally taken by the Eduskunta, the Finns were aware that 
Sweden had chosen not to join in the first wave. Yet, this decision may have been 
a political one to distinguish Finland from Sweden. According to Esa Stenberg 
(1999: 38), “[0]ne argument for Finland’s EMU decision (put forth at least by . . .  
Lipponen) was that Finland must take decisions based on her own interests and 
not follow Sweden.”
One could also argue that the Swedes knew that the Finns would decide to 
participate fully in EMU as soon as possible and should logically have done the 
same. Commenting on why Sweden would not follow the Finnish lead into the 
Euro area, Swedish Finance Minister Erik Asbrink said, “There is much that is 
good with Finland. But there is no reason for us to copy the Finnish decision­
making process. I could refer to other countries that have come to a completely 
different position. Great Britain and Denmark are some examples. Does Lars 
Tobisson [a Conservative MP who was critical of Asbrink] want to have 
unemployment as high as that in Finland? Let us shape this process with the
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starting point in what we think is best for Sweden. Swedish interests, nothing else, 
shall lead the way. Do not suggest that we will have less influence if we do not 
join the currency union. Do Lars Tobisson and Anne Wibble [another critical MP] 
think that Great Britain under Tony Blair will not have some influence, just 
because they will most likely not join the currency union when it starts in 1999?” 
(Cited in Hojelid 1999: 91).61
Asbrink’s audacity to see Sweden in the same position as Denmark and the UK 
rather than Finland is striking. It clearly confirms the picture of Sweden as a 
reluctant European, but, more importantly, it suggests strong Swedish self- 
confidence. Asbrink argued that if the British could have an influence despite 
remaining outside of Euroland, then the Swedes should also be able to do so. 
However, he disregarded the difference in the size and position of the two 
countries as well as the fact that the UK had a negotiated opt-out, whereas the 
Swedes, who joined the EU after the Maastricht Treaty had been signed, did not 
possess such an option.
Identity also played a role in the Finnish and Swedish decisions and was even 
reflected in the national debates on EMU. Despite the relevance of identity in both 
countries, it pulled Finland and Sweden in opposite directions. According to 
Lindahl (2000: 113), “In the Swedish debate, those opposing Sweden’s EMU 
membership argue that the country would lose the ‘krona’ -- traditionally a strong 
symbol of ‘national identity’ -- and control over financial and eventually fiscal 
policy.” In Finland, however, adoption of the single European currency was seen 
as giving added validity to Finland’s European identity.
The role of identity in influencing national positions on EMU membership has 
been acknowledged by several scholars. For instance, Daniela Engelmann, Hans-
61 Translation of: “Det firms mycket bra med Finland Men det finns ingen anledning att vi shall 
kopiera de finlandska beslutsprocessen. Jag skulle kunna hanvisa till andra lander som hamnar pa 
en helt annan position. Storbritannien och Danmark dr nagra exempel. Vill Lars Tobisson ha lika 
hog arbetsloshet som i Finland? Lat oss utforma den har processen med utgangspunkt i vad vi tror 
dr bdst for Sverige. Svenska intressen, ingenting annat, shall vara vagledande. P&sta inte att vi far 
mindre inflytande om vi inte gar in i valutaunionen. Tror Lars Tobisson och Anne Wibble att 
Storbritannien under Tony Blair inte kommer att ha ndgot inflytande, bora for att de med all 
sannolikhet inte g&r med i valutaunionen ndr den startar 1999?”
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Joachim Knopf, Klaus Roscher, and Thomas Risse (1997: 105) “argue . . . that 
EMU cannot be understood in economic and monetary terms alone. Support for 
EMU by the political elites in most member states cannot be explained on the 
basis of materially defined economic or foreign policy interest. Rather, the 
planned introduction of the Euro has to be linked to the larger political project of 
European integration. EMU forms part and parcel of European integration in 
general and has acquired symbolic meaning as the cornerstone of European 
political unification. The Euro is much more about European union than about 
lowering transaction costs.” Bringing in the examples of France and Germany, 
they continue, “This is why Europe’s centre-right leaders such as German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed to it in the first place and continue to push it. This 
also explains why there are remarkably little challenges to EMU by leading Social 
Democratic opposition parties such as the German Social Democrats (SPD) or the 
French Socialists (PSF)” (Engelmann et al. 1997: 105).
Discussing the symbolism of currencies themselves and their connection to 
identity, Engelmann et al. (1997: 128) write, “The Euro . . . symbolizes a 
collective European identity, while the Deutsche Mark, the franc and the pound 
Sterling are constructed as the symbolic remnants of a nationalist past. At the 
same time, opponents of EMU use the Deutsche Mark, the franc, and the pound as 
the symbols of national identities which are not to be subsumed under some vague 
‘Europeanness’” (emphasis in original).
Identity is regarded as a crucial variable for explaining national attitudes towards 
EMU. Engelmann et al. (1997: 105) argue “that German and French support for as 
well as British opposition to EMU can only be understood in the context of 
identity politics, while an interest-based account misses the mark.” Identity was an 
important factor in both the Finnish and Swedish decisions, although, as 
mentioned earlier, it pushed the two countries in opposite directions. In fact, 
Engelmann et al. (1997)’s explanation of the British approach to EMU could in 
many respects be equally well applied to the Swedish situation. They argue, 
“There is not much collective European identity found in the British debates. 
‘Europe’ is still identified with the continent and perceived as ‘the other’ in 
contrast to Englishness” (Engelmann et al. 1997: 113). Furthermore, in the UK
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“conceptions of statehood and sovereignty are often viewed as potentially 
threatened by European integration” (Engelmann et al. 1997: 113). In Sweden, as 
in Britain, the threat to the national currency was seen as undermining national 
identity, as the destruction of “symbolic remnants of a nationalist past,” to borrow 
words from Engelmann et al. (1997: 128). Although not introduced in Sweden 
until 1873, the krona nevertheless had become an important Swedish symbol. In 
Finland, on the other hand, participation in EMU’s third stage was regarded as 
strengthening Finland’s national identity. Smiley (1999c: 9) suggests that being 
able to adopt the Euro in the first wave was a “mighty uplift” to Finnish morale 
and nationalism. The Finnish markka, introduced in 1860 (even earlier than the 
Swedish krona), could more easily be sacrificed. The loss of a Finnish national 
currency would result in the net strengthening of the Finnish national identity.
The differences in identities, attitudes, and choices observed prior to the 
commencement of EMU’s third stage continued even during 1999 and 2000. 
Following Finnish entry into EMU’s third stage on 1 January 1999, the two 
countries’ paths obviously diverged. Continuing actions confirmed this 
divergence. Finland participated actively in the third stage of EMU, whereas 
Swedes had not by the end of 2000 taken any steps that would bring them closer 
to adoption of the Euro. This was despite the fact that Sweden was preparing to 
hold the EU Presidency during the first half of 2001. During its Presidency, 
however, Sweden would be excluded from EMU-related decisions and Belgium 
(the country that was due to assume the Presidency after the Sweden) would hold 
the chair in Sweden’s place when EMU was on the agenda.
Significantly, as noted earlier, Sweden did not join ERM2, the successor to the 
ERM. This was in contrast to the decisions of Denmark and Greece, also outside 
of Euroland initially, to join. According to de Grauwe (2000: 148), “Since the 
political will to enter EMU is rather weak in Sweden, it is possible that this 
country will continue to stay out of ERM-II. Entering this exchange rate 
arrangement would legally bind Sweden also to enter EMU (provided that the 
other convergence criteria are satisfied).” The consequences of joining ERM2 for 
Swedish EMU participation were elucidated by Asbrink on 3 June 1997. 
According to Asbrink, “Participation in ERM2 can be seen as a direct preparatory
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step for entrance into the currency union. Therefore, much speaks for actualising 
the linkage of the krona to ERM2 first in connection with a possible future 
Swedish participation in the currency union” (Cited in Hojelid 1999: 49).62
As discussed above, the Swedish attention to public opinion was reflected in the 
need perceived across the party divides for a referendum on Swedish participation 
in EMU’s third phase before the policy-makers could make a final decision on 
whether or not to lead Sweden into Euroland. The Swedish policy-makers’ 
perceived need for a referendum before they could decide on EMU continued 
even after EMU’s third stage commenced without Sweden on 1 January 1999.
There were, however, some indications after the third stage of EMU began 
without Swedish participation that Swedes, both policy-makers and the Swedish 
public, were growing increasingly positive towards the possibility of Swedish 
adoption of the Euro. According to Kinnwall (2000: 156), “In the Winter of 1999, 
when the government issued statements that were widely interpreted as signals of 
a more pro-EMU position on the part of the Persson administration, Swedish yield 
spreads narrowed and the krona strengthened.” In fact, in January 1999 “the 
Persson government announced what was widely perceived as a timetable for 
Swedish EMU membership” and “an extraordinary party congress intended to, 
and did, take a (Yes) decision in Spring 2000,” seemingly preparing for a 
referendum on the Euro in August 2000 (Kinnwall 2000: 162).
However, by May 1999, public support for adoption of the European single 
currency had declined and the Social Democrats “seemed to have second thoughts 
on the EMU issue” (Kinnwall 2000: 163). Kinnwall (2000: 163) argues, “[I]t now 
appears as if the Persson government has changed its mind, at least in terms of the 
provisional political timetable for Swedish EMU entry” and it “now appears to be 
that any final decision will be postponed until after the next general election in 
September 2002. EMU membership in 2004 at the earliest is, thus, now the most 
likely scenario.” Similarly, Lindahl (2000: 114) believes that “an EMU
62 Translation of: “Deltagandet i ERM2 kan ses som ett direkt forberedande steg fore ett intrade i 
valutaunionen. Ddrfor talar mycket for att en knytning av kronan till ERM2 aktualiseras first i 
samband med ett eventuellt framtida svenskt deltagande i valutaunionen. ”
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referendum will probably not take place until the government is sure there will be 
a stable majority in favour. The Persson government is expected to minimise the 
risk of losing office at the 2002 election by not moving too fast on this issue, 
especially as public opinion has turned more negative towards EMU 
membership.”
One reason for the decrease in public support for Swedish participation in EMU as 
1999 progressed may have been that the Swedish economy was strong during 
1999 and 2000, despite being outside Euroland. Kinnwall (2000: 156) points out 
that an “indication of Sweden’s strength is that the Riksbank was able to cut the 
repo rate below the ECB’s refi rate in March 1999.” In addition, “the ‘Euro’s’ 
weakness since the beginning of EMU in January 1999 has also encouraged some 
Euro-sceptics to suggest that Sweden can stand on her own two feet, outside 
EMU” (Kinnwall 2000: 157). As Lindahl (2000: 114) argues, “On the EMU 
question, Swedish public opinion will not only be influenced by domestic political 
discussion, but also by the economic performance of the Euro-11 and 
developments in Britain and Denmark concerning their potential EMU 
membership.” Thus, even if the Swedish policy-makers were more concerned with 
public opinion than with economic arguments, economics might have been 
influential via public opinion. There are thus a variety of factors that influenced 
Swedish opinion (both at the mass and elite levels) on EMU in 1999 and 2000. 
Despite these factors, however, the call for a referendum remained.
There were, nevertheless, concerns that, in the long run, the EU might require 
Swedish adaptation in the area of monetary policy. As Kinnwall (2000: 163) 
phrases the difficulty, “Will it be possible for Sweden in the long run to stay in the 
EU but outside EMU, despite the fact that Sweden has ratified the Maastricht 
Treaty and fulfils the convergence criteria? Probably not!” In Finland, on the other 
hand, at the end of 2000, EMU membership was accepted by policy-makers and 
tolerated by the public.
There are thus many obvious differences between Finland and Sweden regarding 
EMU. In fact, it would be difficult or even impossible to find another policy area 
in which the two countries chose such different paths between 1995 and 2000.
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From an early point, Finnish policy-makers made their ambitions to join EMU’s 
third stage known as soon as possible, whereas Swedish policy-makers were less 
enthusiastic and less certain of what they wanted. Even at the end of the time 
period under consideration in 2000, there were no clear signs of Swedish 
commitment to adopt the Euro. There was, at the end of 2000, continued 
acceptance of the need for a referendum before the Swedish government would be 
willing to commit to such a step. However, the date for a referendum had not even 
been set, so Swedish EMU participation appeared to be no more than a possibility 
for the distant future as December 2000 came to a close.
Analysis and Conclusion
In a sense, this case study may seem strikingly unsurprising in its results. Nearly 
everyone, from scholars to policy-makers to the general public, could see that 
there were significant differences between the Finnish and Swedish strategies 
regarding their participation in Economic and Monetary Union. It is true that, in 
contrast to the other two policy areas that will be analysed in the following 
chapters, this issue demonstrates more obvious differences. Yet, it is also an area 
where there is a surprising amount of similarity for two countries that took such 
differing decisions. Their economic histories were in many ways similar. The 
public opinion in both countries regarding national adoption of the European 
single currency was among the lowest in the EU-15, particularly in late 1997 
when the decisions on participation were taken at the national level. There was 
also division both between and within political parties on the topic of EMU in 
both Finland and Sweden. Despite these similarities, however, the decisions they 
took differed radically. On the one hand, the Finnish government and parliament 
decided to lead their sceptical population into Euroland in the first wave. The 
Swedish government and parliament, on the other hand, chose to “wait-and-see,” 
promising that there would be a public referendum at an unspecified future date 
before Swedes would consider replacing their krona with the Euro.
Here, as with the other case studies, this project has the task of attempting to 
explain why, despite their similarities, policy-makers in the two countries chose
169
different approaches. Because EMU is inherently an economic matter one might 
assume that economics can explain the differences. The preceding pages, 
however, have cast severe doubt on a purely economic explanation of the 
differences between the two Nordic neighbours’ strategies. Although there were 
economic reasons for remaining outside Euroland (e.g. the fact that major trading 
partners Denmark and the UK remained outside and that the Swedish economy 
seemed to manage without problems), there were also economic arguments for 
adopting the Euro (e.g. the majority of EU countries were already inside 
Euroland). Furthermore, the feasibility of Sweden remaining outside the Euro area 
for an extended time was in question and the political costs of remaining outside 
continued to be of importance. Unlike Denmark and the UK, the only other two 
member states that were set to remain outside Euroland at the end of 2000 (as 
Greece prepared to join on 1 January 2001), Sweden did not have an opt-out. 
Thus, while economic factors may help explain why Finns wished to adopt the 
Euro or why Swedes elected not to do so, they go less far in explaining the 
differences between the two decisions. If anything, purely economic analyses such 
as that of Jonung and Sjoholm (1999) suggest that Finland had more to risk by 
adopting the Euro than Sweden would have had.
Although EMU is undoubtedly an economic matter, many scholars have agreed 
that it is a political one as well and is, in fact, often opposed by economists 
(Minkkinen and Patomaki 1997: 7). Petri Minkkinen and Heikki Patomaki (1997:
9) argue, despite the existence of some economists who do support the EMU 
project, that “it seems that the community of economists is almost as uncertain 
about the reasons for EMU as is the EU-European citizenry.” A similar argument 
is presented by Engelmann et al. (1997: 127): “EMU and the Euro can only be 
understood as a political rather than an economic project. While the advantages 
and disadvantages of a single currency are indeterminate, to say the least, and 
while its social consequences regarding cuts in the European welfare state are 
rather significant, at least in the short run, the project has become the cornerstone 
of European political integration.”
Such arguments do not support traditional arguments for explaining participation 
in European integration. Engelmann et al. (1997: 106) argue, “Most traditional
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approaches to European integration -- be it neofunctionalism or liberal 
intergovemmentalism — exogenize interests and preferences of actors assuming 
that economic and/or power-based foreign policy interests can largely explain the 
outcome.” Based on these traditional approaches, “European integration is then 
driven by increasing economic interdependence among the EU members, by 
responses to the challenges of globalization, or by traditional ‘balance of power’ 
considerations” (Engelmann et al. 1997: 106). According to Engelmann et al. 
(1997: 106), however, “[Traditional accounts based on materially defined 
interests are at least indeterminate, if not outright misleading in explaining the 
variation in attitudes toward EMU among the political elites” of the countries they 
studied: France, Germany, and the UK. Moravcsik’s (1998) liberal economic 
approach is similarly incapable of explaining the differences between the 
formulation of Finnish and Swedish EMU policies. For Moravcsik (1998), 
economic interest is a vital explanatory factor. However, the economies of Finland 
and Sweden are strikingly similar, and there is no evidence that differing 
economic interests can explain why Finland chose to adopt the Euro in the first 
wave while Sweden did not. Ingebritsen’s (1998) sectoral analysis is also unable 
to explain the two countries’ different decisions, and, indeed, EMU is strikingly 
absent from her analysis of the Nordic countries and European integration, 
perhaps suggesting that it is not applicable in this case. Although sectoral 
interests, particularly those representing labour, did argue for at most a wait-and- 
see approach to Swedish participation in EMU’s third stage in the first wave, even 
they emphasised the importance of democratic debate and public support, themes 
that permeated the Swedish discussions on EMU. There is no evidence that 
sectoral interests can explain the two countries’ divergent choices.
There is, however, support here for the argument that HICI shape the formulation 
of national EU policies. The role of identity has already been clarified. Historical 
experiences had an important effect in shaping that identity (as was explained in 
the preceding chapter). The Swedish decision-making style, which focused around 
consensus and grew out of Sweden’s historical experiences, certainly influenced 
the policy-makers’ decisions on Swedish participation in EMU. According to 
Hojelid (1999: 253), who finds a role for history and ideas, “[E]ven the form of 
politics is of importance from a more ideological perspective. We know that social
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democracy by tradition is a social movement party, where questions must be 
researched, supported, explained, discussed.” The historical roots of the SAP 
and other aspects of Sweden’s historical experiences are seen as important 
explanatory factors for the need of the Swedish policy-makers not to lead Sweden 
into Euroland without public support. Similarly, the more hierarchical Finnish 
decision-making style, also the result of historical experiences, shaped the Finnish 
policy of adopting the Euro despite low public support and without a referendum. 
These differences in Finnish and Swedish decision-making styles are a result also 
of institutions, shaped by history (notably by the presence or absence of a 
President).
Furthermore, the legacy of the Swedish model and the people’s home left their 
impact on Swedish policy-makers, including Goran Persson. Describing Persson, 
Hojelid (1999: 293) writes, “The picture of someone with a real nostalgia for the 
people’s home that I think accommodates the idea that Sweden and the Swedish 
welfare model were at their best some time between 1955 and 1975 comes forth. 
It was also then that the public finances were in order and the Swedish welfare 
model served as a kind of ideal for many countries.”64 Swedes thus felt that they 
had more to sacrifice than did Finns. For Finns, EMU brought only gains for the 
Finnish self-confidence and identity, strengthening Finland’s position as a 
Western European country.
In addition, even after making the decision to remain outside Euroland initially, 
Swedish actions demonstrated further willingness to deviate from the EU 
mainstream by not making concerted efforts to join the third stage of EMU in the 
near future. Despite movements towards possible membership after the third stage 
of EMU commenced in the beginning of 1999, Swedish policy-makers had backed 
off any such movement by the end of 2000. This renewed Swedish reluctance to 
move towards EMU membership was particularly striking because of the then
63 Translation of: “oven politikens form dr betydelsefull ur ett mer ideologiskt perspektiv. Vi vet att 
socialdemokratin av tradition dr ett folkrdrelseparti, ddr frdgor maste utredas, forankras, 
fbrJdaras, diskuteras.”
64 Translation of: “Fram tonar ocksd bilden av en akta folkhemsnostalgiker som jag tror hyser 
uppfattningen att Sverige och den svenska samhallsmodellen var som bast ndgon gdng 1955-75. 
Det var ocksd da som de offentliga fmanserna var i ordning och den svenska valfardsmodellen 
utgjorde ett slags forebildfor manga lander.”
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upcoming Swedish Presidency. During their Presidency, Swedes would have been 
able to chair decisions on the Euro if they were inside Euroland and would have 
been shut out of such decisions if they were outside. The policy-makers’ 
movement away from support for the Euro mirrored those of the Swedish public, 
suggesting the importance placed by the Swedish elite on democratic legitimacy.
In terms of actual adaptation, defined here as changing pre-existing national 
policies or positions, EMU clearly demonstrates greater Finnish adaptation to the 
EU than Swedish. Although both countries initially showed signs of adaptation in 
terms of attempting to implement the Maastricht criteria and ensure that they 
would have the option of being among the first group of countries to adopt the 
European single currency, the Finns regarded full participation in EMU’s third 
stage from the outset as a more important priority than the Swedes did. 
Furthermore, in their differing decisions on adopting the Euro, Finland and 
Sweden sent different messages to their EU colleagues. As Bergman et al. (1997: 
2) argue, “The government of Sweden . . .  in essence reneg[ed] on the 
commitment made when voters accepted the Maastricht treaty by announcing in 
Spring 1997 that it would not be among the first group of EU countries forming 
monetary union.” Thus, Finland’s choice demonstrated the country’s desire to be 
in the EU mainstream, whereas the Swedish decision reflected a greater national 
self-confidence and less concern for being accepted into the EU core. In other 
words, Finland regarded the EU more as a “regime” to which it would need to 
conform in the area of monetary policy in order to have an influence, whereas 
Swedes were less concerned with this.
In sum, therefore, this case study supports the hypothesis that differences in 
history, institutions, culture, and identity lead to differences in the national 
formulation of EU policies. The differences in their policies were characterised by 
adaptation to some extent by both Finns and Swedes, but Finns displayed a greater 
desire for acceptance by their EU colleagues and made more changes to their pre­
existing policies and positions, whereas Swedes were less concerned about how 
their colleagues perceived them and more committed to maintaining their existing 
policies and positions.
Chapter Five: Relations with Non-EU Neighbours in 
Northern Europe
As the twentieth century drew to a close, both Finnish and Swedish governments 
regarded relations with the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (as well 
as other neighbours in Northern Europe) as being of high priority. In this chapter 
the Finnish and Swedish strategies for relating to these neighbours is considered. 
Particular emphasis is given to the extent and nature of European Union (EU) 
involvement in these relations. Although the focus is on the three Baltic states and 
the integration of the EU into regional cooperation through the Northern 
Dimension Initiative (NDI), attention is also given at times to other non-EU 
Northern European neighbours. These include the Russian Federation (Russia) 
and the broader region, thus encompassing the Arctic and Barents areas as well as 
the littoral region surrounding the Baltic Sea.65
Two Similar Approaches
Both Finland and Sweden prioritised relations with their non-EU Northern 
European neighbours during the time period under consideration, 1995 to 2000. In 
fact, both countries increased the emphasis that they gave to their own Northern 
European region even earlier, especially after the end of the Cold War. As has 
been discussed in chapter three, the onset of the post-Cold War era led to changes 
throughout the international system, but particularly in Europe. These 
transformations inspired scholars such as Max Jakobson (1998) to write about a 
“new” Europe. The disappearance of a sharply bipolar world and the related 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and its ceasing to be a superpower (with the “new” 
Russia lacking the economic and political muscle of its Soviet predecessor) led to 
many new opportunities in the Baltic region.
65 Although mention is occasionally made of non-EU Nordics Iceland and Norway, they are not 
the focus of this chapter.
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There was an increased focus on the Baltic region in particular and the building of 
a new Baltic identity. Whereas the common Nordic identity that Finland and 
Sweden shared with their Nordic neighbours belonged to the “old” Europe, the 
emerging “Baltic project” was a part of the “new” Europe (Waever 1992: 92). The 
region surrounding the Baltic Sea became increasingly important as a region, and 
it seemed likely that seas, including the Baltic Sea, would serve as “the prime 
mythic sources of identity” rather than the borders they once formed (Waever 
1992: 102). This new Baltic identity built upon existing historical and cultural 
links (and even linguistic bonds between the Finnish and Estonian languages) 
between the Nordic and Baltic states. Despite these ties dating back to the time 
when Baltic lands were included along with Finland in the Swedish kingdom, 
there was (as has been discussed in chapter three) a “clear distinction” between 
“the kingdom of Sweden proper” (which included Finland) and the Baltic 
provinces (Kirby 1990: 223).
Despite the fact that they had positions that differed from those of Finland, 
Sweden, and their other Nordic neighbours in a historical perspective, the Baltic 
countries continued to consider themselves in many ways similar to them. 
According to Kirby (1995: 379), “One of the beliefs that helped sustain the 
peoples of the three Baltic states reincorporated into the Soviet Union at the end of 
the Second World War was that they had enjoyed a prewar living standard 
comparable to that of the Finns (and by implication, might also have joined the 
ranks of the affluent welfare states, had they not been dragged into the mire of 
Soviet Communism).” Although there were similarities (as well as differences) 
between Finland and its Baltic neighbours in the postwar years, the gap widened 
considerably during the years of the Cold War (Kirby 1995: 379). Finland was 
clearly in the same league as Sweden, whereas the Baltic countries lagged notably 
behind. There were, however, links between the Baltic and Nordic countries 
(including family members living in the Nordic region and the Estonians’ access 
to Finnish television) that (along with their histories of independence) meant that 
“the indigenous peoples of the Baltic republics were undoubtedly less susceptible 
to such propaganda than those who had experienced Soviet rule from its inception. 
At the very least, they were better able to maintain an alternative vision of life as 
it might be, even if awareness of the superior comforts of their Finnish or Swedish
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neighbours could induce feelings of inferiority or even despair” (Kirby 1995: 
380). Despite the similarities, according to Kirby (1995: 381), “the differences 
between the Baltic and Nordic states far outweigh their similarities.”
The regional integration was on many levels and included many actors. It 
involved not only the Baltic and Nordic states, but also other countries, including 
the Russian Federation. In fact, the Nordic states’ relationship with Russia 
changed in the post-Cold War era as ties were strengthened. Both Finland and 
Sweden were engaged in cooperation with Russia both bilaterally and 
multilaterally. There was even cooperation between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
and the Russian Federation (with which they had been joined in the Soviet Union 
for many decades).
The integration in the Baltic (and even Barents) region after the Cold War fit in 
with a global pattern of an increasing “significance of regions in international 
relations” (Heininen et al. 1995: 72). A vital part of this regionalisation, in the 
Baltic region as elsewhere, was the involvement of sub-national actors, often 
working “from below” outside of “official governmental connections and 
institutions” (Mdttola 1996: 155). Both Finland and Sweden were involved on the 
national level at the same time that subnational actors, such as local governments 
in Finland and Sweden, also became actively involved in regional cooperation.
Even outside of Northern Europe, the area was seen as one of increasing 
importance. As Risto E. J. Penttila (1994: 43) explains, “[T]he Nordic-Baltic area 
forms the only area that directly links Russia with Western Europe.” Crucially, the 
“region is situated between the Western geoeconomic area and the Eastern 
geopolitical one” and is tied to three different “spheres of interest/influence”: the 
Russian, the EU, and the Atlantic (American) spheres (Penttila 1994: 44). For 
Finland and Sweden, their new positions in the post-Cold War system meant a 
required redefinition of roles both in their immediate regional position among 
their Baltic neighbours and in Europe as a whole. According to Mottola (1996: 
152), “From the perspective of influence, the Nordic countries face the 
paradoxical dual challenge of marginalisation and enlargement of their roles, the 
task of coping simultaneously with the status of periphery and centrality”
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(emphasis in original). Although they needed to fight against “the disadvantages 
of being a periphery within the wider Western Europe”, their position in the new 
Northern Europe was one of “centrality” (Mottola 1996: 152).
Finland and Sweden, based on their locations and their attempts to encourage 
cooperation between the Eastern and Western halves of Europe, could perhaps 
have been regarded as bridge-builders, a term attributed to small states that 
attempt to provide cohesion within multilateral institutions or regimes. Allen Sens 
(1996: 90-91) argues that, as bridge builders, “small states . . .  carve out functional 
niches for their foreign policies which buttress their claims to foreign policy 
independence and sovereignty through the exertion of unique international roles. 
By pursuing a strategy of cohesion, a small state can thus choose to promote its 
interests within co-operative international environments and institutions through 
its role as a good international citizen, a selfless contributor, and a helpful fixer. 
This attempt to gain influence and further their security interests through the 
promotion of the values vested in international institutions and their operation 
defines the small-state strategy of acting as a binding agent.” Both Finland and 
Sweden, based on Sens’ (1996) definition, acted at least to some extent as bridge- 
builders in the new Europe.
The changes in the Northern European region were institutionalised through the 
formation of new fora developed to promote regional security and cooperation. 
One of the earliest and most important institutions to emerge was the Council of 
the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), established in Copenhagen in 1992. Finland and 
Sweden were among the founding states, as were Denmark, Estonia, Germany, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, and Russia, as well as the European 
Commission. Finland and Sweden were also founding members of the Council of 
the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR), which was established in Kirkenes, 
Norway in 1993. The co-founders of this organisation also included the European 
Commission as well as Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Russia. In addition, 
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Poland, the United Kingdom (UK), and the 
United States (US) were involved as observers from the Council’s inception. As 
can be seen from the above examples, the European Commission (and thus the 
EU) was involved from an early stage in Northern European regional cooperation,
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and both Finland and Sweden accepted the Commission’s activity in this area. 
These new institutions were vital to both Finland and Sweden and provided the 
framework for increased Finnish and Swedish activism within the Northern 
European region.
Within the EU, Finland and Sweden continued to be active in supporting their 
non-EU neighbours, and even increased their actions to assist them. Magnus 
Ekengren and Bengt Sundelius (1998: 141) argue that Finnish and Swedish EU 
membership allowed for additional policy-coordination between the Nordic 
countries, including in the area of regional cooperation and that “this has paid off 
in the joint emphasis on the plight of the Baltic states and in the Baltic Sea Area 
initiative.”
The changing Europe also set the stage for the enlargement of the EU to countries 
previously precluded from joining. The first to join were Finland and Sweden 
themselves (along with Austria) in 1995. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, as well as 
other Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs), were the next states to 
join the queue. For the CEECs, the first step to EU membership was the signing of 
Europe Agreements, beginning in 1991, when the first such agreement was signed 
with what was then Czechoslovakia. At the Copenhagen European Council in 
June 1993, before Finland and Sweden became members, the EU had already 
committed itself (in principle, although no definite dates were agreed) to 
enlargement to the CEECs.
An example of similar Finnish and Swedish goals is their desire for EU 
enlargement to the three Baltic states. Both Finland and Sweden actively 
supported the accession of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (as well as the other 
applicants) to the EU. Enlargement eastwards was a top issue at the December 
1995 European Council summit in Madrid, which ordered the Commission to 
prepare a document on enlargement that would address the EU’s budget as well as 
agricultural and structural policy. This document, which was known as Agenda 
2000, was presented on 16 July 1997 and recommended that accession 
negotiations should begin initially with six applicant countries (Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia). According to the document,
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(European Commission 1997: 57), “In the light of its analysis, and in accordance 
with their respective merits, the Commission considers that Hungary, Poland, 
Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia could be in a position to satisfy all the 
conditions of membership in the medium term if they maintain and strongly 
sustain their efforts of preparation.” As for Cyprus, “The timetable agreed for 
accession negotiations to start with Cyprus means that they could start before a 
political settlement is reached” (European Commission 1997: 55).
In accordance with the Commission’s suggestion in the Agenda 2000 document, 
the Luxembourg European Council decided in December 1997 to commence 
negotiations with the six countries in the spring of 1998 (European Council 1997). 
Despite the initial prioritisation of these six, the decision was taken at the Helsinki 
European Council in December 1999 to begin negotiations with five other 
countries, including both Latvia and Lithuania as well as Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Slovakia (European Council 1999c). The extension of the negotiations to include 
all three Baltic states may be regarded as a success for Finland and Sweden and a 
further step towards the fulfilment of their goal of enlarging the EU to these three 
states.
The Finnish and Swedish commitments to EU enlargement can be seen in their 
official documents. For Finland, in October 1997, EU enlargement was at least as 
important as EMU, structural and regional policy, and agricultural policy 
(Utrikesutskottet 1997: 1). Earlier the same year (1997), the Swedish government 
ordered seven studies (utredningar) on the consequences of enlargement for 
Sweden and the other countries involved, both those already in the EU and those 
anxious to join. These studies, which were completed at the end of 1997, included 
examinations of the areas of agriculture, environmental policy, security policy, 
and social policy (Regeringen 1998: 10).
Finnish and Swedish policy-makers at the highest levels also indicated their 
support for EU enlargement to include the Baltic states (as well as other applicant 
countries). In 1995, Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen asserted that Finland 
supports “enlargement of the EU to include not only Cyprus and Malta, but also 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic republics” (Lipponen
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1995: 36). Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson expressed the hope in 1996 that 
the EU would welcome its first new members by 2000, although that was not to be 
the case (Persson 1996a: 13). At a conference sponsored by Finland’s largest daily 
newspaper Helsingin Sanomat on 30 July 1997, the former Swedish Prime 
Minister Carl Bildt (who was the leader of the Conservative Party, Moderata 
Samlingspartiet, at the time) voiced his support for Finnish and Swedish 
cooperation on European issues. He cited as an example his pleasure with the fact 
that both Finland and Sweden supported EU enlargement to the Baltic states 
(Pugin 1997).
Finland and Sweden gave their support to EU enlargement despite the likely costs 
and difficulties that it would impose on both the EU as a whole and Finland and 
Sweden in particular. The many differences between the applicant countries and 
the existing EU members were likely to create problems and add costs for those 
already inside the Union. The candidate countries were poorer, had smaller 
economies, had newer and less stable democracies, and had agricultural sectors 
that represented larger percentages of Gross Domestic Products (GDP) 
(Torstensson 1997: 6-7). While only five percent of the population in the EU-15 
was employed in agriculture, the corresponding figure for the applicant countries 
was 22 percent. Indeed, due to the lower GDP in the candidate countries, the EU’s 
GDP per capita would have decreased by 25 percent if all of the candidate 
countries were to join at the same time (Torstensson 1997: 27). In discussing the 
difficulties that could be expected with the accession of the newcomers to the EU, 
Szilvia Dora (1997: 55) argues that “[t]he areas most likely to provoke 
disagreement and where compromises will be necessary are: agriculture, 
trade/tariffs, labour, monetary integration, structural funds, and international 
issues.”
For Finland and Sweden, there were particular costs as well as benefits of EU 
enlargement to the Baltic states, which differed from those for the other EU 
members. There was the increased threat of immigration from Baltic neighbours 
once Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian nationals were free to travel, live, and 
work in the Union. In terms of immigration to Sweden, “Sweden’s geographical 
position primarily favours immigration from the Baltic States. The cultural links
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that Sweden has with these countries, and the institutions that have been built up 
because of the links, may also play a role, even if it is difficult to substantiate how 
important these factors can be for migration” (Lundborg 1997: 65-66). Finland 
faced a similar situation, and indeed had already been the target of migration, 
particularly from Estonia (which had, in fact, been encouraged by Finland), 
although this had declined due to problems in the Finnish labour market 
(Lundborg 1997: 49).
There was also the benefit of easier, less costly trade with Baltic neighbours that 
were already trading partners and were likely to provide their Nordic neighbours 
with even greater opportunities for expanding their markets as well as for 
investment once they were all inside the EU. In addition, there were important 
political benefits for Finland and Sweden from EU enlargement (especially to the 
Baltic states), including increased security in the region. Furthermore, should the 
applicant states not be granted EU membership, their EU neighbours would still 
risk an influx from the East. As a Swedish report asserts, “In a situation in which 
Central and Eastern European economies were not developing in a positive way, 
Sweden, not least, could be affected, for example by streams of refugees and 
security policy instability. . . .  As we have found that economic development in 
the CEECs will probably be better with EU membership, there are thus also 
security policy gains for Sweden and the other EU countries to derive from an 
enlargement” (Torstensson 1997: 35). The Finnish Council of State (1997) also 
argued for the importance of EU enlargement for Finnish security.
Enlargement also formed an important aspect of both countries’ Presidency 
programmes (Finland 1999, Sweden 2000). Finns included enlargement as a 
concern in the plan for their Presidency and hosted the December 1999 summit at 
which the European Council decided to begin enlargement with additional 
countries, including Latvia and Lithuania. The Helsinki decision was seen as a 
success by both Finland and Sweden. In advance of their own Presidency in the 
first half of 2001, the Swedes proclaimed that enlargement would be a key focus 
for their Presidency. Indeed, the Swedish Presidency would focus on the three Es: 
enlargement, employment, and the environment.
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Both Finland and Sweden supported the Baltic countries in a variety of ways, 
which were not always directly related to EU enlargement. Their aid was also 
directed towards other countries in the Baltic Sea region, in addition to Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. Poland and Russia were particularly significant aid 
recipients. For Poland, this included support for EU membership. Often, Finns and 
Swedes cooperated with each other as well as other Nordic countries in 
coordinating their efforts in the region. According to Par Stenback (1995: 26), 
“Operations in northwestern Russia and the Baltic countries are the fastest 
growing forum of Nordic cooperation.” For instance, the Nordic countries 
participated in a Baltic investment programme as well as the Nordic 
Environmental Finance Corporation (NEFCO), which financed projects in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, there were four agencies of the Nordic Council 
in St. Petersburg and the Baltic capitals with funding worth fifty million Danish 
crowns (Stenback 1995: 26). As Leif Pagrotsky (1999), the Swedish Minister for 
Trade (handelsminister) at the time, explains, “The Nordic Information offices are 
. . . [an] essential element of this regional cooperation. Information offices have 
been established in Riga, St. Petersburg, Tallinn and Vilnius. At present they 
organise language courses, administer scholarships and are engaged in various 
types of cultural exchanges. In addition they spread general information about the 
Nordic countries and Nordic cooperation.”
The Finnish and Swedish commitments to their Baltic neighbours and their entire 
Northern European region thus extended beyond investment in these countries. An 
idea of Finnish cooperation with its neighbours can be found in Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (1999), while Regeringen (1998) demonstrates the extent of 
Swedish involvement. As Unto Vesa (1998: 51) argues, the two Nordic 
neighbours “have in many ways, actively and concretely supported not only the 
inclusion of the three Baltic states in the Nordic and West-European cooperation, 
but designed comprehensive programmes in which all Baltic states can 
participate.” Perhaps the most significant of such efforts was the establishment of 
the initiative for a Northern Dimension of the European Union.
Both Finland and Sweden showed support for the EU’s Northern Dimension 
Initiative (NDI), originally a Finnish initiative that became a part of EU policy in
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1997. The NDI was designed to link the EU member states with partner states 
Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, and the Russian Federation 
(Stenlund and Nissinen 1999 and General Affairs Council 2000). Although the 
beginnings of the initiative in Finland may be traced even further back in time, the 
plans for the NDI first gained international recognition in a speech by Lipponen in 
Rovaniemi in 1997 (Lipponen 1997a). The EU first recognised the NDI as an EU 
initiative at the Luxembourg European Council in December 1997 (European 
Council 1997). A year later in Vienna, “[t]he European Council welcomed the 
Interim Report on a Northern Dimension for Policies of the European Union 
submitted by the Commission” (European Council 1998). According to the 
Presidency Conclusions from the Cologne European Council in June 1999, “The 
European Council considers the guidelines adopted by the Council for a ‘Northern 
Dimension’ in European Union policy as a suitable basis for raising the European 
Union’s profile in the region. It welcomes the incoming [Finnish] Presidency’s 
intention of holding a Ministerial Conference on the Northern Dimension on 11 
and 12 November 1999” (European Council 1999b). The Foreign Ministers’ 
“Conference took favourably note of the Community and partner countries 
activities in the region as reported in the inventory presented by the European 
Commission” (Foreign Ministers’ Conference 1999). At the Helsinki European 
Council in December 1999 the invitation was extended to the European 
Commission to prepare an Action Plan on the Northern Dimension (European 
Council 1999c), and the Action Plan was then presented at the Feira European 
Council in June 2000 (European Council 2000).
The NDI was initially billed as requiring no additional funding or institutions; 
rather, it would entail coordinating existing funds, programmes, and institutions 
under the NDI umbrella. The lack of need for further funding was noted by 
prominent Finnish politicians, notably by Lipponen in his 1997 speech in 
Rovaniemi and by Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari in his speech at Chatham 
House in London the same year (Lipponen 1997a, Ahtisaari 1997). According to 
Peter Stenlund and Maija Nissinen (1999: 2), “The Northern Dimension builds 
upon the existing framework of contractual relationships, financial instruments 
and regional organisations. No additional financial instruments are needed in the 
EU for this purpose. The dialogue takes place within the context of the Europe
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Agreements as regards Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, that of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement as regards Russia and that of the 
European Economic Area as regards Norway and Iceland.” They furthermore 
suggest that the Commission should “fully utilis[e]” existing regional bodies for 
“implementation and further development of the Northern Dimension” and that 
“the Northern Dimension itself should not be seen as a new regional initiative” 
(Stenlund and Nissinen 1999: 2). The NDI thus built upon and strengthened pre­
existing projects in which Finland and Sweden already participated and, at the 
same time, gave the EU an increased role in the Northern European region.
The existing programmes, which were brought under the NDI umbrella, included 
Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS); 
Poland, Hungary: assistance for economic restructuring (Pologne, Hongrie: 
assistance a la reconstruction economique, PHARE); and Inter Regional 
(INTERREG) programmes. After the beginning of 2000, the Special Accession 
Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD) and the 
Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession (ISPA) were also included. 
Many of these programmes had their beginnings long before Finland and Sweden 
joined the EU. This demonstrates the pre-existing EU commitment to the Northern 
European region. That commitment, however, was clearly not as extensive 
initially as it was after 1995, and certainly the region did not enjoy such a high 
profile prior to that time.
The NDI also involved regional groupings and international financial institutions 
(IFIs), including regionally-based IFIs. According to the European Commission’s 
NDI website, “The main regional organisations and IFIs active in supporting the 
ND” were the Arctic Council (AC), the Barents Euro Arctic Council (BEAC), the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Nordic 
Investment Bank (NIB), and the Nordic Project Fund (NOPF) as well as the 
CBSS and the NEFCO (European Commission 2001).
Although the Action Plan helped to concretise the NDI (for instance, by 
identifying the CBSS and BEAC as regional actors that would have roles in the 
initiative), the initiative still remained vague. For instance, Vadim Kononenko
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(2000: 1) argues that the NDI, even after the adoption of the Action Plan at the 
Feira European Council in 2000, continued to be “a subject of different and very 
often controversial interpretations” with “far from clear-cut definitions.” Indeed, 
the exact definition of the EU’s Northern Dimension and what the initiative 
entailed on a practical level was vague throughout the time period of this study.
A further vagueness with the NDI was its relationship to the process of EU 
enlargement. According to the EU’s General Affairs Council (1999: 4-5), the NDI 
“can contribute the reinforcement of positive interdependence between the 
European Union, Russia and the other states in the Baltic Sea region, also taking 
into account the enlargement process and thus enhancing security, stability and 
sustainable development in Northern Europe.” Vesa (1998: 60) argues that the 
coordination of existing programmes that the NDI encompasses is “considered to 
be important from the perspective of the forthcoming enlargement as well as for 
the development of closer cooperation between the Union and Russia.”
What was certain was that the NDI gave the EU a leading role in the region and 
that the NDI, despite ambivalence on the part of many member states outside the 
Northern European region, became a part of EU policy. That there was strong 
Finnish support for the initiative was similarly clear. Indeed, Finland’s support 
was evident from its inception, as the initiative was developed by and then 
presented to the EU by Finns. There was also Swedish support for the initiative, as 
is evidenced, for instance, by Pagrotsky’s expression of appreciation to his 
Finnish neighbours for their role in the development of the NDI and 
acknowledgement of its importance for Sweden. According to Pagrotsky (1999), 
“Thanks to our Finnish friends and their initiative, the EU has adopted guidelines 
for implementing what is known as the northern dimension.” Furthermore, 
according to the Swedish government, “For the EU, the Northern Dimension 
opens up new opportunities to promote cooperation, economic growth, a sounder 
environment and cultural exchange in northern Europe. As president of the EU, 
Sweden will strive to further develop the Northern Dimension” (Government of 
Sweden 2000).
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Indeed, as has already been mentioned, both Finland and Sweden cemented their 
support for the Northern Dimension by including it in the programmes for their 
EU Presidencies. According to David Arter (2000: 692), “As early as June 1998, 
at a Nordic prime ministers’ meeting in Malmo, the NDI was identified as one of 
the themes that the Nordic countries would co-operate in promoting with an eye to 
the forthcoming presidencies.” Lee Miles and Bengt Sundelius (2000: 44) assert 
that “the Swedish government, like its Finnish counterpart, sees that one of the 
main ‘cooperative security’ aims of any ND policy is to keep key non-EU states, 
such as Russia and Norway, involved in EU policy affecting the region, especially 
after the Commission explicitly recognised” the importance of Northern Europe in 
connecting the EU with Russia.
The NDI, however, was not the only action that the EU undertook (with the 
support of Finland and Sweden) to increase cooperation between the EU and its 
neighbours in Northern Europe. In June 1999, at the Cologne European Council, 
the EU’s formal commitment to the Northern European region was formally 
extended with the adoption of the common strategy on Russia (European Council 
1999a and European Council 1999b). According to Miles and Sundelius (2000: 
45), the “‘common strategy’ . . . complements the more general ‘Northern 
Dimension’ initiative.” This strategy, like the NDI, received Swedish as well as 
Finnish support.
Finland and Sweden thus shared many common goals in their relations with their 
non-EU Northern European neighbours. Both gave increased emphasis to their 
immediate surroundings in the post-Cold War era, including during the time 
period between 1995 and 2000. Both participated in and showed support for 
bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation, including the EU’s Northern 
Dimension Initiative. Both were also supportive of EU involvement in the region 
through the EU’s NDI as well as through EU enlargement to the Baltic states.
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Two Different Approaches
Despite the many similarities in Finnish and Swedish approaches to relations with 
non-EU Northern European neighbours, there were also crucial differences. For 
instance, although their geopolitical roles in the new Europe bore many 
similarities, Finland’s long border with Russia continued to play a significant role, 
particularly as the Finnish-Russian border formed “one of the main fracture zones 
between the global postmaterial community and the modem states” (Ries 1999:
10). For Sweden, the historical experience of having had great power status, 
international recognition, and regional leadership still had an impact. There were 
political motivations for continuing to try to be and be seen as a regional leader. 
According to Miles and Sundelius (2000: 34), “From a political perspective, 
Sweden has an interest in portraying itself as a nation-state with substantial 
regional influence, committed to coordination with neighbouring states. This 
image strengthens indirectly the Swedish government’s negotiating hand in 
European organizations and further projects the country’s voice on the world 
stage.”
Although Finland and Sweden both supported EU enlargement to the Baltic states 
(Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), the tactics they employed differed. Notably, 
whereas both countries initially argued for the commencement of accession 
negotiations with all three countries at the same time, Finland changed its position 
to agree with the approach preferred by the European Commission and presented 
in its Agenda 2000 document: fast-tracking Estonia but not Latvia and Lithuania 
initially. The differences between the approach adopted by Finland and that 
followed by Sweden (as well as Denmark) are also noted by authors including 
Esko Antola (1999) and Toby Archer and Luca Mattiotti (2000).
An analysis of official Finnish documents and speeches clearly demonstrates the 
change in the Finnish position. Finland initially supported the Swedish (and 
Danish) strategy of presenting a united Nordic front in support of commencing EU 
accession negotiations with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania at the same time. It was 
even initially viewed as a security concern for Finland. According to the Finnish
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Council of State (1997: 21), “A particularly important security goal for Finland is 
the accession of the Baltic States to EU membership. Finland is supporting the 
Baltic States’ efforts to meet the criteria for membership. In common with 
Sweden and Denmark, Finland has taken the view that negotiations should 
commence with all applicants for membership at the same time so as not to 
endanger the stability-enhancing effect of enlargement.”
On 5 September 1997, Lipponen announced the change in the Finnish position: 
Finland would now support the Commission’s proposal to fast-track only six 
countries (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia). 
Lipponen argued that the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) 
should not be treated as one group, but rather that Estonia should be allowed to 
begin negotiations and not be held back by Latvia and Lithuania. Lipponen further 
asserted, “I would hope that this would also be crystal clear in our neighbouring 
country to the west,” referring, of course, to Sweden (Cited in Rautio 1997).66
In fact, the Finns’ decision to change their position did create tensions between 
Finnish and Swedish policy-makers. As is discussed below, “From an early stage 
the Swedes preferred that a joint policy between the three existing Nordic EU 
member states be followed, based on ensuring that the EU’s Agenda 2000 
programme treated the three Baltic Republics similarly and as a de facto convoy 
of applicants. This policy came unstuck when the Finns broke ranks and 
championed Estonia’s sole promotion into the fast-track of EU entry -- to the 
consternation of the Swedish Foreign Ministry” (Miles and Sundelius 2000: 43).
At a conference organised by Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat in Helsinki 
on 9 October 1997, Lipponen again stated his support for the Commission’s 
proposal and expressed his hope that Estonia’s early membership in the EU would 
“pave the way” for Latvian and Lithuanian membership (Kairisalo 1998: 142). 
The Finns thus, despite modifying their position, continued to support Latvian and 
Lithuanian EU membership, even though they no longer pushed for these 
countries to join the “fast track.” Finland’s then Minister for Foreign Affairs,
66 Translation of: “Toivoisin ettd tdmd kirkastuisi myos lantisessd naapurimaassamme
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Taija Halonen, suggested to Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Saudargas that 
the EU should re-evaluate Lithuania’s situation on a yearly basis to determine 
when it would be ready for membership (Kairisalo 1998: 143). When Latvian 
President Guntis Ulmanis visited Finland in November 1997, Ahtisaari promised 
Finland’s support for Latvia’s application to join the EU (Kairisalo 1998: 145).
By the end of October 1997, the fast-tracking of accession negotiations for 
Estonia but not for Latvia and Lithuania had become a definite part of Finnish EU 
policy. The Finnish Foreign Affairs Committee (Ulkoasiainvaliokunta, or 
Utrikesutskottet) argued in its 31 October 1997 report that it was important that at 
least one Baltic state was included in the next EU enlargement and that the EU 
should not treat all the three Baltic republics as a group, but rather should analyse 
each country’s individual situation (Utrikesutskottet 1997: 3).
The changing Finnish approach was in contrast to the consistency of Swedish 
policy. Even after the publication of the Agenda 2000 document, the Swedes 
openly argued that negotiations with the three Baltic countries should commence 
at the same time, despite the fact that this Swedish approach contradicted that of 
the Commission. In a document responding to the Commission’s Agenda 2000 
document and in advance of the decision taken at the Luxembourg European 
Council, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet, or 
MFA) argued, “How the decision in Luxembourg is taken will influence the 
relationship between Europe’s countries for a long time to come. Sweden supports 
a common start for the negotiations with all the candidate countries that fulfil the 
Copenhagen criteria for a democratic state, in other words, at the present moment, 
all countries except Slovakia” (Utrikesdepartementet 1997: 3)67
In the same document, the Swedes comment specifically on how and why their 
position differs from that of the Commission: “Sweden shares in many respects 
the Commission’s judgements of the individual countries, but it is not possible to
67 Translation of: “Hur beslutet i Luxembourg utformas kommer att paverkas forhallandet mellan 
Europas lander for en lang tidframdver. Sverige forordar en gemensam forhandlingsstart for alia 
kandidatlander som uppfyller Kopenhamnskriteria for en demokratisk stat, dv.s. i dagslaget alia 
utom Slovakien.”
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ignore that these are in many respects statistical. The development in many 
candidate countries is progressing rapidly and within a short time the ranking of 
the countries may change. That must be weighed into the decisions, which will 
beone of the most important that the union has ever taken” (Utrikesdepartementet 
1997: 3-4).68 The Swedes criticised the Commission’s analysis of Latvia, which 
they argued was “too statistical and often lacks a perspective of the future. We 
have argued that Latvia is in the middle of a phase of dynamic development” 
(Utrikesdepartementet 1997: 26).69 Their criticisms of the Commission’s position 
on Lithuania were similar. In particular, they stressed, “Sweden does not believe 
that the Commission has shown enough consideration of the fact that Lithuania is 
in the middle of a dynamic development with a high rate of change in the legal 
system, administration and business” (Utrikesdepartementet 1997: 27).70
The Swedes also emphasised the undesirable consequences that they feared would 
be the result of not beginning negotiations with all three Baltic countries (and the 
others fulfilling the democratic criteria viewed as essential by the Swedes) at the 
same time. According to the MFA, “An exclusion can lead to a negative reaction 
in the countries that are not invited, which can strengthen Eurosceptical forces and 
increase the risk of backlashes in the reform process. In the economic area there is 
a definite risk that foreign investors will prioritise those countries with which the 
Commission recommends that negotiations should begin, with the consequence 
that those countries not included in this group would become even more 
disadvantaged” (Utrikesdepartementet 1997: 4).71 Yet, the Swedes also stressed 
that commencing negotiations with all countries at the same time would not
68 Translation of: “Sverige delar i manga avseenden kommissionens beddmningar av de enskilda 
landerna, men det gar inte att bortse fran att dessa i manga avseenden dr statistiska. Utvecklingen 
i manga kandidatlander gdr snabbt framdt och pd kort tid kan det inbdrdes rangordningen mellan 
landerna forandras. Detta maste vdgas in i beslutet, som blir ett av de viktigaste unionen hittills 
har fattat.”
69 Translation of: “alltfor statistisk och ofta saknar framtidsperspektiv. Vi har framhdllit att 
Lettland dr inne i en dynamisk utvecklingsfas
70 Translation of: “Sverige anser inte att kommissionen har beaktat tillrdckligt att Litauen dr inne i 
en mycket dynamisk utveckling med hog omvandlingstakt av rattssystem, administration och 
ndringsliv.”
71 Translation of: “Ett uteslutande kan framkalla en negativ reaktion hos de lander som inte 
inbjuds, vilket kan starka euroskeptiska krafter och oka risken for bakslag i reformprocessen. Pd 
det ekonomiska omradet finns en klar risk for att utlandska investerare prioriterar de lander med 
vilka kommissionen rekommenderar att forhandlingar ska inledas, med konsekvensen att de lander 
som inte ingdr i denna grupp blir dn mer utsatta."
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necessarily need to mean that they would all join the EU at the same time 
(Utrikesdepartementet 1997: 4).
In contrast to the Finns, therefore, the Swedes not only continued with their initial 
policies once they were seen to differ from those of the Commission, but also 
openly criticised the Commission’s analyses of Latvia and Lithuania. Although 
the decision was taken at Luxembourg to follow the Commission’s suggestion 
(which Finland supported), the Swedes did not view this as a failure because the 
decision was taken to open preliminary discussions with the five states not fast- 
tracked (Regeringen 1998: 10).72 The decision had even less importance after the 
Helsinki European Council decided in December 1999 to commence accession 
negotiations with additional countries, including Latvia and Lithuania. Despite 
this, the Finnish and Swedish tactics employed in the run-up to the Luxembourg 
European Council did demonstrate significant differences, particularly in the 
extent to which they were prepared to alter their own positions in order to fit in 
with the EU mainstream.
The Finns also distinguished themselves from their Swedish neighbours by taking 
the lead with the initiative on a Northern Dimension for the EU and even 
discussing it with then Commission President Jacques Santer before its official 
launch. As Arter (2000: 689) notes, “Correspondence between Lipponen and . . . 
Santer, in spring 1997, antedated the Rovaniemi launch and Brussels was fully 
consulted at the highest level from a very early stage.” Although “doubts were 
expressed about the need for the Commission to bolster its efforts in Northern 
Europe, and there was the latent sense that the NDI represented an implicit 
criticism of existing EU activities in the region” (Arter 2000: 689), there was 
sufficient support for Finland to proceed with the initiative’s development and 
launch. Finland, in fact, actively marketed the NDI through “roadshows” in 
Moscow and Helsinki in 1998 (Arter 2000: 690).
Furthermore, the role that the NDI played in Finnish regional and EU policies was 
different from that which it played for Swedish policies. Finnish development of
72 This is also supported by an interview with Lars Nilsson and Ola Pihlblad on 11 August 1998.
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the NDI may be regarded as an example of Finland’s “customising” of the EU, a 
term set out by Hanna Ojanen (1999). According to Ojanen (1999), Finland used 
the NDI to “customise” the Union to its own preferences. She explains, “Finland’s 
EU, then, looks in essence like Finland. It furthers Finnish goals and values. 
Should the Union’s policies deviate from these, Finland aims at getting 
recognition for its particular features” (Ojanen 1999: 14). She writes, “Such 
customising has served to bring the Finnish people closer to the Union: it 
increases legitimacy. Second, by presenting an initiative of this magnitude, 
Finland has also strengthened its image as an active and constructive member state 
-  something that it may be able to rely on in future bargaining” (Ojanen 1999:15).
Although, as mentioned above, Sweden eventually supported the NDI and 
included it in its Presidency programme, the Swedish reaction was initially far 
from supportive. According to Arter (2000: 687), “From the outset, the NDI 
encountered suspicion and informal opposition from the two Nordic EU states of 
Denmark and Sweden.” He argues that “[t]he Danes and Swedes felt they had not 
been properly consulted and residual prejudices surfaced” (Arter 2000: 687). Arter 
(2000: 687) explains, “In Denmark and particularly Sweden, the initial response to 
the NDI was generally lukewarm. It was obvious from informal conversations 
along the corridors of the Rovaniemi conference that the Swedes felt they had not 
been properly consulted and that the NDI should have been prepared in the Nordic 
Council. They were possibly irritated too by the fact that later in the autumn of 
1997, the praesidium of the Nordic Council passed a resolution -- drafted by Finn 
Peter Stenlund — supporting the NDI. In any event, whilst Swedish officials 
stressed the significance of regional co-operation, noted the existence of an 
institutional framework for promoting it in the Baltic and Barents areas, and 
intermittently referred to the northern dimension, they did not connect any of this 
to the Finnish initiative.”
Whereas the Finns prioritised the NDI as their main method of cooperation in 
Northern Europe, the Swedes concentrated on other fora, which were often 
included under the NDI umbrella, rather than focusing on the NDI itself. As 
Ekengren and Sundelius (1998: 142) write, “One Swedish objective is to draw 
into the region the official interests of the larger European partners, as well as the
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US. Prime Minister Persson in August 1996 visited the White House as a US 
show of support for the Swedish leadership role in the Baltic Sea Area.” Similarly, 
Miles and Sundelius (2000: 39) point out that a “notable and high-profile strategy 
of the Goran Persson government was to engage the USA in the development of 
this [Baltic] subregion.”
The example of the Swedish desire to include the US was just one instance of 
Swedish eagerness to bring partners from outside Europe into cooperation within 
the region. In fact, Miles and Sundelius (2000: 35) argue that “Swedish policy has 
operated at many levels, including bilateral and multilateral approaches . . . and 
using most of the institutional mechanisms presently on offer.” Ojanen (2000) 
presents a similar argument. She explains that “Sweden seems to work more 
through different channels [than Finland does], ‘multiorganisationally’ . . . which 
makes it necessary to think more about the ways in which organisations differ and 
relate to each other, instead of trying to make the EU an omnipotent, all- 
embracing organisation” (Ojanen 2000: 24). Helena Jaderblom emphasises that, in 
addition to participation in the EU, regional involvement was a high priority for 
Sweden in the 1990s. The Nordic Council continued to be as important for 
Sweden even after EU membership, as did other forms of cooperation in the Baltic
TXSea region and Europe more broadly, including the Council of Europe.
An important element of Swedish support for the Northern European and, 
particularly, the Baltic Sea region was the “Baltic Billion Fund” 
(Ostersjomiljarden), a fund begun with the allotment of one billion SEK in 1996 
and then supplemented with an additional billion in 1998. Yet, this support was 
neither within the context of the EU’s NDI nor in direct cooperation with Nordic 
neighbours. Indeed, Miles and Sundelius (2000: 38) argue, “The economic 
objective of this bilateral support is, in many ways, to increase Swedish, as 
opposed to Nordic, influence in the Baltic Sea region and, in particular, to give the 
country’s firms a hand in securing investment opportunities in the face of 
competition from other Nordic and Western rivals.”
73 Interview with Helena Jaderblom on 26 August 1999.
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Although the Swedish approach to cooperation in the Baltic and Barents regions 
was originally more bilateral, after Persson assumed the office of Prime Minister 
in 1996, the Swedes put greater emphasis on working multilaterally as well. 
According to Miles and Sundelius (2000: 40), “Swedish Baltic policy is more 
‘balanced’ since 1996, with Sweden’s well-established bilateral programmes 
supplemented by a gradually more prominent role in key multilateral 
organizations associated with the Baltic Sea.”
The CBSS was a particularly important organisation for the Swedes. According to 
Miles and Sundelius (2000: 40), “The CBSS extensive action programmes for the 
Baltic Sea region were largely the result of negotiations shaped during the 
Swedish Presidency (1995-96) [of the CBSS] and the Swedes were influential 
during the high profile summit held in Visby in May 1996 . . . The Swedes used 
their period holding the Presidency [of the CBSS] to ensure that the agenda of the 
CBSS was influenced by their priorities already shaping Sweden’s bilateral 
programmes. Indeed, it is striking that the so-called ‘Visby process’ mirrored 
many of the priorities emphasized in Swedish domestic programmes. The ‘Baltic 
21 ’ (Agenda 21 for the Baltic Sea region) programme, for instance, included many 
familiar themes, such as sustainable development, close to Swedish hearts. 
Furthermore, at Visby, the Swedish Prime Minister was instructed to ensure the 
coordination of Baltic cooperation through a special office -- the Baltic Sea States 
Support Group -- which was the embryo for the CBSS Secretariat established in 
Stockholm in 1998.”
Swedish participation in the CBSS also meshed with the Swedish desire discussed 
above to cooperate with the United States because, according to Miles and 
Sundelius (2000: 41), “the US has been generally in favour of the CBSS in 
particular and, thus, Sweden can operate with American approval and support. 
Persson’s ‘Baltic Offensive’ was launched after securing American blessing and 
the CBSS has avoided embroilment in many of the divisions associated with 
NATO and Russia.”
The CBSS, however, was not the only organisation in which Swedes invested. As 
Miles and Sundelius (2000: 40) point out, “The Swedes have also tried to play a
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role on the [BEAC] . . . and, under the Swedish chairmanship (1997), helped to 
push forward negotiations on, amongst other things, policy towards nuclear safety, 
the management of nuclear waste and on the efficient use of energy.”
The EU can also be seen in the context of Sweden’s multilateral activity as one of 
many groupings where Swedes worked and attempted to achieve regional 
influence. Miles and Sundelius (2000: 41-42) argue that “the Swedes have been 
interested for a long time in utilizing, where possible, the European Union, in 
order to aid the democratic and economic reform processes taking place in the 
Baltic rim states. On top of its growing bilateral programmes, Sweden has also 
contributed to EU programmes for Eastern Europe — TACIS and PHARE — 
amounting to SEK 1.2 billion up to and including 1998.” These EU programmes 
were actually in many ways similar to existing Swedish bilateral programmes. 
According to Miles and Sundelius (2000: 42), “Like Sweden’s smaller bilateral 
programmes, these EU funds were largely focused on aiding the Baltic Republics 
(initially) and (later) directed at institution-building in the Baltic Rim states more 
generally in order to support ongoing reforms.”
The Swedish desire to focus on a variety of multilateral and bilateral forms of 
cooperation rather than concentrating on giving the EU the leading role is 
connected to the Swedish desire to listen to public opinion. As Miles and 
Sundelius (2000: 40) write, “An active role in the Baltic is less controversial back 
home with the electorate than is the country’s membership in the European 
Union.” Such a role also “carve[s] out Persson’s individual contribution as 
Swedish premier” and “reaffirm[s] Sweden’s role as a leading player in the Baltic 
Sea” (Miles and Sundelius 2000: 40).
As noted above, Finns, like Swedes, were active in regional organisations such as 
the CBSS and the BEAR in addition to the EU. However, whereas the Swedes 
wished to make these groupings, and particularly the CBSS, primary, Finns used 
them as marketing arenas, where they could promote the NDI, and then included 
them under the ND umbrella. According to Arter (2000: 693), “[T]he new 
regional institutions, such as the BEAR and the CBSS, afforded Finland valuable 
channels for agenda-setting and alliance-building . . . Indeed, as early as
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September 1994, the 12-month chairmanship of the BEAR gave Finland an 
opportunity of raising its profile in relation to northern issues, as well as 
influencing the content of co-operation in the region and increasing the EU’s 
interest in Barents’ questions. Brussels in short was by no means the only 
negotiating site for the Finns in promoting the NDI, especially as the EU was 
represented on both the BEAR and the CBSS.”
Furthermore, as has been discussed above, the EU’s Northern European policy 
was supplemented in 1999 with the common strategy on Russia (European 
Council 1999a). This policy, unlike the NDI, arguably received more Swedish 
than Finnish support initially. Miles and Sundelius (2000: 45) assert that the 
common strategy “is of particular interest to the Swedish government since it has 
built an extensive array of bilateral contact and developmental cooperation with 
the evolving Russian Federation dating back to 1991.” They assert that Swedish 
bilateral cooperation with Russia “has intensified considerably in recent years 
with, for example, the Persson government adopting a new country strategy for 
development cooperation with Russia (1999-2001) as recently as October 1999” 
(Miles and Sundelius 2000: 46). As Miles and Sundelius (2000: 46) argue, 
however, “What is of particular interest is the fact that Sweden’s important 
relationship with Russia has been formally recognised by the Union. The Persson 
government has been given the task of further cementing the new CFSP ‘common 
strategy’ through its extensively developed cooperation with the Russians.”
Despite Sweden’s role in the common strategy on Russia, according to Miles and 
Sundelius (2000: 47), “The irony is that it has been, at least initially, the Finns, 
rather than the Swedes, who have been better so far in projecting themselves on 
Baltic questions inside the Union and thus, they have (so far) benefited most from 
playing the EU-Baltic card.” It seems that the Swedes were eager to be leaders 
rather than to follow the Finnish lead, and this may help explain the initial 
Swedish hesitance, particularly regarding the NDI. Miles and Sundelius (2000: 
47-48) share this view: “For this reason, the Persson government will also seek to 
maintain its high profile in other Baltic forums, like the CBSS. Furthermore, it 
will also stress Sweden’s excellent bilateral relationship with Russia as being of 
value to the entire Union.”
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In fact, the title of Miles and Sundelius’ (2000) article “‘EU Icing on a Baltic 
Cake’: Swedish Policy towards the Baltic Sea and EU Northern Dimensions” 
appropriately characterises the Swedish attitude towards cooperation with non-EU 
Northern European neighbours. For the Swedes, the base was clearly Baltic, with 
the CBSS having a leading role, while the EU merely provided the icing to top off 
the pre-existing “cake” of long-established Swedish bilateral and multilateral 
regional cooperation. For Finns, on the other hand, the EU lay at the heart of 
cooperation within the Northern European region.
There were indeed significant differences between Finnish and Swedish EU 
policies regarding relations with their non-EU Northern European neighbours. In 
terms of EU enlargement to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, although both Finland 
and Sweden initially supported starting accession negotiations with all three 
countries at the same time, Finland changed its position to fall in line with the 
Commission’s wish to fast-track Estonia but not Latvia and Lithuania. There were 
also differences between their approaches to the EU’s Northern Dimension 
Initiative. Finland, which formulated the initiative, prioritised it and along with it 
a high profile role for the EU in Northern Europe, whereas the Swedish emphasis 
was on regional institutions (particularly the CBSS, which was actually 
incorporated into the NDI) and other forms of bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation.
Analysis and Conclusion
This policy area differs from the previous one (EMU) in that here there were more 
obvious similarities between Finnish and Swedish policies than was the case with 
EMU. Both Finland and Sweden supported regional cooperation in Northern 
Europe even before they joined the EU. Once they were members, both adopted 
an active role in promoting regional cooperation. Both were among the strongest 
supporters of EU enlargement to the Baltic states and included the Northern 
Dimension Initiative in their EU Presidency plans. It is therefore particularly 
interesting to note differences in this area and to observe their significance.
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As with the previous case study, economic factors cannot fully explain the 
differences in their approaches. For instance, both countries had economic 
interests in the Baltic states, and the economic costs and benefits of EU 
enlargement to include the three countries were similar. In addition, the NDI had 
positive implications for both Finland and Sweden. Indeed, particularly from an 
economic sense, there was nothing for either country to lose by supporting and 
furthering the development of the NDI. Andrew Moravcsik’s (1998) liberal 
intergovemmentalist approach therefore fails to explain the divergences between 
Finnish and Swedish policies in this area. Although economic interest is a crucial 
component of his explanation of member states’ policy formulation, there are no 
indications that this was at play in this instance. His approach does not leave much 
space for HICI, which again were vital in explaining the differences between the 
Finnish and Swedish approaches.
Furthermore, economic factors are not completely excluded from the current 
model. As was discussed in chapter two, countries’ economic historical 
experiences and economic institutions are considered to be part of their overall 
historical experiences and institutions, which may in turn shape national identity 
and culture and thereby affect policy formation. Thus, the argument here is not 
that economic interests have no role in explaining Finnish and Swedish 
approaches in this policy area. Rather, the argument is that they alone are not the 
primary explanatory factors and that it is instead the HICI factors that must be 
considered in order to understand Finnish and Swedish policy formulation.
Similarly, a sectoral analysis is also incapable of explaining differences between 
the two countries in this area. Indeed, Christine Ingebritsen (1998), who argues in 
support of such an approach, views Finland and Sweden as practically identical. 
However, she does argue that a sectoral analysis is not as relevant when security 
concerns dominate, and one might think that security concerns would dictate in 
this area. Yet, the Finnish deviation from the common Nordic plan to support the 
commencement of EU accession negotiations for the three Baltic republics at the 
same time demonstrated their willingness to alter their pre-existing position, even 
when security concerns were involved. The Finnish Council of State (1997)
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clearly indicated that beginning negotiations with all three states together was 
perceived as important for Finnish security. The security concerns for Finland 
would be at least as strong as for Sweden, so certainly the difference between 
them cannot be explained by security concerns alone. Thus, once again, the 
arguments of Moravcsik (1998) and Ingebritsen (1998) are not able to explain the 
differences between the formulation of Finnish and Swedish policies in this area.
Even the one instance discussed in this chapter that might seem to present an 
argument for the primacy of economic interests, Finland’s decision to join with 
Commission in supporting only Estonia of the three Baltic states for the fast-track 
to membership in 1997, is not convincing. Although Finns clearly had stronger 
economic interests in Estonia than in Latvia and Lithuania, their decision to agree 
with the Commission was based more on a pragmatic decision not to pursue an 
objective that was unlikely to succeed than on an economic one to support the 
country where Finland had the strongest economic ties. The argument of the 
Finnish Foreign Affairs Committee (Utrikesutskottet 1997: 3) that it was 
important that at least one of the three Baltic states be included in the first group is 
indicative of this Finnish pragmatism and belief that it was better to ensure that at 
least one Baltic state would be fast-tracked rather than risking that none of them 
would be. Such a position is also in keeping with Finland’s general desire to be 
regarded as a mainstream EU member and to change its pre-existing positions to 
fall into line with those of EU colleagues.
Thus, rather than demonstrating the primacy of economic interests, the decision 
on whether or not to fast-track Latvia and Lithuania in 1997 demonstrates the 
importance of HICI factors. As in other areas, Finnish policy-makers were more 
concerned than Swedish policy-makers with following the EU mainstream. Here 
again, a weaker Finnish national self-confidence and less certain Western 
European identity, which were results of differing historical experiences, led to a 
greater Finnish concern with pleasing their EU colleagues. Sweden, on the other 
hand, continued to maintain its stand that enlargement negotiations should begin 
with all three Baltic countries at the same time. The Swedish approach was 
particularly striking in that Sweden openly criticised the Commission’s analyses 
of Latvia and Lithuania (giving political as well as economic reasons), a clear
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demonstration of the self-confidence of the Swedes and their willingness to 
deviate from the EU mainstream that goes beyond a purely economic motivation.
The Finnish desire not to antagonise EU colleagues was also demonstrated by the 
Finns’ work with the EU on the NDI since before the initiative’s presentation. 
This again demonstrates Finland’s desire to be seen as a good partner as well as 
Finnish pragmatism in not pursuing an initiative with no future or one that was 
likely to antagonise EU colleagues. Swedes, on the other hand, were more willing 
to risk opposing the EU and to maintain pre-existing positions.
The fact that Sweden was initially reluctant to demonstrate support for the NDI 
reinforces the argument for a Swedish desire to play a leading role whenever 
possible. Swedes displayed greater national self-confidence in terms of both EU 
enlargement and the NDI and prioritised arenas such as the CBSS where Sweden 
already had a leading role. The difference between this and the Finnish approach 
is a logical consequence of Sweden’s historical experiences as a great power and a 
model welfare state. Furthermore, here again the Swedish desire to consider 
public opinion can be seen, as these issues of regional cooperation were ones that 
were supported by the public. The Finnish hierarchical decision-making culture, 
itself shaped by Finnish history and institutions, was also visible again, as, for 
instance, Finland altered its position on enlargement.
Therefore, this case study provides additional support for the importance of HICI. 
Existing theoretical approaches, such as those of Moravcsik (1998) and 
Ingebritsen (1998), on the other hand, are not able to explain the differences 
between the Finnish and Swedish cases. Furthermore, there are signs of adaptation 
in this policy area. Finland clearly adapted to the EU by changing its position on 
EU enlargement to Latvia and Lithuania. In terms of the NDI, there were also 
signs of adaptation, as Finland tried to “customise” its initiative to fit EU needs 
and please EU colleagues. Sweden also adapted, notably by becoming more 
positive to the NDI than it was initially. Yet, the Finnish adaptation was again 
more along the lines of conforming to a regime. The Swedes adapted when it 
suited their needs with less regard for the reactions of their EU colleagues than 
was the case with the Finns.
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Chapter Six: Access to Documents
Of the three case studies, this third and final one is where one might expect to find 
the greatest similarities between Finland and Sweden. The focus of this chapter is 
on access to documents, although the related issue of transparency in the decision­
making process is also touched upon. The terms “openness” and “transparency” 
are used largely interchangeably here, as they are in much of the literature and 
even official documents, although Tony Bunyan (1999) distinguishes between the 
two terms. He argues that openness “describes the citizen’s right of access to 
documents,” whereas transparency is “used, in the EU [European Union] context, 
to mean the ‘transparency’ of the decision-making process -- that it should be 
clear who makes decisions, when, and where” (Bunyan 1999: xi).
Two Similar Approaches
From a historical perspective, both Finland and Sweden had traditions of 
openness, which developed long before they joined the EU. In particular, the 
publicity principle, julkisuusperiaate in Finnish or offentlighetsprincipen in 
Swedish, guaranteeing public access to official documents, has a long history in 
both countries. This tradition dates back at least to 1766, when the Freedom o f the 
Press Act (Tryckfrihetsforordning) was passed in Sweden, which at the time (as 
has been discussed in chapter three) included Finland as well. Emily von Sydow 
(1999: 147), however, argues that the policy of openness “has its roots in Martin 
Luther’s translation of the Bible from the elite’s Latin to the general public’s 
mother tongue.”74
Although Finland left the Swedish realm to become part of the Russian empire in 
1809 (as noted in chapter three), Sweden changed as much if not more than 
Finland. There were alterations in the area of openness and the related area of 
freedom of the press in both countries in the nineteenth century. In Sweden, 
according to David Kirby (1995: 83), “The freedom of the press enshrined in the
74 Translation of: “har sina rotter i Martin Luthers bibeldversdttning jr&n elitens latin till 
allmogens modersmdl.”
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Swedish constitution was curbed in 1812, an unconstitutional measure which the 
estates nonetheless accepted for fear that Bemadotte might quit the country if his 
wish were not obeyed.” In Finland, newspapers were suppressed, including J. V. 
Snellman’s Swedish-language paper Saima in 1846 and the Finnish-language 
Kanava in 1847 (Kirby 1995: 113). The situation did, however, improve 
somewhat after a December 1904 decree “relaxed the censorship throughout the 
[Russian] empire,” including Finland (Kirby 1995: 227).
Despite these constraints and the separation of Finland from Sweden in 1809, 
openness remained an important legal and political tradition in both countries. 
During the time that Finland was a Grand Duchy in the Russian empire, Snellman 
wrote in 1862, “If our country shall have a parliament, then it must have the 
freedom of the press” (Cited in Manninen 1991: 81, emphasis in original). After 
declaring its independence, Finland re-enacted its Freedom o f the Press Act 
(Painovapauslaki) (1/1919). As Sami Manninen (1991: 82) explains, “The 
Freedom of the Press Act was confirmed on January 4, 1919, by the regent of the 
independent Finland, a nation that had seceded from the stage body of Russia. The 
new Parliament that had convened after elections held during the same spring 
enacted the Constitution Act [Suomen Hallitusmuoto] (94/1919). In this act, a 
chapter on civil rights corresponding to the Basic Law on Civil Liberties included 
a provision guaranteeing the freedom o f speech and o f the press to the citizens 
(CA, Art. 10)” (emphasis in original).
Both countries made changes to their legislation on openness in the second half of 
the twentieth century. On 9 February 1951, Finland issued a new law, the Act on 
Access to Documents in the Public Authorities {Laid, yleisen asiakirjain 
julkisuudesta) (83/1951). On 9 April 1998 the Finnish government submitted bill 
HE 30/1998 (Bill for a New Act on Open Government and for Certain Related 
Legislation, or Laiksi viranomaisten toiminnan julkisuudesta ja  siihen liittyviksi 
laeiksi) to the Eduskunta regarding new legislation on openness. The new 
legislation, known as the Finnish Act on Openness o f Government (Laki 
viranomaisten toiminnan julkisuudesta), Law 621/99, stemmed from the 1995 
“basic rights” reform of the Finnish Constitution, which made public access to 
documents a basic right (Wallin 1999: 2). According to Anna-Riitta Wallin of the
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Finnish Ministry of Justice (Oikeusministerid), (1999: 2), “The general objectives 
of the bill are to enhance, intensify and expand the realisation of the principle of 
openness in the activities of the authorities, to increase the transparency of 
preparatory works, to promote access and good practice in information 
management, to clarify the delimitation of secret documents, and to lay down a 
framework for a uniform regulation of inter-authority transfers of information.”
The Swedish legislation on openness was updated as part of the constitutional 
revisions that took place in 1975. New legislation was then introduced in 
connection with Sweden’s entry into the European Union. According to 
Statskontoret (2000: 9), “As an expression of the parliament’s and the 
government’s desire for the greatest possible openness to be applied when Sweden 
became a member [of the EU] the recommendations on foreign policy secrecy in 
the secrecy legislation were changed. With that change a clear right to damages 
was introduced, which meant a presumption of openness.”75 These changes were 
included in the government’s 1994 bill that focused on legislation relating to 
secrecy (Regeringen 1994), although the earlier bill relating to broader 
constitutional changes also touched upon issues relating to the Freedom o f the 
Press Act (Regeringen 1993).
In both Finland and Sweden the provisions for openness between 1995 and 2000 
ensured public access to documents held by governmental ministries. This 
included documents sent to ministries, as well as those created by them. For 
instance, much to the dismay and shock of then Commission President Jacques 
Santer, a critical letter that he had written to Swedish Prime Minister Goran 
Persson was made available to the public under the Swedish offentlighetsprincip 
(cf. Goteborgs-Posten 1999). Furthermore, the term “documents” was defined 
broadly and included not only printed papers but also records in audio or other 
forms. Moreover, as was noted above in reference to Finland, access to 
information was considered to be a basic right; this was the case in Sweden as
75 Translation of: “Som ett uttryck for riksdagens och regeringens vilja att storsta mdjligen 
oppenhet skulle tilldmpas ndr Sverige blev medlem tindrades foreskriften om utrikessekretess i 
sekretesslagen. Darmed infordes ett enhetlig rakt skaderekvisit vilket innebar en presumtion for 
qffentlighet
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well as in Finland. Although this right of access was initially limited to Finnish 
citizens in Finland, it applied to foreigners as well after the passage of Law 
739/1988; in Sweden, the principle of public access applied to foreigners as well 
as to Swedish citizens. In addition, both the Finnish and Swedish authorities 
maintained registers of all “documents” that they held which were accessible to 
the public. As might be expected, both countries also had legislation that provided 
for some documents (or even parts of documents) to be kept secret.76
In both countries openness was regarded as an integral part of the political 
process, deeply ingrained in their institutions and political cultures. In both 
Finland and Sweden openness was regarded as increasing democratic legitimacy. 
From the Finnish perspective, “Public access to information is seen . . .  as a 
vehicle for improving the credibility of the authorities (the legitimacy function) 
and the community spirit of the people (the integration function)” (Wallin 1999: 
1). The Swedish Commission on Administrative Policy (Forvaltningspolitiska 
kommissionen) argues that the Swedish offentlighetsprincip is “a cornerstone of 
Swedish democracy” and “an important aspect of public administration” 
(Forvaltningspolitiska kommissionen 1997: 127).77
As the reforms instituted by both countries in the 1990s suggest, there was 
concern in both Finland and Sweden about the potential negative effect that EU 
membership could have on their national traditions regarding openness. According 
to von Sydow (1999: 136), “Early on the offentlighetsprincip became one of the 
most visible issues for the No to EU movement in Sweden and the other Nordic 
countries.”78 Among the ten most frequently asked questions that the Finnish 
public asked of the Finland Information on European Integration unit, a temporary 
unit established before Finland joined the EU, was: “Will the public right of 
access remain unchanged?” (Natri 1994: 45). Magnus Ekengren and Bengt
76 For more on Finnish and Swedish legislation on openness, see, for example, AlthofF (1995), 
Bohlin (1996), Manninen (1991), Norstrdm (1995), Oberg (2000), Olsson (1999), and Wallin 
(1999). The discussion of the national provisions on openness has been kept to a minimum here 
because of the political rather than legal nature of this thesis.
77 Translation of: “en hornsten i den svenska demokratin” and “en viktig aspekt pa 
forvaltningspolitiken.”
78 Translation of: “Offentlighetsprincipen blev tidigt en av paradfrdgorna for Nej till EU-rorelsen i 
Sverige och ovriga Norden.”
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Sundelius (1998: 140) assert that “public openness” was among the “areas of 
particular concern” during the debate on EU membership in Sweden.
The Finnish and Swedish legislation on openness between 1995 and 2000 differed 
in many ways from that of the other EU member states as well as the EU itself. 
According to EU Ombudsman Jacob Soderman (a Finn who championed 
openness in the EU), “In Europe, a strong tradition of open government exists in 
the Netherlands and the Nordic countries, while Ireland recently enacted a law on 
freedom of information” (Soderman 2000). Although some other member states, 
notably Denmark and the Netherlands, where openness was also constitutionally 
assured, had similarly stringent legislation safeguarding openness, most EU states 
had considerably weaker provisions (Norstrom 1995: 166).
Despite the existence of openness legislation in other member states, there were 
significant differences not in only terms of legislation but also in terms of mindset 
between most of the other member states and Finland and Sweden. Then Finnish 
Minister for Justice (oikeusministeri) Kari Hakamies explained the differences 
between the Finns and their central European colleagues: “For us public access to 
documents is a legal question, in central Europe it is a political issue. There a civil 
servant can determine that a document is secret, if it is seen to be politically 
appropriate. For us it is for the law to determine what is public, non-public, or 
secret. I do not think that the Union’s culture will change terribly before things are 
clarified in legislation” (Cited in Metsalampi 1997).79 Similarly, Helena 
Jaderblom of the Swedish Ministry of Justice (Justitiedepartementet) argues that 
in Sweden (as in Finland) openness is supported across party lines and is non­
political in nature.80
The degree of openness found in Finland and Sweden, in theory as well as in 
practice, went beyond what could possibly be expected in most of the other EU
79 Translation of: “Meille asiakirjojen julkisuus on juridinen kysymys, Keski-Euroopassa se on 
poliittinen asia. Siella toimielin voi madrata asiakirjojen salaiseksi, jos nakee sen poliittisesti 
tarkoituksenmukaiseksi. Meilla on laissa madratty, mikd on julkista, ei-julkista tai salaista. En 
usko, etta unionin kulttuuri kauheasti muuttuu, ennen kuin asiasta on selkeat saadokset
80 Interview with Helena Jaderblom on 26 August 1999.
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member states.81 According to Ulf Oberg (2000: 195-196), “The British- 
Continental public administration principle means that all information in the 
governmental sector’s possession is secret, as long as it is not explicitly made 
public.” Non-Nordic EU members tended to differ from Finland and Sweden not 
only in terms of their current provisions for access to documents but also in their 
historical traditions and political cultures. In Germany, for instance, despite 
changes towards increased openness in the late twentieth century, the tradition of 
public access to information was completely lacking (Putter 2001).
The differences between the approaches to openness in the Nordic countries and 
in most of the other member states (with the Netherlands being the notable 
exception) meant that the EU was regarded as open by some observers and as less 
so by Nordic ones. Swedish journalist Ewa Hedlund described the situation in the 
EU as “a closed leakage policy” (Cited in EU 96-kommitten 1995: 12).83 
According to Hedlund, “There is leakage from EU institutions to journalists, but 
the leakage is often selective,” meaning that those with a vested interest in leaking 
information could decide to whom (i.e. to which journalists) they wished to give 
their information (Cited in EU 96-kommitten 1995: 12-13).84 The dissemination 
of information in this manner differed from the comprehensive access guaranteed 
in Finland and Sweden. Furthermore, EU officials from certain countries were 
more likely to leak information than were those from other member states. For 
instance, after the European Council meeting in Mallorca in September 1995, only 
three heads of government (those from Finland, Sweden, and Denmark) spoke to 
journalists after the first day’s deliberations (EU 96-kommitten 1995: 12).
Within the EU itself there was, on the whole, less openness, and the openness that 
existed was of a different type than that found in Finland and Sweden. The 
Council of Ministers was particularly lacking in openness from a Finnish and 
Swedish perspective. Unlike the Commission, where openness was largely a
81 Even as a researcher, this openness was observed since both Finnish and Swedish ministries 
provided this researcher with relevant documents, including when she did not know the details or 
even the existence of the documents in question.
82 Translation of: “Derma brittisk-kontinentala jorvaltningsprincip innebdr att alia uppgifter i 
offentlig ago dr hemliga sdvida de inte uttryckligen offentliggjorts
83 Translation of: “en sluten lackagepolitikn
84 Translation of: “Det lacker fran EU-organen till journalister, men lackagen dr ofta selektiva.”
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matter of access to documents, the Council dealt more with negotiations, and 
opening up an ongoing process was more sensitive. In fact, the Finns and Swedes 
noticed this fact. For instance, Christian Leffler of Sweden’s Permanent 
Representation suggested that Sweden should attempt to understand other member 
states’ views on the issue of openness in the Council (EU 96-kommitten 1995: 
12).
The Council had already taken steps in the direction of increased openness even 
before Finland and Sweden joined the EU. Particularly noteworthy was the 1993 
Code of Conduct, based on Council Decision 93/731/EC, which was viewed by 
Finns and Swedes as an important move in the direction of increased openness, 
but not enough. Leffler asserts, “Even if its implementation from the Swedish 
perspective is not good enough it is still an important step” (Cited in EU 96- 
kommitten 1995: 12).85
The EU institution that was the most open was the European Parliament. The 
Parliament held many press conferences and briefings, and committee meetings 
were open to invited guests. According to Hedlund, “It is so open that one 
sometimes becomes confused and unsure what is going on” (Cited in EU 96- 
kommitten 1995: 13).86
Despite the relatively weak provisions for openness in most member states, the 
attempt to increase openness in the EU began before Finland and Sweden joined 
the Union and was initially spearheaded by Denmark and the Netherlands. The 
1993 Code of Conduct, which was mentioned earlier, was an example of the move 
towards increased openness that occurred before Finland and Sweden became EU 
members. These developments were thus begun prior to 1995, but continued and 
were strengthened by Finnish and Swedish accession to the EU. In a similar vein, 
Carsten Gronbech-Jensen (1998: 186) argues that “the 1995 accession of Sweden 
and Finland has reinforced an alternative tradition of public policy-making and
85 Translation of: “Aven om tillampningen enligt svensk syn inte dr tillrackligt bra dr detta dnda ett 
viktigt steg.”
86 Translation of: “Det dr sd oppet att man ibland blir forvirrad och osaker over vad som pdgdr.”
207
administration, based on principles of transparency and openness, which 
challenges traditional Community policy styles.”
Finland and Sweden both mounted strong attempts to increase openness in the 
EU, which began before the two countries formally joined the Union. Finland and 
Sweden (as well as Norway) attached declarations concerning their commitment 
to public access to documents to their EU Accession Treaty. Both the Finnish and 
Swedish declarations included very similar statements in support of positive steps 
already underway in the EU. According to the Swedish declaration, “Sweden 
welcomes the development now taking place in the European Union towards 
greater openness and transparency” (Sweden 1994: 397). The Finnish declaration 
contained a similar statement: “The Republic of Finland welcomes the 
development taking place in the Union toward greater openness and transparency” 
(Finland 1994: 397).
The Finnish and Swedish declarations also contained statements recognising the 
importance of openness to their national traditions. The Swedish declaration 
stated, “Open government and, in particular, public access to official records as 
well as the constitutional protection afforded to those who give information to the 
media are and remain fundamental principles which form part of Sweden’s 
constitutional, political and cultural heritage” (Sweden 1994: 397). According to 
the Finnish declaration, “In Finland, open government, including public access to 
official records, is a principle of fundamental legal and political importance” 
(Finland 1994: 397).
After becoming full EU members, both Finland and Sweden continued their 
efforts to increase openness in the EU. The first major concrete actions towards 
increased openness after Finland and Sweden joined the EU were taken during the 
1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). Teija Tiilikainen (1998b: 36) 
argues that “increasing openness and transparency” was “among the key goals of 
the Nordic EU-members.” Official documents from Finland and Sweden support 
her argument that they both prioritised openness as an important issue during the 
IGC. Already before the IGC, Finland and Sweden included openness as a
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concern in their statements of priorities (The Cabinet Office 1995, Council of 
State 1996).
Both of the main Finnish parliamentary committees dealing with EU affairs, the 
Foreign Affairs Committee (Ulkoasiainvaliokunta) and the Grand Committee 
(Suuri valiokunta), supported the idea of cooperating with Sweden as well as 
Denmark during the IGC on issues of common interest, including “increasing 
transparency” (Foreign Affairs Committee 1996: 21). According to the Finnish 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (1996: 11), “The [Foreign Affairs] 
Committee requires that Finland’s primary objective in the transparency issue 
should be to ensure the access of citizens to information and documents.” 
Furthermore, the Committee argued, “When votes are taken in the Council [of 
Ministers], the votes of the Member States, as well as any explanations of votes or 
other declarations should be made public” (Foreign Affairs Committee 1996: 11). 
The Eduskunta*s Committee for Constitutional Law (Perustuslakivaliokunta) 
(1996: 27) was similarly positive, arguing, “The Committee [for Constitutional 
Law] strongly supports the recognition in the Treaties of the right of access to 
information and thus supports the Government’s proposal to insert into the 
Treaties an article concerning public access to documents” (emphasis in original). 
Furthermore, the Committee for Constitutional Law (1996: 27) was “of the 
opinion that Finland should support making the Council’s decision-making public 
at the stage of approving legislation.”
In Finland and Sweden, governmental officials and MPs spoke about the 
importance of pushing for increased openness at the IGC. The then Swedish 
Minister of Justice (justitieminister), Laila Freivalds, explained at a conference 
(on the topic of public access to information) in Stockholm in 1996 that Sweden 
had suggested that the IGC should consider the issue of public access to official 
information (Freivalds 1996). The then Swedish EU Minister Mats Hellstrom 
(1995: 81) stressed the Swedish desire to increase openness and transparency in 
the EU and Swedish plans to “launch an initiative [at the IGC] to implement at the 
European level the principles of openness and public access that it has long 
practised on a national level.” Finn Eikka Kosonen, head of the Secretariat for EU 
Affairs, spoke at a conference in Athens in April 1996 about Finland’s “long-
209
standing, deep-rooted tradition of openness and transparency” and said that it 
“should not be a surprise if this tradition would be reflected in the Finnish position 
in the union as well” (Kosonen 1996).
An analysis of the Finnish and Swedish proposals to the IGC for an EU-level 
publicity principle demonstrates significant similarities between the two. Both 
countries submitted proposals for a new Article 192a, which was eventually 
included in the Treaty of Amsterdam as Article 255. Both supported increased 
openness in the EU institutions, and both agreed that EU institutions (at a 
minimum the Council of Ministers) would have a role in determining the 
procedures for access to documents (Finland 1996, Sweden 1996).
Despite their success in increasing openness, as demonstrated by the inclusion of 
Article 255 in the Treaty of Amsterdam, there was a cost in the form of a 
declaration that was attached to the Treaty that served as a restraint on openness. 
Finnish MEP Heidi Hautala (herself an active supporter of openness, as discussed 
below) views this declaration, which was pushed through primarily by France, as 
the price that Finland, Sweden, and other supporters of increased openness had to 
pay for Article 255.87
Finns and Swedes were also involved in EU-level court cases relating to access to 
documents. A case relating to openness actually reached the EU level before 
Finland and Sweden joined the EU. The first case to achieve particular attention 
was one brought by the British newspaper The Guardian and its journalist John 
Carvel (case T-194/94). This was followed by additional cases relating to access 
to documents, of which two are of particular interest because of their high profile 
as well as because they were brought by Finnish or Swedish parties. The 
Journalisten case (T-174/95) was brought by the Swedish newspaper of the same 
name, published by the Swedish Union of Journalists. The other case (T-14/98) 
was one brought by Hautala. Although Finland was not active in the first case, in 
the Hautala case, Finns as well as Swedes lodged their formal support for the
87 Interview with Heidi Hautala on 30 June 2001.
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Finnish MEP in June 1998. Thus, the governments of both countries took action in 
at least one of these cases to fight for increased openness within the EU.
Despite many positive developments towards increased openness in the EU, 
potential setbacks came in the late 1990s and 2000. According to Soderman 
(2000), “[T]hings began to go wrong . . .  in 1997, following the Amsterdam 
Treaty.” A particular threat to increasing openness in the EU in line with Nordic 
traditions came with the appointment of NATO’s former Secretary-General Javier 
Solana as the EU’s Secretary-General and High Representative for five years from 
13 September 1999. In fact, Soderman said that Solana’s appointment had been “a 
mistake” (Cited in James 2000).
Especially worrying to the Finns and Swedes was Solana’s proposal for restricting 
access to documents, which was viewed by Finns and Swedes as contradicting 
Article 255 of the Amsterdam Treaty. Although Article 255 was meant to increase 
openness, his proposal would actually have led to increased secrecy in the EU, in 
fact, a norm of secrecy in the area of foreign policy, and was opposed by only four 
member states (Finland and Sweden as well as Denmark and the Netherlands). 
According to Statewatch News Online (2000b), “When the proposal was suddenly 
introduced at the Council’s Working Party on Information (comprised of the press 
officers from the EU’s member states permanent offices in Brussels), it is reported 
that the Swedish and Finnish representatives stormed out of the meeting and a 
spokesperson for the Netherlands said it was a ‘coup by the military.’” Hautala 
argued that Solana’s proposal was “NATO introducing its culture of secrecy by 
the back door” (Statewatch News Online 2000b). The Decision of 14 August 2000 
(10702/00) was a particular setback for the Finns because it amended the “Council 
Decision on the improvement of information on the Council’s legislative activities 
and the public register of documents” of 19 December 1999. As Statewatch News 
Online (2000a) points out, “This Decision was one of the distinctive measures 
adopted under the Finnish Presidency of the EU” (cf. James 2000). At the end of 
2000, this crisis, known as the “Solana Decision” or even the “Solana coup,” and 
the related process of formulating the new procedures on openness provided for in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam were not fully resolved.
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There is therefore strong evidence of similarities between Finnish and Swedish 
policies regarding public access to documents within the EU. Both countries had 
strong traditions of openness that existed long before they joined the EU. Both 
attached declarations concerning their traditions of open government to their 
accession treaties, and both submitted proposals for an Article 192a relating to 
access to documents to be included in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Both were 
otherwise active within the EU to increase openness, including supporting 
Hautala’s court case regarding access to documents.
Two Different Approaches
Although the principle of public access to documents in both Finland and Sweden 
has its roots in the 1766 Freedom o f the Press Act, the paths of Finland and 
Sweden regarding public access to official documents began to diverge when the 
countries themselves went their own separate ways in 1809. Although there were 
changes in both countries during the nineteenth century, the Swedish traditions 
continued with less interruption than was the case in Finland. The Swedish 
legislation was also, until the late twentieth century, even stronger than was the 
case in Finland. For instance, there was no Finnish equivalent to meddelarfrihet, 
which essentially entailed legally sanctioned whistle-blowing (Norstrom 1995). In 
addition, the application of openness legislation to foreigners came later in 
Finland than it did in Sweden.
Furthermore, despite the existence of strong traditions of openness in Finland as 
well as Sweden, Sweden received greater international recognition for its 
openness than did Finland. Even the European Union took notice of Sweden’s 
openness in a comparative survey on public access to information, whereas 
Finland was not mentioned: “Outside the Community, statutes granting access to 
information in the United States, Canada, Norway, and Sweden have been studied. 
In the case of the latter country, a right of access to information has been 
established for over two hundred years” (European Union 1993: 8).
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Although access to documents was a concern for Finns and Swedes when they 
applied for EU membership, there were differences in the way and degree to 
which openness featured in the national debates in the EU. In Sweden, openness 
had a prominent position in the debate, with those supporting Swedish EU 
membership arguing that by joining the EU Swedes would be able to increase 
openness at the EU level and export their own traditions to the EU. Those against 
Swedish EU membership argued that it would constrain and threaten Sweden’s 
cherished traditions of openness. Interestingly, however, Ekengren and Sundelius 
(1998: 141) argue that “the handling of confidential EU documents has not been 
considered problematic by the Swedish civil servants, as was feared before 
membership.”
As discussed previously, Finland and Sweden both attached declarations on 
openness to their EU Accession Treaty. Although the similarities between the two 
declarations were shown in the previous section, there were also differences. 
Significantly, the Swedish declaration contained the following sentence: “Sweden 
confirms its introductory statement of 1 February 1993” (Sweden 1994: 397). The 
statement of 1 February 1993 stressed the importance of openness for Sweden and 
that the Swedish provisions for openness would continue to apply in Sweden even 
after EU membership. It also included a Swedish offer to share Swedish traditions 
with the EU (Norstrom 1995: 91, which cites the Swedish text of the 1993 
statement). In contrast, the Finnish declaration stated, “The Republic of Finland 
will continue to apply the principle in accordance with the rights and obligations 
as a member of the European Union” (Finland 1994: 397).
The EU’s response (or lack thereof) to the two declarations demonstrates the 
differences between the declarations themselves as well as the way in which 
Finland and Sweden were perceived by their future EU colleagues. The EU gave 
the following response to the Swedish declaration: “The present Member States of 
the European Union take note of the unilateral Declaration of Sweden concerning 
openness and transparency. They take it for granted that, as a member of the 
European Union, Sweden will fully comply with Community law in this respect” 
(European Union 1994: 397). Finland, however, received no such response (nor 
did Norway).
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Furthermore, the EU’s response demonstrates the differing views held by Sweden 
and the collective position of the then EU-12 on the issue of openness. It also 
shows the outspokenness and self-confidence of the Swedes. Deirdre Curtin and 
Herman Meijers (1995: 394-395) argue that “the contradictory declarations made 
by Sweden and the European Union Member States annexed to the Accession 
Treaty graphically illustrate” that “the issue of openness and transparency in the 
decision-making process within the European organs concerned, considered 
essential by a large part of its citizens, is a time-bomb slowly ticking away.”
The difference between the Swedish and Finnish (as well as Norwegian) 
approaches is clear. As von Sydow (1999: 140) astutely points out, “Norway and 
Finland had softened their declarations by stating that they would continue to 
enforce their openness rules ‘in accordance with their rights and responsibilities as 
a member of the European Union.’ That was the polite bowing to the court in 
Luxembourg that the twelve wanted to have in order not to feel challenged to
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counterattack.” Bjom Mansson, a journalist for Finland’s main Swedish- 
language daily newspaper Hufvudstadsbladet also saw a difference between the 
Finnish and Swedish approaches in their differing declarations. According to 
Mansson (2000), “While Sweden formulated its declaration so arrogantly that the 
EU felt that it must make a so-called response [literally anti-declaration] that made 
it clear that Sweden could not single-handedly dictate the rules, Finland’s (and 
Norway’s) were formulated so that they did not inspire any negative response.”89 
In a similar vein, Swedish researcher Johan Althoff (1995: 66-67) argues, “The 
[EU’s] response [literally anti-declaration] puts the Swedish declaration in a 
telling light. It cannot reasonably be interpreted in any other way than that the EU 
behaved rather coldly to the official Swedish carelessness.”90
88 Translation of: “Norge och Finland hade mjukat upp sina forklaringar med att de skulle 
fortsatta att tillampa sina offentlighetsprinciper 7 overensstammelse med sina rattigheter och 
skyldigheter som medlem i Europeiska Unionen. ’ Detta var den snygga bugning &t domstolen i 
Luxemburg som de tolv ville ha for att inte karma sig manade att ga till motattack”
89 Translation of: “Medan Sverige formulerade sin deklaration sa frdnt att EU ansag sig tvunget 
att gora en s.k motdeklaration som klargjorde att Sverige inte ensidig kan diktera spelreglerna, 
formulerades Finlands (och Norges) sa att den inte vackte nagon motreaktion
90 Translation of: “Motdeklarationen stdller den svenska deklarationen i avslbjande belysning. Den 
kan inte rimligen tolkas pi5 annat satt an att EUforhaller sig tamligen kallsinnig till den qfficiella 
svenska bekymmersldsheten
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Perhaps less significant but also worthy of note is that, while the Swedish 
declaration made note of the importance of “the constitutional protection afforded 
to those who give information to the media” (known as meddelarfrihet in 
Swedish), the Finnish declaration did not. Meddelarfrihet was also mentioned in 
Sweden’s 1993 statement, which had no Finnish equivalent. This subtle nuance 
demonstrates another example of Swedes pushing the issue even further than their 
Finnish colleagues.
Although, as EU members, both Finland and Sweden saw difficulties with EU 
traditions regarding public access to information, here, too, there were significant 
nuances that set the two countries apart. A difference between the Finnish and 
Swedish perspectives on openness was the way in which they regarded the 
possibility of a trade-off between openness and efficiently. The Swedish view was 
that such a trade-off, regarded by many in other EU countries as a powerful 
argument against increasing openness, was not a necessity. According to 
Hellstrom, the argument that there is such a trade-off is one that “on the surface is 
seductive, but which, according to me, has very little in it. Why should efficiency 
increase and decisions become better the fewer individuals who take part in the 
basis of the decision?” (Cited in EU 96-kommitten 1995: 17, emphasis in 
original).91 Although Finns also realised the importance of the increased 
legitimacy that would follow from openness, their approach to the potential 
danger that increasing openness in the EU would lead to decreased efficiency was 
different from that of the Swedes.
Despite efforts by both Finland and Sweden to increase openness in the EU during 
the 1996-1997 IGC, there were also differences between their approaches here. 
Already before the IGC began there were at least subtle differences between the 
Finnish and Swedish strategies, as reflected, for instance, in their official 
documents. According to the Eduskunta’s Foreign Affairs Committee (1996: 11), 
in a discussion regarding the issue of transparency, “The necessary trust must be 
established among the Member States, in order that the doubts and difficulties in
91 Translation of: “pdytan dr bestickande, men som enligt mig har mycket lite for sig. Varfor skulle 
effektmteten oka och besluten bli battre ju  f&rre individer som tar del av underlaget till beslutet?”
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the way of success can be overcome.” Thus, although the Finns’ goal was to 
increase openness in the EU during the IGC, they also emphasised the importance 
of “trust . . . among the Member States,” suggesting a Finnish desire not to 
alienate their colleagues.
Discussing the behaviour of Finnish and Swedish policy-makers during the IGC, 
von Sydow (1999: 46) argues, “The Finns were constantly worried about being 
side-stepped and that the discussions would be driven outside the current rooms, 
which was one of the reasons why they wanted to hasten slowly with openness. 
Too much openness forces discrete discussions in locked rooms where we 
newcomers do not have entrance, reasoned the government, eagerly cheered by 
Antti Satuli, ambassador and leader of the Finnish delegation in Brussels.”92 Such 
a view is supported by the comments of Kosonen, who in 1996 stressed the 
importance of openness for Finland. He noted that Finns were “not, however, 
blind to possible negative repercussions of procedures, which would not allow 
confidential and open debates in the decision-shaping and making. While 
favouring openness to the largest possible extent we would like to ensure that the 
real debates take place between all member states in the common fora and not in 
smaller groups outside these fora” (Kosonen 1996).
The texts of the Finnish and Swedish suggestions for a new publicity principle for 
the EU also demonstrate differences between the two countries. Although both of 
their proposals for an Article 192a stress the importance of public access to 
documents from the EU institutions, there are differences between them. An 
analysis of versions of the two articles dating from roughly the same time (during 
the second half of 1996) demonstrates the differences. The proposed Finnish 
article reads as follows:
“1. Every citizen of the Union and every natural or legal person residing or having 
its registered office in a Member State, shall have a right of access to documents
92 Translation of: “Finlandarna oroade sig standigt for att bli sidsteppade och for att 
diskussionerna skulle foras utanfor de gdngse rummen, vilken var en av anledningama till att de 
ville skynda l&ngsamt med oppenheten. For mycket oppenhet tvingar from diskreta diskussioner i 
lasta rum dit vi nykomlingar inte har tilltrade resonerade regeringen, ivrigt pahejad av Antti 
Satuli, ambassador och ledare for den finska delegationen i Bryssel
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held by the institutions. The right of access to documents may be restricted only 
on the grounds of essential private or public interests.
2. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 189 
b, shall adopt the necessary regulations on the implementation of the right 
provided for in paragraph 1 and on the general conditions and restrictions relating 
to public access to documents held by the institutions” (Finland 1996).
The proposed Swedish Article 192a reads as follows:
“1. Any natural or legal person shall have a right of access to documents held by 
Community institutions in conformity with the principles and within the limits 
determined by the Council pursuant to Article 192b. The right of access applies to 
internal working documents only if they have been handed out by the institution 
concerned. Implementing measuring shall be determined by each institution under 
its own Rules of Procedure.
2. A document is held by an institution if it is in its possession, irrespective of who 
is the author of the document, provided it concerns a subject matter which falls 
within the competence of the institution” (Sweden 1996).
There are several differences between the Finnish and Swedish proposals. 
Whereas the Swedish article applies to “[a]ny natural or legal person,” the Finnish 
article is restricted to EU citizens as well as natural or legal persons residing in the 
EU, thus excluding those who are neither EU citizens nor residents. Furthermore, 
the second section of the Swedish Article 192a, which states that the all 
documents held by an institution should be included in the legislation regardless 
of its author, has no equivalent in the Finnish article. In addition, Sweden also 
presented an Article 192b, which states that the Council “[i]n accordance with the 
procedure referred to in Article 189b . . . shall decide on . . . procedural rules for 
granting access to documents, limitations of the right of access to documents, 
rules obliging the institutions to register documents and to keep public registers, 
[and] rules obliging the institutions to file documents” (Sweden 1996). According 
to the second paragraph of Sweden’s Article 192b, “The Council shall decide on
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limitations in accordance with the previous paragraph when this is necessary in 
order to satisfy interests that may be considered more important than the public 
right of access to documents” (Sweden 1996). Although in some ways similar to 
the second paragraph of Finland’s Article 192a, the Swedish Article 192b is more 
detailed and discusses the institutions’ obligations regarding openness, which are 
not covered in the Finnish article. Furthermore, the Swedish Article 192c, which 
(like Sweden’s Article 192b) was without a direct Finnish equivalent, sets out 
provisions for the Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, and the 
European Court of Justice to adopt measures that would empower the Court of 
Justice in the area of access to documents (Sweden 1996). Although the 
distinctions between the Finnish and Swedish proposals may seem small, they 
nevertheless demonstrate that the two countries did not fully coordinate their 
actions. Furthermore, these differences suggest that the Swedes pushed for even 
more guarantees of openness than did the Finns.
As with the IGC proposals, the Finnish and Swedish involvement in the 
Journalisten and Hautala court cases demonstrates differences as well as 
similarities. This difference is perhaps most obvious in the Journalisten case, the 
earliest of the two. In that case, the Swedish government gave its support to 
Journalisten, whereas the Finnish government did not. Journalisten, the Swedish 
Union of Journalists’ paper, requested twenty documents relating to Europol (the 
European agency for police cooperation) both from the EU and from Sweden. 
Although in some instances parts of the documents were blacked out, the Swedish 
authorities provided Journalisten with at least partial copies of eighteen of the 
twenty documents.93 The EU’s Council of Ministers, on the other hand, acted in 
accordance with its 1993 Code of Conduct (based on Council Decision 
93/731/EC) and released only two of the twenty documents. Journalisten then 
protested to the General Secretary of the Council and received two additional 
documents. Although Journalisten had already received the majority of the 
requested documents from Sweden, they decided to bring their case to the
93 These documents were, at least as recently as 19 March 2002, listed by Gravande Joumalister 
on their homepage at http://www.imk.su.se/dig/iour-vs-eu/euedoclist.html. See also 
http://www.imk.su.se/dig/iour-vs-eu/euindex.html on the same site for more information and 
documentation relating to the case, which was still available on 19 March 2002.
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European Court of Justice’s Court of First Instance in September 1995.
The fact that information about and documents from the case (including the 
Council of Ministers’ secret Statement of Defence) were made public (on the 
Internet) contributed to the difficulties of this case. Many interested parties, 
including those from outside Sweden, gained access to the documents from 
Journalisten* s own homepage and then (after the documents were removed from 
the Journalisten site) from Gravande Journalistef s website. The Council of 
Ministers, as might be expected, reacted negatively to the publishing of its secret 
Statement of Defence on the Internet. The Council thus sent a letter to the 
European Court of Justice in which it asserted that Journalisten*s participation in 
publishing the Court proceedings on the Internet was in violation of the 
established rules of proceeding. In reaction, the Court, without making a decision 
on the case, called for a cessation of all proceedings in the case until further 
notice.94 Later, despite the Court’s ruling in Journalisten*s favour, the paper was 
only reimbursed for two-thirds of its legal fees because of its inappropriate 
publication of information surrounding the case.
The Swedish government intervened in the case to support Journalisten by 
lodging an application at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 5 February 
1996 on behalf of the Swedish paper. Denmark and the Netherlands also offered 
formal support, but Finland did not. According to Hautala, the Journalisten case 
provided the first opportunity for Finland to intervene in the EU on the question of 
transparency, but Finland decided not to do so. The exact reasons for the Finnish 
decision are not certain; an official from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
(Ulkoasiainministerio) claimed that it was because the decision came during the 
summer holidays, whereas one from Finland’s Permanent Representation argued 
that he feared potential negative repercussions for Finnish openness if 
Journalisten then lost their case.95 Regardless of the stated reasons, it seems 
certain that the decision reflected an initial Finnish cautiousness. The Swedish
94 For an explanation of the Court’s reaction and the withdrawal of documentation from 
Journalisten's homepage see http://www.imk.su.se/dig/iour-vs-eu/euewithdrawfacts.html 
(Accessed as recently as 19 March 2002).
95 Interview with Hautala on 30 June 2001.
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support for Journalisten despite the publication of the secret material on the 
Internet as well as the involvement of the Swedish Ministry of Justice in releasing 
most of the documents requested by Journalisten demonstrates the defiance of the 
Swedes, including even government officials, in contradicting the EU.
The second case was the one brought by Hautala against the Council of Ministers. 
The story of the case can be traced to 14 November 1996, when Hautala asked the 
Council for clarification of the eight criteria for EU arms exports, which the 
European Council had defined in 1991-1992. Hautala was concerned with why 
member states exported weapons to countries that committed human rights 
violations. In its reply to Hautala, the Council referred to a document from 
CO ARM (the Council’s Working Group on Conventional Arms Export). Hautala 
then wrote to the Council on 17 June 1997 to ask for a copy of the document, but 
was denied access on 25 July and 4 November 1997. On 13 January 1998, she 
lodged a formal complaint against the Council.96
The European Court of First Instance considered her case and ruled in July 1999 
that the Council was wrong not at least to research the possibility of releasing 
information to Hautala in part, even if the full document could not be disclosed. 
The Court ruled that the Council should consider the public’s interest in the 
material at the same time that it considered the potential damage its disclosure 
could cause and decide which concern was more pressing. Significantly, when the 
Court issued its ruling, Finland, which was then holding the Presidency of the 
Council, did nothing to prevent the Council from appealing against the Court’s 
ruling and instead allowed itself to be led by the Council’s legal service. Hautala 
regards this as an example of Finnish desire to follow the EU mainstream and 
notes that Swedish diplomats were “very disappointed” because they wanted to 
intervene on Hautala’s behalf but were prevented from doing so by the Finnish 
Presidency.97
Despite the Court’s ruling that the Council did not give sufficient consideration to 
Hautala’s request, the Court did not stipulate that the document (or any part of it)
96 Interview with Hautala on 30 June 2001.
97 Interview with Hautala on 30 June 2001.
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should be released to Hautala. Instead the Court’s ruling put the burden on the 
Council to reconsider Hautala’s request and then decide whether or not it could 
release any part of the document to her; releasing the full document had already 
been ruled out as an option by Council in 1997. Mansson (1999) argues that, 
although she was pleased with the Court’s decision, she was disappointed that the 
Court did not itself consider the document’s contents and decide whether or not 
any of it could be disclosed to her. It should be noted, however, that Hautala had 
already obtained access to the secret document elsewhere and thus the case 
became a matter of principle rather than a genuine desire to gain access to the 
requested information.
Three member states intervened initially in Hautala’s case. In June 1998, France 
sided with the Council of Ministers (although mainly as a passive supporter), 
while Finland and Sweden supported Hautala. Although both Finland and Sweden 
lodged their formal support at approximately the same time, Mansson (1999) 
argues that Sweden was the more active supporter, whereas Finland gave its 
official support only because it felt it was its duty to do so. Furthermore, Finland 
had voted against Hautala in the initial Council decisions, both in the working 
group and in the confirming vote in the Council, whereas Sweden voted in support 
of Hautala on both occasions. Hautala sees then foreign minister 
(ulkoasiainministeri) Taija Halonen’s declaration of support on her behalf as a 
“turning point” in the Finnish position from one of not supporting to supporting 
her.98
Furthermore, whereas the Finnish effort for increased openness was concentrated 
on the EU, the Swedes worked through multiple organisations to achieve their 
goal. Notable examples of Swedish efforts were found in the Council of Europe as 
well as the United Nations (UN). In the Council of Europe, Sweden’s Helena 
Jaderblom chaired the ten-person Expert Group on Access to Official Information. 
The other nine members represented Norway (which took a particularly active 
role), Bulgaria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Turkey, and 
the UK. Although Finland’s Pekka Nurmi also attended meetings, he was there as
98 Interview with Hautala on 30 June 2001.
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an observer representing the CDCJ, the Council of Europe’s European Committee 
on Legal Co-operation." In the UN, too, Sweden attempted to promote openness. 
In January 1997, Sweden joined the UN Security Council for a two-year term. 
According to an article in Swedish daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter on 2 January 
1997, increased openness in the Security Council was a major Swedish goal. 
Moreover, the promise of increased democratisation within the prestigious but 
traditionally secretive Security Council was one of the reasons why Sweden was 
elected (by a wide margin) to its two- year term (Petersson 1997).
Furthermore, there were additional indications of differences in the levels of 
restraint shown by Finnish and Swedish policy-makers. Despite Finland’s desire 
to increase rather than limit openness in the EU, there was also a Finnish view that 
it was important not to be too vocal, whereas Swedes were less inhibited about 
expressing their opinions. An example of this Finnish restraint can be found in the 
reactions to the “Solana Decision” discussed earlier. Both the newspaper 
Helsingin Sanomat and Satuli criticised Soderman for his open criticism of Solana 
(Mansson 2000).100 Satuli argued that Soderman, himself a Finn, “did not keep to 
his role” when he criticised Solana’s appointment (Cited in Mansson 2000).101 
Thus, according to Finland’s EU ambassador, who can be regarded as 
representing the Finnish official position (in contrast to Soderman, whose 
legitimacy came from the EU rather than Finland), it was best not to be too vocal 
in criticising a high-profile representative of the EU. Whereas Finnish officials 
criticised Soderman for speaking openly, Swedes instead argued for the 
importance of debate on the topic of openness in Sweden and the EU. For 
instance, the Swedish Committee on Public Administration (Forvaltningspolitiska 
kommissionen) suggested that “education and debate within public administration 
on the offentlighetsprincip is of the greatest importance” (Forvaltningspolitiska 
kommissionen 1997: 128).102
99 Interview with Helena Jaderblom on 26 August 1999.
100 Interestingly, Finland’s main daily Swedish-language newspaper, Hufvudstadsbladet, was far 
more supportive of Soderman and of efforts to increase openness in the EU in general (cf. 
MSnsson 2000).
101 Translation of: “inte holl sig till sin roll.”
102 Translation of: “utbildning och debatt inom statsforvaltningen om offentlighetsprincipen dr av 
storsta vikt.”
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In addition, although both Finland and Sweden promised to make access to 
documents a priority during their EU Presidencies, there were differences even 
here, including in the expectations that observers held for the upcoming 
Presidencies. Soderman, for instance, doubted the Finns’ commitment to 
openness, arguing, “Everyone thinks that openness will move forward during 
Finland’s Presidency. In the Finnish embassy, however, they spoke only about the 
Northern Dimension, which I do not really know what it is. They have not said 
anything about openness. I asked the ambassador about it. He looked perplexed” 
(Cited in Metsalampi 1999).103
There is thus strong evidence to support the conclusion that there were significant 
nuances that differentiated the Finnish and Swedish policies regarding access to 
documents in the EU. These differences were visible even before the two 
countries became EU members, with the declarations attached to their Accession 
Treaty demonstrating differing levels of concern with antagonising their future 
colleagues. Once inside the EU, their proposals to the 1996-1997 IGC 
demonstrated differences, not only in the actual text of the proposals but also in 
the behaviour of the policy-makers. Furthermore, other differences included the 
degree and nature of their intervention in court cases relating to access to 
documents from EU institutions. Although the Journalisten case demonstrated the 
greatest contrast (because the Swedish government played an active role, whereas 
the Finnish government was not involved), the Hautala case also showed 
differences in the two countries’ approaches.
Analysis and Conclusion
Of the three policy areas examined in this thesis, openness was the one in which 
there were the most obvious similarities between Finland and Sweden up to and 
including their first six years as EU members. Their traditions relating to openness 
had their origin in the same Act dating from 1766, and their legislation regarding
103 Translation of: “Kaikki uskovat, etta avoimuns etenee Suomen puheenjohtajakaudella. Suomen 
lahetystossa he puhuivat kuitenkin vain pohjoisesta ulottuvuudesta, josta en oikein tieda, mita se 
on. Avoimuudesta eivat puhuneet mitadn. Kysyin siita suurldhettiladlta. Han oli hammastyneen 
nakoinen.”
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public access to documents developed along similar lines. Not only were their 
institutions for handling openness similar, but openness had also become an 
integral part of both the Finnish and Swedish political cultures. Despite some 
differences in their legislation and traditions following the separation of Finland 
from Sweden in 1809, the similarities outweighed the differences. Furthermore, 
by 1995 openness had been firmly entrenched in the institutions and political 
cultures of both countries, and the two countries were essentially similar in terms 
of their backgrounds in this policy area.
Access to documents was also the policy area where historical experiences, 
institutions (including legislation), and political culture in Finland and Sweden 
were, despite some similarities with other EU member states (particularly 
Denmark and the Netherlands), most dissimilar to those found in other EU states 
as well as in the EU institutions. Although there had already been progress 
towards increased openness in the EU by the time that Finland and Sweden joined, 
there were still not the same provisions for or culture of openness as was found in 
Finland and Sweden. Openness was therefore a policy area where there was 
considerable room for adaptation on the part of the Finns and Swedes, and in this 
respect Finland and Sweden chose different paths at the same time that both 
worked for increased openness in the EU.
Even when Finland and Sweden were preparing to join the EU, there were 
noticeable differences between their approaches, as is demonstrated by their 
declarations on openness attached to the EU Accession Treaty. Already at this 
point, Finland showed signs of adapting to the EU, whereas the Swedes showed 
defiance. Despite historical, institutional, and cultural similarities between the two 
countries regarding openness, they behaved in significantly different manners. 
True, the two countries’ declarations were very similar in many ways. Yet, the 
difference between them, as is demonstrated by the fact that Sweden’s declaration 
elicited a response (and a cold one at that) from the EU whereas Finland’s did not, 
is a significant one.
The 1996-1997 IGC also demonstrated significant differences between the Finnish 
and Swedish strategies despite the two countries’ common desire to increase
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openness in the EU. The Finns were more concerned about not offending their EU 
colleagues than were the Swedes, both in the run-up to and particularly during the 
1996-1997 IGC. Although Finns did support increased public access to 
documents, representatives of the Finnish government, especially Satuli, were 
more concerned about offending their EU partners. The texts of the proposals 
themselves also differed, with the Swedes pushing for even more guarantees of 
openness and transparency than the Finns did.
Finnish journalists and even representatives of the government were critical of the 
Swedish approach; in a few cases they were even openly critical. According to 
Erkki Metsalampi (1996), “Sweden’s proposal was based on the country’s own 
very extensive legislation on public access to documents, without concern for the 
possibility of its success.104 According to Hakamies, “Here is a little example of 
Sweden, as is typical for them, wanting to show that it is even more advanced than 
Finland. We have even looked at the issue from a pragmatic point of view.” (Cited 
in Metsalampi 1996)105
Observers also identified subtle but nonetheless significant differences in their 
behaviour during the IGC in regard to openness. For instance, von Sydow (1999: 
49) explains the differences between the Finnish and Swedish approaches to 
openness at the 1996-1997 IGC in the following way: “One can possibly interpret 
the Finns’ behaviour as a sober dose of cynicism. They had been involved before 
and negotiated in the deep with a great power while the Swedes behaved a little 
naively. The Finns were driven by harsh pragmatism, while Swedes fought on 
with naive idealism and enthusiasm for reform.”106
The Finnish and Swedish approaches to the Journalisten and Hautala cases also 
demonstrate significant differences in their adaptation to the EU. The Journalisten
104 Translation of: “Ruotsin esitys pohjautui maan erittain pitkdlle menevaan julkisuuslakiin eika 
silla nahty lapimenon mahdollisuuksia
105 Translation of: “Tassa on vahan sita, etta Ruotsi heille tyypilliseen tapaan haluaa osoittaa 
olevansa viela edistyksellisempi kuin Suomi. Me olemme katsoneet asiaa myos pragmaattisesta 
nakokulmasta.”
106 Translation of: “Mdjligen kan man tolka finlandernas agerande som ett nyktert matt av cynism. 
De hade liksom varit med forr och forhandlat i djupet med en stormakt medan svenskarna agerade 
lite blaogt. Finlandarna drevs av barsk pragmatism, medan svenskarna kampade vidare med naiv 
idealism och reformiver”
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case is an example of particular divergence in that the Swedish government was 
intimately involved, whereas Finland did not intervene at all. The Hautala case 
also shows differences; Finland was initially hesitant about intervening and even 
voted against Hautala when the original decisions on releasing the document were 
taken in the Council. Sweden, on the other hand, enthusiastically supported 
Hautala, despite the fact that she was a Finnish rather than Swedish MEP.
The fact that two of the most active individuals in the campaign to increase 
openness in the EU were Finns (Hautala and Soderman) demonstrates the 
important position that openness held within Finnish institutions and political 
culture. Despite their Finnish nationality, however, they were not representatives 
of the Finnish government. Hautala was accountable to the Finnish electorate 
rather than to the government, and Soderman represented all EU nationals. 
Furthermore, those individuals who represented the official Finnish line did, as 
mentioned earlier, at times speak out or vote against these two Finnish individuals. 
Finland voted against Hautala in the Council of Ministers initially and also did not 
prevent the Council from appealing against her during its Presidency. 
Furthermore, Satuli made his displeasure of Soderman’s criticism of Solana 
known.
Although Finland did become more supportive of and active in furthering 
openness in the EU, this behaviour was not necessarily a sign of a change in the 
Finnish strategy. Hautala suggests that the change in Finnish behaviour may be a 
result of other EU countries warming to the concept of increased openness, rather 
than a paradigm shift on the part of the Finnish policy-makers.107 Thus, this policy 
area, like the other two, demonstrates the greater emphasis that the Finns placed 
on feedback from their EU colleagues as well as Finnish policy-makers’ greater 
desire to be a part of the EU mainstream, in comparison with Swedish policy­
makers. Here again, the Finns altered their own positions to fit with the those of 
the EU mainstream more than the Swedes did, thus showing greater Finnish 
adaptation. Furthermore, historical experiences once again provided the impetus 
for differing Finnish and Swedish approaches, and cultural, institutional and
107 Interview with Hautala on 30 June 2001.
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identity differences, themselves shaped by the two countries’ differing histories, 
also shaped their differing policies.
Once again, therefore, there is support for the importance of HICI, factors that are 
not prioritised by Andrew Moravcsik (1998) and Christine Ingebritsen (1998). 
Furthermore, the factors that they emphasise are not able to explain the 
differences between Finnish and Swedish behaviour in the area of access to 
documents. In particular, economic and sectoral interests cannot explain the two 
countries’ differing approaches. Indeed, openness is a policy area that is notable 
for its non-economic and non-political nature, at least in Finland and Sweden. It is 
also a policy area that, like the two previous ones, demonstrates greater Finnish 
desire to adapt to the EU mainstream and greater Swedish reluctance to change 
pre-existing positions.
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SECTION III: WHAT IT ALL MEANS
Chapter Seven: Conclusion: Finnish and Swedish
Adaptation to the European Union?
As new members entering the European Union (EU) at the same time and with 
many similarities in their historical experiences, institutions, cultures, and 
identities (HICI) (as well as other structural features), Finland and Sweden were 
ideal countries for a comparative analysis. The purpose of this study was thus to 
examine whether or not the two countries adapted to membership in the EU in the 
same way or to the same extent and why. Based on a most similar systems 
research design, the differences between their adaptation should be found in the 
differences between these two countries, which were, on the whole, very similar.
The preceding chapters have demonstrated both similarities and differences 
between the countries themselves as well as between the formulation of Finnish 
and Swedish national EU policies and the degree and manner of their adaptation 
to the EU during their first six years of membership. Although both countries (i.e. 
the policy-makers formulating national EU policies on their behalf) “adapted” (in 
the sense of altering their pre-existing policies or positions) in some respects, 
there were also significant nuances that differentiated the degree and manner of 
their adaptation. The evidence presented in this thesis supports an argument for 
the importance of HICI. At the same time, a challenge is presented to existing 
theoretical frameworks, particularly those that prioritise economic interests and 
sectors and give little role to the four factors that have been emphasised here. The 
thesis thus, although primarily an empirical work, also makes a theoretical 
contribution, adding to the theoretical debate on European integration as well as to 
the fields of International Relations (IR), Comparative Politics (CP), and 
European Union Studies. It fills a void on studies addressing adaptation to the EU 
at the national level, as identified by Tapio Raunio and Matti Wiberg (2001), as 
well as a gap in the literature on the Nordic states and European integration, noted 
by Iver Neumann (2001).
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Two Similar Countries
Throughout the thesis, the appropriateness of using Finland and Sweden for a 
most similar systems research design has been developed. Chapters three through 
six were organised around this approach, with chapter three providing the 
necessary background information for the following chapters at the same time that 
it highlighted both similarities and differences between the two countries. The 
focus in chapter three was on Finland and Sweden’s historical experiences as well 
as their institutions, political cultures, and identities. This included an examination 
of their common history when they were united in the Swedish kingdom from 
medieval times until 1809. Chapters four through six also demonstrated 
significant similarities between the Finnish and Swedish approaches in three 
diverse policy areas, further strengthening the suitability of a most similar systems 
approach.
Finland and Sweden were identified as having much in common. Their joint 
history prior to 1809 was complemented by similar institutions, including both 
formal political and judicial institutions and informal institutions. The similarities 
included aspects of the political decision-making processes in the two countries as 
well as common elements in their cultures (political and otherwise), with both 
sharing many Nordic traditions. Even their identities had much in common, with 
both Finland and Sweden having, for instance, a Nordic identity. Social 
democracy became an important force in both countries, and both developed 
welfare states based on the Nordic model. They were both predominantly 
Lutheran countries, and both had a historical tradition of a Lutheran state church. 
The Finnish and Swedish economies also shared similar structures, with many of 
the same industries playing an important role in both economies and developing 
along similar lines. For instance, the timber industry was vital to both countries 
already during the nineteenth century, while the telecommunications industry 
grew exponentially in both Finland and Sweden during the twentieth century. A 
further crucial similarity between Finland and Sweden was that both entered the 
European Union at the same time on 1 January 1995.
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Chapter four, which analysed the topic of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
demonstrated the similarities of the two countries, even in a policy area that would 
seem to highlight their differences. The economic similarities between Finland 
and Sweden were discussed, and the interdependence between the Finnish and 
Swedish economies was highlighted. An analysis of the two governments’ 
approaches towards EMU also revealed similarities, with both commissioning 
expert reports (the Pekkarinen report in Finland and the Calmfors report in 
Sweden) that were prepared in similar ways and considered similar issues. In 
addition, both Finnish and Swedish policy-makers had to deal with publics that 
were not enthusiastic about national participation in EMU’s third stage, especially 
in comparison with the EU average.
Further similarities were shown in chapter five, which covered Finnish and 
Swedish policies relating to relations with non-EU Northern European neighbours. 
The importance that both countries attached to regional cooperation, particularly 
since the end of the Cold War, was discussed, as was the acceptance by both 
Finland and Sweden of EU involvement in that cooperation. Particular attention 
was given to further EU enlargement, especially to the three Baltic states (Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania), which was supported by both Finnish and Swedish policy­
makers and also enjoyed public support in both countries. Both also gave their 
support to the Northern Dimension Initiative (NDI) and included it in their plans 
for their EU Presidencies.
Particularly strong similarities between Finland and Sweden were revealed in 
chapter six, which concentrated on public access to documents. The extensive 
similarities between Finnish and Swedish traditions guaranteeing openness were 
demonstrated. Particular similarities were identified in their legislation and 
political cultures regarding openness. Policy-makers in both countries felt so 
strongly about their traditions that they attached declarations to their Accession 
Treaty that confirmed their importance. Furthermore, this was an area in which 
Finnish and Swedish policy-makers were especially active at the EU level, with 
both introducing proposals on the subject at the 1996-1997 Intergovernmental
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Conference (IGC). Both also supported Finnish MEP Heidi Hautala’s EU-level 
court case on access to documents.
Therefore, throughout the thesis, and primarily in chapters three through six, the 
similarities between the two countries were reconfirmed. Because there were 
significant similarities between them (certainly at least as great as that between 
any other two EU member states), their appropriateness for a most similar systems 
research design was confirmed.
Two Different Countries
As well as highlighting the similarities between Finland and Sweden, chapters 
three through six also included an analysis of the differences between the two 
countries. With a most similar systems research design, it is necessary to highlight 
not only the similarities but also the differences. Indeed, these differences between 
the two countries became the potential factors to explain differences between their 
adaptation to the EU.
Chapter three examined many of the differences between Finland and Sweden, 
some of which were regarded as being more likely to be important explanatory 
factors than others. The separation of Finland from Sweden in 1809 and its 
subsequent inclusion in the Russian empire were regarded as important steps in 
distinguishing Finland from Sweden. Differing historical experiences in the two 
countries between 1809 and 2000 were regarded as likely to have an impact of the 
formulation of national EU policies between 1995 and 2000.
Culture and identity, in turn shaped by both historical experiences and institutions 
(with institutions themselves formed by history), were observed to be important 
variables explaining the differences between the Finnish and Swedish approaches. 
Among the factors that impacted on their differing identities was Finland’s far 
shorter period of independence in comparison with that of Sweden as well as 
Finland’s involvement in bitter wars during the twentieth century when Sweden 
was able to remain neutral. Because of the differences in their historical
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experiences, Sweden was viewed as more clearly belonging to Western Europe 
than Finland was. This meant that EU membership and integration had different 
consequences for Finnish identity than for Swedish identity. Sweden’s greater 
international reputation from its time as a great power in the seventeenth century 
as well as the high profile of its welfare model in the twentieth century provided 
Swedes with a greater collective self-esteem than the Finns had. Whereas the 
Swedes had greater self-confidence and even a sense of superiority, the Finns had 
lower self-confidence and felt greater vulnerability. This difference in self- 
confidence (or self-esteem) can be traced back to differences in their historical 
experiences. In terms of explaining their EU policies, differences in identities 
were important. There were indications that, whereas Finnish identity pushed 
Finland towards greater adaptation to the EU and thus enhancing Finland’s 
European identity, Swedish identity was an incentive for Swedes to maintain pre­
existing policies rather than conforming to the EU mainstream and thereby 
weakening Swedish identity.
The cultural differences between Finland and Sweden had their roots in the 
historical differences, which then became institutionalised and ingrained in their 
political cultures. Among the differences in their political cultures, their differing 
decision-making styles were highlighted. The Finnish decision-making style 
developed through dealings with the Russian empire, the Soviet Union, and then 
the Russian Federation. Although its beginning may be traced at least to the time 
when Finland was a Grand Duchy within the Russian empire (between 1809 and 
1917), it developed primarily after Finnish independence. As a result of Finland’s 
historical experiences, Finns took decisions more hierarchically, with the leaders 
making decisions accepted by most if not all political parties and the public 
(despite their disagreement at times). Swedish decision-makers, on the other hand, 
were more divided among and even within political parties. Furthermore, as 
discussed in chapter four, Stefan Hojelid (1999) sees the Swedish concern for 
democratic debate and public support as having its roots in the history of the 
Swedish Social Democratic Party (Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet, SAP).
Chapters four through six demonstrated how differences in HICI led to differences 
in policy formulation in three distinct areas. The fourth chapter, concentrating on
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EMU, provided a particularly good example of the impact of differences in their 
political cultures. Despite low public support for adopting the Euro in the first 
wave in both countries, Finland decided to participate in EMU’s third stage 
without a referendum, whereas Sweden chose not to join in the first wave. As has 
been noted, the differences in these decisions had their roots in the countries’ 
differing historical experiences, institutions, and cultures. Identity also played a 
role here, motivating Finns to adopt the Euro and Swedes not to do so.
In chapter five, which covered Finnish and Swedish approaches to relations with 
non-EU Northern European neighbours, there were also differences between the 
two countries. Notably, although both countries supported EU enlargement to the 
three Baltic states, Finland changed its position to agree with that of the European 
Commission to fast-track Estonia but not Latvia and Lithuania, while Sweden 
retained its original position that all three should be fast-tracked. Furthermore, the 
Finns (initially alone) developed the EU’s NDI (which gave the EU a prominent 
position in regional cooperation). The Swedes, however, particularly in the 
beginning, preferred to concentrate on regional groupings, such as the Council of 
the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), and did not feel the need for the NDI umbrella.
Further differences were revealed in the sixth chapter, which concentrated on 
public access to documents. Even the declarations attached to their Accession 
Treaty showed differences, with the Finns being more conscious of how their 
declaration would be perceived than the Swedes. Their 1996-1997 IGC proposals 
also showed significant nuances, as did the behaviour of their negotiators. Further 
differences were observed in their participation in legal cases relating to access to 
documents at the EU level. The Finns did not become involved in the Journalisten 
case in which the Swedish government took an active role. Although Finland did 
eventually support Hautala, Finland initially voted against her in the Council of 
Ministers, whereas Sweden did not and was more eager to intervene.
The three case studies thus demonstrated significant differences between the 
Finnish and Swedish approaches to the EU and also shed light on the role that 
HICI played. Although the differences were at times only nuances, they were 
significant nuances that were observed across policy areas. The Finns adapted
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more frequently, in terms of changing their initial position in order to fall in line 
with the EU mainstream, whereas the Swedes were more firm about keeping their 
positions and were more vocal and self-confident in terms of criticising their EU 
colleagues.
Empirical Conclusions about Finnish and Swedish 
Adaptation
As has just been discussed, there was evidence of both similarities and differences 
in the formulation of Finnish and Swedish EU policies between 1995 and 2000. 
The empirical case studies suggested that historical experiences impacted on 
future policy formulation. According to Lee Miles (2000a: 236), “The success of 
Swedish governments in influencing the EU’s agenda is also affected by the high 
degree of ‘Euro-scepticism’ prevalent in Swedish society. This largely explains, 
for example, the tentative ‘wait and see’ policy of the Persson government 
towards Swedish membership of the ‘Euro’ between 1995 and [19J99 . . .  and why 
issues like the degree of transparency and openness of decision-making are 
highlighted by the Swedish government.” Yet, it is not so much the existence of 
such Euro-scepticism that is particularly interesting; rather, it is the willingness 
and determination of the Swedish policy-makers to listen to and be led by the 
sentiments of the Swedish public. Although there was also Euro-scepticism in 
Finland, the Finnish policy-makers were not influenced by it to the same extent as 
their Swedish colleagues.
Differences in their policy formulation were also evident in terms of the degree of 
outspokenness which they demonstrated when they were formulating their 
policies at home and sharing them with their EU colleagues. According to Hanna 
Ojanen (2000: 4), despite the “distant position” that Swedes adopted towards the 
EU, Sweden was “more outspoken, expressing its views with greater emphasis 
than Finland, and taking a stand on more issues than Finland would do.” This 
difference was particularly evident in the area of openness. The Swedes were, 
indeed, neither afraid to open their mouths nor reluctant to stand their ground, 
even when the majority of their EU colleagues stood on the opposing side.
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Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson’s criticism of the UK government and 
then Prime Minister John Major at the same time that he raised serious questions 
about the Euro at the 1996 Florence European Council (as discussed in chapter 
four) was also an example of this Swedish self-confidence. The Swedish 
commitment to beginning enlargement negotiations with Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania at the same time even when it became clear that the Commission and 
the majority of the member states did not support this approach (as discussed in 
chapter five) was another instance. In addition, the refusal of the Swedes to 
include a qualifier in their declaration on transparency (that was attached to their 
EU Accession Treaty) was an indication that Swedes planned to follow their own 
traditions when they conflicted with those of the EU.
In particular, the Finns were willing to compromise at times when the Swedes 
were not. For instance, the Finns changed their position on enlargement to agree 
with the Commission’s Agenda 2000 document, whereas the Swedes did not. The 
Finns remained silent or muted when Swedes were more vocal (e.g. pushing for 
an extension of the Swedish principle of public access to documents to the rest of 
the EU and arguing that the Swedish system would be maintained at all costs).
According to David Arter (2000: 691), “More than neighbouring Sweden, the 
Finns assimilated the political culture of the EU, accommodated to the timetable 
of economic integration (it is the only Nordic member of EMU), learnt the art of 
negotiation and sought to situate itself at the centre of the decision-making 
process.” Ann-Cathrine Jungar (2000: 261) argues that “of the newcomers to the 
European Union Finland has been the most active in trying to gain a position in 
the EU by deliberate and fast adaptation” (emphasis added).
Related to this Finnish desire to assimilate or adapt is the Finnish tendency to 
adopt a common position on EU-related issues. This could be seen, for instance, in 
the area of EMU, where, despite initial disagreement between the political parties, 
all the major Finnish political parties eventually accepted the government’s 
decision. In fact, the vice-chairperson of the Finnish Centre Party (Suomen 
Keskusta, KESK), Sirkka-Liisa Anttila argued on 3 March 1995, “As members of 
the EU a strong opposition is no longer an end in itself. The most important thing
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for the country is that there is unity about things, which then can be defended 
together in the EU” (Cited in Jungar 2000: 290). This statement supports the 
evidence from the case studies presented in earlier chapters that the Finns placed 
tremendous emphasis on creating unified positions within the EU and minimising 
differences. As nearly all the major parties were also in the governmental rainbow 
coalitions that were a feature of Finnish politics between 1995 and 2000, this 
agreement was further strengthened, and one might even argue that the EU made 
such cooperation seem easier and more necessary. Due to the high levels of 
cooperation between the parties, it seems that the actual results of the national 
elections may not have had a great impact on Finnish EU policies had they gone 
in a different direction. Despite that, the inclusion of parties in the government 
certainly increased their positive approaches to the European Union, which might 
have been more negative had they been in opposition. Jungar (2000: 293) argues, 
“Consensual models of decision-making revived again with the five-party 
government.”
There were also differences in the impact that EU membership had on the national 
political parties. Whereas the formulation of EU policies brought Finnish parties 
together, it divided the Swedish parties. Of the policy areas analysed in this thesis, 
EMU provides the clearest example of this, as the other two areas were less 
politically divisive in both countries. Although Jungar (2000: 307) characterises 
EMU as a “highly sensitive and divisive” issue, and there were differences 
between and even within the Finnish parties on this issue (as was the case to an 
even greater extent in Sweden), many Finnish parties compromised on EMU. In 
Finland, the final decision was not challenged, not even by the individuals or 
parties that had been opposed to or hesitant about Finnish EMU participation.
Despite the evidence of what may appear to be greater Finnish than Swedish 
adaptation to the EU, the Swedes clearly did adapt at times, when it suited their 
needs. For instance, as discussed in chapter three, the Swedes made changes in 
their own institutional structures on the basis of their experiences inside the EU. 
Already within the first year of membership, the Swedes made adaptations within 
their Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet), elevating the 
importance of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) coordination unit,
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which had initially been small (Ekengren and Snndelius 1998: 138). Swedes even 
made adaptations relating to EMU, including giving the Riksbank more 
independence in order to make EMU entry easier if Sweden chose to adopt the 
Euro.
Methodological and Theoretical Findings
The results here present a challenge to existing theoretical frameworks, including 
that of Andrew Moravcsik (1998). It should be noted that there have been no 
indications that the findings of Moravcsik’s (1998) study are not valid (and no 
attempt has been made to replicate his study or challenge the findings for the cases 
he analyses). There are, however, indications that his results cannot be generalised 
to explain the cases examined in this thesis.
The results of this project also challenge the theoretical framework of Christine 
Ingebritsen (1998). First, her approach is not capable of explaining differences 
between Finland and Sweden, an assertion that is confirmed by Ingebritsen’s 
(1998) own research, which highlights the similarities between these two 
countries without identifying any significant differences. Although sectoral 
interests did play a role in national EU policy-formulation in the Nordic countries, 
they were not the primary explanatory factors and, as argued above, were 
particularly unable to explain differences between Finland and Sweden. In almost 
every case, the same sectors were likely to gain in Finland as in Sweden. 
Similarly, sectors that were likely to lose in one country were likely to do the 
same in the other. Furthermore, her approach is not compatible with a framework 
that concentrates on the concept of adaptation, as Neumann (2001) points out. 
Indeed, in a debate with Tiilikainen (2001) and Neumann (2001), Ingebritsen 
(2001) argues against their suggestions of the importance of culture and history, 
again highlighting instead the importance of sectoral interests as in her earlier 
(1998) work.
Although the EMU case study did demonstrate the relevance and importance of 
political parties, the findings of this thesis also challenge a focus on party politics
237
as the primary explanatory factor of adaptation to the EU. With EMU, one might 
be able to argue that Sweden would have been more likely to adopt the Euro in 
1999 had Carl Bildt and his Conservative Party (Moderata Samlingspartiet, M) 
remained in power. Similarly, one might argue that Finland would have been less 
likely to participate then if the Centre Party had not been in the government 
between 1991 and 1995. Yet, even with EMU there were other factors at play, and 
these impacted upon the choices made by the political parties. With the other two 
policy areas, however, political parties played an even less significant role, as 
parties in both countries were united in their support for regional cooperation and 
EU enlargement as well as public access to documents. No party openly opposed 
these issues, and they did not feature prominently in election campaigns.
The rigorous methodology employed in this study strengthens the validity of the 
findings, and the empirical results found here also shed light on theoretical 
approaches to “adaptation.” In terms of overall adaptation, Finland behaved more 
according to Mouritzen’s (1993) mode of balanced adaptation than did Sweden. 
As explained in chapter two, following Mouritzen’s (1993) arguments, an EU 
member should follow a balanced model, whereas one waiting to join should 
adopt an acquiescent model, which, he argues, was found in both Finland and 
Sweden prior to their joining the EU.
One could perhaps argue, however, that Finnish policy-makers viewed the EU 
core as a group that they wished to join and therefore tended more towards an 
acquiescent approach. The Swedes, on the other hand, did not feel the same need 
to join this inner EU core and therefore did not follow an acquiescent approach. 
Nevertheless, this categorisation is in comparative terms and does not mean that 
Finland’s adaptation was fully acquiescent, as there were also many elements of a 
balanced mode of adaptation within the Finnish approach.
Both Finland and Sweden’s behaviour was most similar to a balanced model of 
adaptation. One might argue, however, that Finland tended more towards an 
acquiescent model, whereas Sweden tended more towards a dominant model 
(despite the fact that Swedes were not necessarily sufficiently influential to follow 
such a strategy). Yet, none of the modes suggested by the adaptation theorists
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examined in chapter two is able to characterise fully the Finnish or Swedish 
behaviours. The modes identified by these theorists therefore do not provide the 
necessary nuances to explain the differences between Finnish and Swedish 
methods of adaptation to the EU.
The features found in the three policy areas analysed in this thesis were also 
present in many other areas. For instance, as is discussed in chapter three, Finland 
lowered its environmental standards to meet EU levels, whereas Sweden refused 
to do so (Molin and Wurzel 2000: 173). Swedes adopted “more radical policies” 
regarding the CAP than other member states did, although the frequency with 
which they did so declined with time (Rabinowicz 2000: 197). Even though 
Swedish policies in the areas of asylum, immigration, and policing were more 
mainstream (Andersson 2000), Swedes did not adopt mainstream policies simply 
because they were mainstream; rather, Swedes selected the policy approach that 
they wanted. Whereas Finns at times compromised their existing positions, 
Swedes did so less often. Swedes were also more vocal about their priorities, both 
when they coincided with those of the EU and when they did not.
Furthermore, an examination of both those policy areas considered in detail in this 
thesis and others suggested that Swedes were less radical towards the end of the 
period under consideration than they were during the early years of their 
membership. In terms of EMU, Swedes, both the policy-makers and the public, 
were warming to the possibility of potential participation in EMU’s third stage. In 
the area of agricultural policy, Rabinowicz (2000), as previously noted, finds 
indications that Swedes became less radical with time. Yet, despite these moves, 
differences between Finland and Sweden remained throughout the time period 
analysed here.
Finland and Sweden thus both adapted to the EU during the time period between 1 
January 1995 and 31 December 2000, albeit with significant differences in the 
method and extent of their adaptation. The EU also adapted to Finland and 
Sweden, although that adaptation has not been the subject of this study and would, 
indeed, require a full analysis of its own. Yet, the two types of adaptation (that of 
the member state to the Union and of the Union to the member state) are not
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independent of each other. Indeed, signals that are sent out by one actor may 
influence the next step of the other actor. This was particularly evident in the case 
of Finland, which, for instance, altered its stance on beginning accession 
negotiations with all three Baltic states at the same time once it became clear that 
the European Commission supported the inclusion of only Estonia initially. In the 
area of openness, Finland and Sweden were not only affected by the EU’s 
traditions regarding public access to information but also actively tried to 
influence the EU, with the Amsterdam Treaty’s Article 255 being a result of their 
efforts (as well as those of other member states).
It is not necessary or even desirable to make a value judgement here about which 
country adopted the “best” approach to the EU between 1995 and 2000. One could 
argue that each country chose the strategy that was best suited to its own historical 
background, institutions, culture, and identity. For Finland, the Swedish approach 
might have been inappropriate, and likewise the Finnish approach for Sweden. 
Such an argument can be supported by the fact that both the Lipponen and Persson 
governments were re-elected during the six years in question, suggesting that the 
Finnish and Swedish publics cannot have been terribly dissatisfied with their 
leaders’ choices. Historical experiences meant that the Finnish public was more 
accepting of its elected leaders’ decisions, even when, as in the case of EMU, that 
meant taking the country into something for which there was relatively weak 
public support (compared with the EU as a whole) and without a referendum. 
Swedish voters, on the other hand, might not have tolerated such decisions by 
their policy-makers. Yet, even these differences between the expectations of the 
voting publics have their roots in HICI, and thus electoral politics alone cannot 
explain differences in Finnish and Swedish adaptation to the EU.
It should be noted that there may be cases that might appear to undermine these 
findings. For instance, the Finnish government or its representatives may have 
openly criticised the EU or its policies during the time period between 1995 and 
2000. Such actions would not invalidate the arguments presented in this thesis. 
The central argument here is that Finnish policy-makers prioritised adaptation to 
the EU between 1995 and 2000 more than their Swedish colleagues did. In other 
words, Finns were more concerned about the possibility of offending their EU
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colleagues and were more likely to alter their own pre-existing positions or phrase 
them very carefully. Finns did not, however, follow a truly acquiescent pattern of 
behaviour; they did put forth their views and go against the EU mainstream in, for 
instance, finally supporting Hautala in her quest for increased access to official 
EU documents. Yet, they waited longer than Swedes in acting and calculated their 
moves so as to offend as little as possible. They went out on a limb to some extent 
in developing and promoting their initiative on the EU’s Northern Dimension, but 
they also tailored their initiative to the EU’s needs and pragmatically marketed the 
initiative to their colleagues. This Finnish strategy resulted in the NDI eventually 
being taken on board by the EU as an EU initiative.
In Conclusion
The results of this study thus suggest that both Finland and Sweden adapted to 
membership in the European Union by altering the formulation of their national 
EU policies during their first six years of membership (between 1995 and 2000). 
The nature and extent of that adaptation, however, differed. The Finns were more 
likely to alter their original position to fit in with the mainstream EU position, 
whereas the Swedes were more likely to hold firm with their original position. 
Furthermore, the Swedish policy-makers were more likely to be vocal about their 
positions (even when they contradicted those of the EU mainstream). The Finnish 
policy-makers, on the other hand, were quieter about their differences with the EU 
and even attempted at times to restrain compatriots who criticised EU 
representatives (as was the case with Satuli’s criticism of Soderman’s 
outspokenness regarding Solana).
There were also indications that these differences were the result (at least in part) 
of differences in historical experiences as well as institutions, culture, and identity. 
Similarities in their economic interests suggested that these could not explain the 
differences in Finnish and Swedish policy formulation. On the other hand, there 
were indications that HICI were helpful in explaining differences, thus 
challenging theoretical explanations, such as those put forth by Ingebritsen (1998) 
and Moravcsik (1998) that leave little or no room for such factors. This research
241
thus makes a contribution to the theoretical literature on policy formulation and 
particularly on national adaptation to European integration as well as to the 
literature on Finnish and Swedish membership in the European Union.
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Appendix
Finnish Prime Ministers 1917-2000
Prime Minister Date Assumed Office Party
Oskari Tokoi 26.3.1917 SDP
P. E. Svinhufvud 27.11.1917 NUORS
J. K. Paasikivi 27.5.1918 SUOMAL
Lauri Ingman 27.11.1918 KOK
Kaarlo Castren 18.4.1919 KE
J. H. Vennola 15.8.1919 KE
Rafael Erich 15.3.1920 KOK
J. H. Vennola 9.4.1921 KE
A. K. Cajander 2.6.1922 Expert Minister (Virkamieshallitus)
Kyosti Kallio 14.11.1922 ML
A. K. Cajander 18.1.1924 Expert Minister
Lauri Ingman 31.5.1924 KOK
Antti Tulenheimo 31.3.1925 KOK
Kyosti Kallio 31.12.1925 ML
Vaind Tanner 13.12.1926 SDP
J. E. Sunila 17.12.1927 ML
Oskari Mantere 22.12.1928 KE
Kyosti Kallio 16.8.1929 ML
P. E. Svinhufvud 4.7.1930 KOK
J. E. Sunila 21.3.1931 ML
T. M. Kivimaki 15.12.1932 KE
Kyosti Kallio 7.10.1936 ML
A. K. Cajander 12.3.1937 KE
Risto Ryti 1.12.39 KE
Risto Ryti 27.3.1940 KE
J. W. Rangell 3.1.1941 KE
Edwin Linkomies 5.3.1943 KOK
Antti Hackzell 8.8.1944 KOK
Urho Castren 21.9.1944 Expert Minister
J. K. Paasikivi 17.11.1944 Expert Minister
J. K. Paasikivi 17.4.1945 Expert Minister
Mauno Pekkala 26.3.1946 SKDL
K.-A. Fagerholm 29.7.1948 SDP
Urho Kekkonen 17.3.1950 ML
Urho Kekkonen 17.1.1951 ML
Urho Kekkonen 20.9.1951 ML
Urho Kekkonen 9.7.1953 ML
Sakari Tuomioja 17.11.1953 Expert Minister
Ralf Tomgren 5.5.1954 SFP
Urho Kekkonen 20.10.1954 ML
K.-A. Fagerholm 3.3.1956 SDP
V. J. Sukselainen 27.5.1957 ML
V. J. Sukselainen 2.7.1957 ML
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V. J. Sukselainen 2.9.1957 ML
Rainer von Fieandt 29.11.1957 Expert Minister
Reino Kuuskoski 26.4.1958 Expert Minister
K.-A. Fagerholm 29.8.1958 SDP
V. J. Sukselainen 13.1.1959 ML
Martti Miettunen 14.7.1961 ML
Ahti Kaijalainen 13.4.1962 ML
Reino Lehto 18.12.1963 Expert Minister
Johannes Virolainen 12.9.1964 KESK
Rafael Paasio 27.5.1966 SDP
Mauno Koivisto 22.3.1968 SDP
Teuvo Aura 14.5.1970 Expert Minister
Ahti Kaijalainen 14.7.1970 KESK
Ahti Kaijalainen 26.3.1971 KESK
Teuvo Aura 29.10.1971 Expert Minister
Rafael Paasio 23.2.1972 SDP
Kalevi Sorsa 4.9.1972 SDP
Keijo Liinamaa 13.6.1975 Expert Minister
Martti Miettunen 30.11.1975 KESK
Martti Miettunen 29.9.1976 KESK
Kalevi Sorsa 15.5.1977 SDP
Mauno Koivisto 26.5.1979 SDP
Kalevi Sorsa 19.2.1982 SDP
Kalevi Sorsa 6.5.1983 SDP
Harri Holkeri 30.4.1987 KOK
Esko Aho 26.4.1991 KESK
Paavo Lipponen 13.4.1995 SDP
Paavo Lipponen 15.4.1999 SDP
Finnish Presidents 1919-2000
President Years in Office Party
K. J. Stahlberg 1919-1925 KE
Lauri Kristian Relander 1925-1931 ML
P. E. Svinhufvud 1931-1937 KOK
Kyosti Kallio 1937-1940 ML
Risto Ryti 1940-1943 KE
Risto Ryti 1943-1944 KE
Gustaf Mannerheim 1944-1946 Military
J. K. Paasikivi 1946-1956 KOK
Urho Kekkonen 1956-1981 ML/KESK
Mauno Koivisto 1982-1994 SDP
Martti Ahtisaari 1994-2000 SDP
Taija Halonen 2000- SDP
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Swedish Prime Ministers 1905-2000
Prime Minister Date Assumed 
Office
Party
Christian Lundeberg 2.8.1905 AVF
Karl Staaff 7.11.1905 LSP
Arvid Lindman 29.5.1906 AVF
Karl Staaff 7.10.1911 LSP
Hjalmar Hammarskjold 17.2.1914 (Conservative)
Carl Swartz 30.3.1917 AVF
Nils Eden 19.10.1917 LSP
Hjalmar B ranting 10.3.1920 SAP
Louis De Geer 27.10.1920 Independent (Liberal)
Oscar von Sydow 23.2.1921 Independent
Hjalmar B ranting 13.10.1921 SAP
Ernst Trygger 19.4.1923 HP
Hjalmar B ranting 18.10.1924 SAP
Rickard Sandler 24.1.1925 SAP
Carl Gustav Ekman 7.6.1926 FF
Arvid Lindman 2.10.1928 HP
Carl Gustav Ekman 7.6.1930 FF
Felix Hamrin 6.8.1932 FF
Per Albin Hansson 24.9.1932 SAP
Axel Pehrsson-Bramstorp 19.6.1936 BF
Per Albin Hansson 28.9.1936 SAP.
Per Albin Hansson 13.12.1939 SAP
Per Albin Hansson 31.7.1945 SAP
Tage Erlander 11.10.1946 SAP
Tage Erlander 1.10.1951 SAP
Tage Erlander 31.10.1957 SAP
Olof Palme 14.10.1969 SAP
Thorbjom Falldin 8.10.1976 C
Ola Ullsten 18.10.1978 FP
Thorbjom Falldin 12.10.1979 C
Thorbjom Falldin 19.5.1981 C
Olof Palme 8.10.1982 SAP
Ingvar Carlsson 12.3.1986 SAP
Carl Bildt 3.10.1991 M
Ingvar Carlsson 7.10.1994 SAP
Goran Persson 21.3.1996 SAP
Goran Persson 7.10.1998 SAP
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Public domain map from The Historical Atlas by William R. Shepherd, 1923.
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/shepherd/sweden 1658.jpg Accessed on 18 February 2002.
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